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ARTICLE III, EQUITY, AND JUDGE-MADE 
LAW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
KRISTIN A. COLLINS† 
ABSTRACT 
  This Article examines the history of judge-made law in the federal 
courts through the lens of the early-nineteenth-century federal courts’ 
equity powers. In a series of equity cases, and in the Federal Equity 
Rules promulgated by the Court in 1822 and 1842, the Supreme Court 
vehemently insisted that lower federal courts employ a uniform 
corpus of nonstate equity principles with respect to procedure, 
remedies, and—in certain instances—primary rights and liabilities. 
Careful attention to the historical sources suggests that the uniform 
equity doctrine was not simply the product of an overreaching, 
consolidationist Supreme Court, but is best understood in the context 
of important and surprisingly underappreciated early-nineteenth-
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century debates concerning judicial reform. During this period, both 
Congress and the Court were preoccupied with the disuniformity in 
the administration of the federal judicial system, especially in the 
farther reaches of the republic. When reform was not forthcoming 
through legislation, the Supreme Court achieved a modicum of 
uniformity in the federal courts through the application of a single 
body of equity principles drawn from federal and English sources. 
But the Court did not act unilaterally. Congress’s repeated 
acquiescence to, and extension of, the Court’s uniform equity doctrine 
reveals a complex, interbranch dynamic at work. 
  Retelling the story of nonstate, judge-made law in the federal 
courts through the lens of equity is not intended to demonstrate that 
such a formulation of federal judicial power was (or is) correct. 
Rather, by recuperating the history of federal equity power, this 
Article illuminates the significant metamorphosis of the meaning of 
Article III’s grant of judicial power. This change has been elided in 
modern accounts of federal judge-made law in an effort to bolster the 
legitimacy of a modern vision of federal judicial power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The history of judge-made law in federal civil cases is commonly 
examined through the lens of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 17891 
(the original Rules of Decision Act) and the Supreme Court’s famous 
interpretation of that Act in Swift v. Tyson.2 This Article examines the 
history of judge-made law in the federal courts, but shifts attention 
away from Section 34, focusing instead on early-nineteenth-century 
federal courts’ equity powers.3 This alternative doctrinal perspective 
 
 1. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. 
 2. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842). In this Article, I use the term “judge-
made law” and variations thereof to describe judicial decisionmaking in the absence or near 
absence of statutory or constitutional direction. Cf. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope 
of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 890 (1986) (defining “federal common law” as 
“any rule of federal law created by a court . . . when the substance of that rule is not clearly 
suggested by federal enactments—constitutional or congressional”). While commentators 
generally use the term “common law” instead of “judge-made law,” I use the latter because my 
focus is on cases brought in equity. Using the term “common law” to describe the judicial 
exercise of equity power would be needlessly confusing. See infra Part I.B. I use the term 
“common law” in this Article only when discussing judge-made law in the context of cases 
brought in law. Some readers will object that the use of the term “judge-made law” necessarily 
and incorrectly imposes a modern gloss on early-nineteenth-century judicial practices because, 
at that time, it was generally understood that judges declared law, rather than made law. I 
address this concern later in the article. See infra text accompanying notes 367–69. 
 3. This Article focuses on the federal courts’ adjudication of private-law litigation in 
which a party sought enforcement of traditional equitable rights or remedies, or sought the 
benefit of procedures available in equity. See infra Part I.B.1. The term “equity,” or “equity of 
the statute,” was also used more broadly to describe a form of statutory interpretation—
employed in law and in equity—that authorized judges to follow a restrictive or expansive 
interpretation of a statute to “prevent a failure of justice.” GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION 
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 457 (1969). Other scholars have examined the 
early role of equitable principles as interpretive tools. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All 
About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–
1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1040–55 (2001) (observing that founding-era judges did not 
generally resort to the notion of “equity of the statute” to justify non-literal statutory 
interpretation); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 79–85 (2001) (arguing that the ratification debates are inconclusive about whether the 
Framers intended to imbue the judiciary with the discretion inherent in the equity of the 
statute). Equity of the statute is not my focus here. Likewise, I do not consider the debates 
concerning the scope of federal equity power with respect to remediation of constitutional 
violations, nor the related debate concerning the federal courts’ inherent power to craft 
equitable remedies in that field. See, e.g., PETER C. HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: 
EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 198 (1990) (“[F]ederal district courts 
transformed the rudimentary Balance of Equity in Brown [v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 
(1955),] from a remedial tool to a way of reading the Constitution.”); GARY L. MCDOWELL, 
EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 3–4 (1982) (arguing that since the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court has 
distorted the traditional view of equitable principles, resulting in excessive judicial discretion); 
John Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot: The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal 
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allows a fresh look at a long-standing debate concerning the historical 
scope of federal judges’ power to apply nonstate, judge-made law, 
and enables reevaluation of some of the historiographic and doctrinal 
claims that are often at stake in that debate.4 The history of federal 
equity told in this Article challenges the notion that one can make 
broad generalizations about early-nineteenth-century views regarding 
the use of nonstate, judge-made law in federal court and instead 
forces one to recognize that modern conceptions of federal judicial 
power are just that: modern. 
Intense focus on the history of Section 34 can in part be traced to 
the years leading up to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,5 and in 
particular to Charles Warren’s research concerning the drafting of 
Section 34 and his contention that the Swift opinion departed from 
the Judiciary Act of 1789’s original intent.6 A decade later, Justice 
Louis Brandeis famously relied on Warren’s work to repudiate the 
Swift doctrine.7 For several decades after Erie, scholars largely 
followed Warren’s and Brandeis’s lead, understanding Swift’s 
ratification of the application of “general common law” in federal 
courts as a perplexing, ill-advised, or even unconstitutional departure 
from the otherwise standard practice of applying state law, including 
“unwritten law,” in diversity actions.8 This characterization of Swift’s 
 
Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1123–24 (1996) (“If the remedies needed to correct a 
constitutional violation lie outside a court’s traditional remedial powers, then separation of 
powers principles require that the answer come from the political branches . . . .”). 
 4. Although Section 34 is often at the center of modern discussions of the metes and 
bounds of nonstate, judge-made law in early-nineteenth-century federal courts, those debates 
have certainly extended beyond Section 34. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, 
The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 46–64 (2009) (examining the 
debate over whether federal courts have power to enforce the law of nations without legislative 
codification); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 
1039–84 (1985) (outlining early debate over federal courts’ common-law powers, with particular 
attention to common-law crimes); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 
U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1254–90 (1985) (explaining how the association of expansive federal power 
with federal common law shaped political debate between Federalists and Republicans); Beth 
Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 399–418 (1997) (analyzing the history of federal courts’ application of 
customary international law). 
 5. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 6. See Charles Warren, New Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 
49, 52 (1923); see also text accompanying infra notes 52–54. 
 7. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73 & n.5. 
 8. As William Fletcher observed in 1984, “[t]he conventional wisdom of modern legal 
scholarship is that [Swift v. Tyson] marked a sudden and dramatic change from prior practice.” 
William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The 
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1513 (1984). 
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significance did not go unchallenged. Over time, several scholars 
marshaled impressive evidence demonstrating that during the early 
nineteenth century, the application of general common law in federal 
court was uncontroversial and consistent with contemporary 
interpretations of Section 34.9 Nevertheless, the belief that application 
of nonstate, judge-made law in federal civil actions was, as a general 
matter, anomalous and problematic during the early nineteenth 
century continues to inform some modern scholarly and judicial 
accounts.10 
The persistence of such views is especially notable given that the 
modern focus on Section 34 and Swift has dwarfed consideration of 
various classes of federal cases in which Section 34 did not apply or 
applied in an especially limited fashion, including federal equity 
cases.11 Prior to 1938, when law and equity were merged in the federal 
system, they occupied separate sides of a federal court’s civil docket 
and were subject to distinct choice-of-law principles. As shown in Part 
I, federal judges enjoyed considerably greater power to apply 
nonstate, judge-made principles when sitting in equity than when 
sitting in law—greater, even, than the power they were allowed under 
 
 9. See id. at 1516–54; sources cited infra note 55. 
 10. For example, Professor Bradford Clark asserts that “[f]ederal common law is a modern 
phenomenon,” explaining that “[p]rior to this century, the Supreme Court confidently asserted 
that ‘[t]here is no principle which pervades the Union and has the authority of law, that is not 
embodied in the constitution or laws of the Union.’” Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: 
A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1255 (1996) (quoting Wheaton v. Peters, 
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657–58 (1834)); see also Kermit L. Hall, The Courts, 1790–1920, in 2 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 106, 123 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher 
Tomlins eds., 2008) (“[O]n comparable points of law federal judges had to regard holdings in 
state courts as the rule of decision in their courts.”); EARL M. MALTZ, SLAVERY AND THE 
SUPREME COURT, 1825–1861, at 149 (2009) (“Prior to 1842 [and the Swift opinion], the Court 
had uniformly held that the legal issues surrounding such a claim [to recover on a promissory 
note] would be determined according to the common law of New York, pursuant to the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . .”); sources cited infra notes 385–86. 
 11. Cases brought in equity were not the only subset of cases in which federal courts had 
significant power to apply nonstate, judge-made law. For example, the federal courts had 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of admiralty cases and exercised significant 
discretionary powers to apply nonstate admiralty law principles in some such cases. See Caleb 
Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 514 (2006) (“At least with 
respect to the high seas, the Supreme Court has long understood the Constitution to displace 
the local law of individual states.”); The Chusan, 5 F. Cas. 680, 683 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 
2717) (Story, J.) (“The subject-matter of admiralty and maritime law is withdrawn from state 
legislation, and belongs exclusively to the national government and its proper functionaries.”); 
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 188 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (observing that Section 
34 applies in “suits at common law as contradistinguished from those which come before the 
court sitting as a court of equity or admiralty”). 
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the Swift doctrine. Indeed, federal courts generally applied a uniform 
body of nonstate, judge-made equity principles with respect to 
procedure, remedial laws, and—in certain instances—the primary 
rights and liabilities of litigants.12 Importantly, these principles—
which were drawn from federal and English sources—were applied in 
equity cases not despite, but precisely because of the failure of the 
forum state’s laws to provide adequate relief. Accordingly, the 
uniform equity principles applied in federal court in the early 
nineteenth century were not drawn from a common reservoir of 
general principles available to state and federal judges alike, but 
rather in many jurisdictions were available in federal court only. 
To be certain, some legal historians have considered equity’s 
significance in light of the Swift doctrine,13 and recently a handful of 
legal scholars have focused on early federal equity power in studies of 
constitutional remedies, early administrative law, and federal subject 
matter jurisdiction.14 Nevertheless, when describing judge-made law 
in early-nineteenth-century federal courts, legal scholarship and 
casebooks tend to ignore the equity side of the docket or significantly 
understate the scope of federal judges’ power to apply nonstate, 
judge-made principles in equity cases.15 As a consequence of the 
narrow focus on Section 34 and Swift, and of the failure to fully 
acknowledge the range of sources of law applicable in federal court, 
 
 12. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 13. See TONY ALLAN FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 26 (1979) [hereinafter FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER] (stating 
that in the early nineteenth century, “[M]any litigants used [federal] diversity jurisdiction in 
order to gain the benefit of equitable doctrines and procedures”); TONY FREYER, HARMONY 
AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 35 (1981) 
[hereinafter FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE] (“[I]n equity . . . federal courts did not 
consider themselves obligated to follow the state law.”); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 222–23 (1977) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s use of “an independent equity power to establish the principle of negotiability in the 
federal courts”). 
 14. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 149–52. 
 15. Other common sources more or less overlook federal equity power when describing the 
history of judge-made law in the federal courts. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 321–27 (5th ed. 2007); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 222–24 (7th ed. 
2008). Hart and Wechsler’s famous Federal Courts casebook briefly discusses the tradition of 
federal equity power but gives a strangely contradictory assessment, first declaring that federal 
courts sitting in equity had substantive lawmaking power, but then describing the cases as 
“inconclusive.” RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID 
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 576 
(6th ed. 2009); see also Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1529 (noting that “the federal courts sitting in 
equity followed local state law”). 
COLLINS IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 10/17/2010  10:06:06 PM 
2010] ARTICLE III, EQUITY, AND JUDGE-MADE LAW 255 
highly generalized statements about antipathy for nonstate, judge-
made law in early-nineteenth-century federal courts are common in 
treatises and articles that purport to explain the limits on the 
application of nonstate, judge-made law by federal courts today.16 
This Article demonstrates that such generalizations lack foundation. 
The purpose of retelling the story of judge-made law in the 
federal courts through the lens of equity is not to provide an 
originalist or quasi-originalist justification for a particular 
understanding of modern federal judicial power.17 Rather, by focusing 
on federal equity, this Article sheds light on the radical 
transformations that have occurred in our understanding of the 
judicial power as set forth in Article III and, in that regard, the 
limitations of originalist methodology in this context. Acknowledging 
the dynamic and historically contingent nature of our understanding 
of Article III also raises the question of why, notwithstanding an 
unchanged textual constitutional mandate, federal equity power and 
the federal courts’ power to apply nonstate, judge-made law have 
evolved over the decades and centuries. Why did the uniform equity 
doctrine take hold in the early nineteenth century, surviving multiple 
direct challenges in the Supreme Court and in Congress? Why is it no 
longer part of our commonsense understanding of federal judicial 
power? And why is the story of federal equity’s earlier formulation—
and its transformation in modern jurisprudence—frequently elided in 
accounts of judge-made law in the federal courts today? 
Part II addresses the first of these questions. One could easily 
attempt to explain the vitality of the federal uniform equity doctrine 
using the familiar explanatory trope that animates many accounts of 
Swift and Supreme Court behavior more generally during the early 
nineteenth century: an overreaching Supreme Court used equity as a 
means of further empowering itself and the lower federal courts at 
the expense of state sovereignty.18 But careful attention to previously 
unexamined historical sources suggests that such an assessment is 
simplistic and misleading if applied to federal equity. Instead, this 
Article argues that the Supreme Court’s insistence that lower federal 
 
 16. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 10, at 1255; sources cited infra notes 385–86. 
 17. William Crosskey offers such an analysis in WILLIAM CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 877–902 (1953). 
 18. For example, Grant Gilmore confidently asserted that in Swift, “[t]he federalizing 
Supreme Court also succeeded in reversing, for all practical purposes, the outcome of the 
constitutional debate which had allocated control of the substantive law to the states.” GRANT 
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 30 (1977). 
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courts apply a uniform body of equity principles is best understood as 
a response to contemporary concerns about disuniformity and 
institutional incapacity in the federal judicial system—concerns 
shared by many jurists and legislators with otherwise substantially 
different views regarding the proper scope of federal power. 
Two heated contests regarding federal equity power originating 
in Kentucky and Louisiana invite attention to an important and 
surprisingly overlooked set of issues that preoccupied both the Court 
and Congress during this period: the spectacular failure of the federal 
judicial system to serve the needs of the rapidly expanding nation and 
the related calls for judicial reform.19 For example, many states that 
became part of the Union after 1789—the “new states”—were not 
included in a federal judicial circuit and hence lacked a circuit court.20 
And for nearly four decades, federal legislation governing judicial 
process in the federal courts simply did not apply in federal courts 
located in the new states.21 But despite a constant stream of petitions 
and complaints, especially from the new states, Congress consistently 
failed to enact judicial-reform legislation that would have helped 
ensure uniform federal judicial services throughout the nation. In the 
absence of legislative judicial reform, the Court sought to secure a 
modicum of institutional uniformity in the lower federal courts, in 
part through the development of a uniform corpus of equity 
principles that applied in federal court.22 
For some students of the federal courts, the most interesting 
aspect of the uniform equity doctrine is not why it thrived in the early 
nineteenth century but that it existed at all. Part III considers why 
accounts of nonstate, judge-made law in the federal courts tend to 
marginalize the story of federal equity power told in this Article. 
There are surely many reasons, but an important factor is that the 
story of federal equity and its demise does not fit neatly into a 
standard narrative of continuity that characterizes many accounts of 
 
 19. The best analysis of the debates over judicial reform in the nineteenth century remains 
FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY 
IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1927). 
 20. See infra Part II.A. 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
 22. By calling attention to the way institutional pressures and concerns shaped Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, this Article builds on and contributes to a body of scholarship that focuses 
on the centrality of institutional dynamics to the development of law. See infra Part II.D. 
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the modern Erie doctrine.23 Thus, even as many jurists and scholars 
acknowledge Erie as “a dramatic reversal in the relation between the 
federal courts and state law,”24 they tend to tell the story of judge-
made law in the federal courts as a story of the stasis of—or a return 
to—purportedly timeless federalism and separation-of-powers 
principles.25 
This point is demonstrated rather transparently in the 
minimization of the federal uniform equity doctrine in modern case 
law. A brief look at Justice Felix Frankfurter’s “surgical” treatment of 
the history of federal equity in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York26 
illuminates why the early equity cases are obscured in modern 
accounts of judge-made law in the federal courts. Under Frankfurter’s 
pen, the robust uniform equity doctrine was largely erased in modern 
jurisprudence to make way for the “outcome determinative” 
principle: the notion that the “outcome of the litigation in the federal 
court should be substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a 
State court.”27 Such erasure is not unusual. Indeed, it is symptomatic 
of the generic conventions of the judicial opinion in our precedent-
based system, conventions that harness historical sources as authority 
while simultaneously erasing any sense of “pastness” from the past 
and any sense of change in our legal traditions. 
I.  FEDERAL JUDGE-MADE LAW IN LAW AND EQUITY 
Although today we generally speak of one Rules of Decision 
Act, which applies to all “civil actions,”28 in fact, the modern vertical 
choice-of-law doctrine—the determination of whether to apply state, 
federal, or another body of nonstate law in a given action—is far 
more complex. Different statutes and standards apply depending on 
whether the law in question is procedural or substantive. And the 
most difficult Erie questions arise when it is impossible to neatly 
classify the law at issue as either. The state of affairs in the late 
 
 23. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal 
History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 275–76 (1973) (arguing that legal history’s “most 
characteristic mark has been an emphasis on continuity and a corresponding deemphasis of 
change”). 
 24. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 169 (1980). 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 27. Id. at 109. 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was even more 
complicated. Article III specifies three different substantive fields of 
competence for federal courts: law, equity, and admiralty.29 Many 
accounts of the history of vertical choice-of-law rules in civil cases are 
framed in terms of the modern concern of whether the law in 
question is procedural or substantive. Although such a focus is not 
anachronistic, it obfuscates the categorization most salient to early-
nineteenth-century jurists: whether a civil case arose in law, equity, or 
admiralty. In each of these fields, different statutes and different 
precedents governed the sources of law that would determine the 
applicable procedures, the primary liability rules, and the remedies.30 
This Part examines the vertical choice-of-law doctrines that 
applied in two tracks of federal litigation, law and equity, and focuses 
in particular on the underexamined rules governing the exercise of 
federal equity power. It is fruitful to study law and equity together, in 
part because they were frequently paired in practice. Some cases 
could have been brought in law or equity, depending on the specifics 
of the case and on the remedy sought.31 Although a particular case 
might be heard by a federal judge in law or in equity, the normative 
and doctrinal predispositions of the vertical choice-of-law regimes 
that applied on these two sides of the federal docket were distinctive. 
On the law side of the docket, although the details are famously 
contested and there are important exceptions, it is fair to conclude 
that there was substantial recognition of the applicability of state law 
in federal court, absent a controlling federal statute, treaty, or 
 
 29. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, . . . [and] to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 30. The situation was more complex than I can reasonably describe in this Article. 
According to G. Edward White, “[a] precise description of the nature and sources of American 
law at the time of the Marshall Court requires the designation not only of source categories but 
of subcategories within those categories and of hierarchies among the categories.” G. Edward 
White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–35, in HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 112 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988). 
 31. For example, the plaintiffs in Riddle v. Mandeville first sued for payment on a 
promissory note on the law side of the federal circuit court in Virginia, Mandeville v. Riddle, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 290, 292 (1803), but the Supreme Court found that no action could be brought 
in law “by the assignee of a promissory note made in Virginia, against a remote assignor.” Id. at 
298. Years later, the same plaintiff filed a bill in equity in the same court. The Supreme Court 
found that in equity the remote endorsers would be “immediately responsible.” Riddle v. 
Mandeville, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 322, 330, 333 (1809). Morton Horwitz provides a careful analysis 
of the Riddle cases and argues that in the 1809 opinion, the Court “invoked an independent 
equity power to establish the principle of negotiability in the federal courts.” See HORWITZ, 
supra note 13, at 223. 
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constitutional provision.32 This state-law-respecting norm applied to a 
certain extent to substantive law and, to an even greater degree, to 
remedial and procedural law. In equity, a significantly different 
vertical choice-of-law doctrine prevailed. That doctrine empowered 
federal judges to apply uniform, nonstate, judge-made equity 
principles without regard to state legal or equity principles, 
sometimes including those codified in state statutes.33  
A. Sources of Law in Cases Brought in Law 
Article III ensures that federal courts have the power to decide 
cases “in law,”34 but defining the contours of this power was left to 
Congress and the Supreme Court. In particular, Article III says 
nothing about which sources of law will guide adjudication in federal 
court (for example, state law, federal law, or the law of nations). Nor 
does it answer the related question of how much discretion federal 
judges have in crafting or declaring the law.35 In the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, Congress and the Court gradually 
attempted to resolve these ambiguities, but the resulting system for 
determining which source of law would apply in federal cases was 
complex. In actions brought at law, different statutes and precedents 
governed this question, depending on whether the legal rule at issue 
governed procedures, remedies, or substantive law. 
With respect to procedures applicable in law, two judicial process 
acts directed federal judges to generally conform to the procedural 
laws of the forum state. Four days after it enacted the famed Judiciary 
Act of 1789, Congress enacted a temporary process act, which 
provided that the “modes of process . . . in the circuit and district 
courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in each state 
respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the 
same.”36 This rule was explicitly reconfirmed in 1792 in what is often 
called the Permanent Process Act, which stated that the processes in 
common law suits “shall be the same as are now used in the said 
courts” under the 1789 Process Act.37 
 
 32. See infra Part II.A. 
 33. See infra Part II.B. 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 35. See White, supra note 30, at 113 (noting “that judges could themselves fashion the rules 
for deciding which sources to give more prominence than others”). 
 36. Act of Sept. 29, 1789 (Temporary Process Act), ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (emphasis 
added). 
 37. Act of May 8, 1792 (Permanent Process Act), ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. 
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Similarly, federal courts deciding cases brought in law generally 
applied the state remedies and procedures used to execute judgments. 
Although the distinction between state and federal remedial regimes 
in law was unlikely to have been significant to determining damage 
judgments, the federal-state distinction could be very important to the 
processes available to enforce such judgments. Whether Congress 
would enact a uniform policy for execution of judgments in federal 
court was a subject of significant debate in the First and Second 
Congresses.38 The Permanent Process Act addressed the issue of 
conformity with state execution-of-judgment laws, requiring that 
“writs [and] executions . . . shall be the same as are now used” in the 
forum state courts.39 Thus, despite some conflicting evidence and 
significant exceptions on this point, federal courts sitting in law 
largely followed state law with respect to remedies and execution of 
judgments.40 
Two observations about the process acts are warranted. First, the 
procedural and remedial conformity required by these acts was static. 
The Temporary Process Act of 1789 expressly stated that the 
procedures used in the district and circuit courts in actions brought in 
 
 38. See Charles Warren, Federal Process and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REV. 421, 426–35 
(1930). 
 39. Permanent Process Act § 2, 1 Stat. at 276. 
 40. See Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in 
American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 453 (2006) (noting that states “retain[ed] legislative 
authority over their own court procedures and remedial regimes, [and] . . . also insisted that the 
federal courts recognize and implement the local state execution processes in the cases that they 
decided”); Warren, supra note 38, at 427–28 (noting that the federal courts were “to administer 
the same remedial justice, that would be administered in the proper state courts” (quoting Ex 
parte Biddle, 3 F. Cas. 336, 337 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1391) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Professor Fletcher concludes that “questions of remedies . . . at law . . . would be 
determined according to federal court practice.” Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1530 n.72 (citing 
Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222 (1818); Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231, 
1234–35 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 9341)). On this point, however, Robinson v. Campbell, 16 
U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212 (1818), and Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 
9341), are better understood as establishing that federal courts would not rely on state 
classifications of remedies as legal or equitable when determining appropriate treatment of a 
case in federal court. Robinson, 16 U.S. at 222 (observing the need to preserve the traditional 
distinction between law and equity in federal courts rather than “adopt[ing] the state practice,” 
lest the federal courts “extinguish” in states without equity practice, “the exercise of equitable 
jurisdiction”); Mayer, 16 F. Cas. at 1235 (“[A]s to suits in equity, state laws, in respect to 
remedies . . . could have no effect whatsoever on the jurisdiction of the court, the act [of 1792] 
having prescribed a rule, by which the line of partition between the law and the equity 
jurisdiction of those courts is distinctly marked.”). For additional discussion of Fletcher’s 
interpretation of Mayer, see infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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law were to be the same “as are now used” in the forum state courts.41 
Because the Permanent Process Act explicitly referenced the 
Temporary Process Act, federal judges were required to follow state 
procedure as it existed in 1789.42 For states admitted to the Union 
after 1789, Congress in 1828 enacted another process act, which 
provided that for actions in law, federal courts were to follow state 
court procedures then in effect,43 hence providing for static 
conformity with state procedure as of 1828.44 Because of the static 
nature of the conformity requirements found in all three of these acts, 
federal courts were not obliged to conform with the state legislatures’ 
prospective changes to state court procedural or remedial law. These 
process acts thus did not require perfect conformity with all current 
state procedural laws.45 However, federal judges were not left free to 
apply any common law procedures or remedies. Rather, depending 
on which process act applied, federal courts were generally required 
to apply state procedural or remedial law as it existed in either 1789 
or 1828. 
Second, the process acts gave federal courts some discretionary 
rulemaking authority. Under the Permanent Process Act, lower 
federal courts could make “alterations and additions” to state 
procedures “as [they] . . . in their discretion deem[ed] expedient.”46 
That Act also empowered the Supreme Court to prescribe 
“regulations” as it “shall think proper . . . to any circuit or district 
 
 41. Temporary Process Act § 2, 1 Stat. at 93 (emphasis added). 
 42. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 32 (1825) (observing that the 
Permanent Process Act “adopt[ed] the State law as it . . . stood [in 1789], not as it might 
afterwards be made”). Because the Permanent Process Act of 1792 adopted the exact terms of 
the Temporary Process Act of 1789, the general view was that federal courts sitting in law were 
to apply state court procedures and remedies as they stood in 1789, rather than in 1792. But see 
Mayer, 16 F. Cas. at 1234 (noting that the process acts established “that the forms and modes of 
proceeding at common law, as used by [state courts] in 1792” applied in federal cases brought in 
law). 
 43. Act of May 19, 1828 (Process Act of 1828), ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278, 278–79. Note that this 
meant that in states admitted after 1789, no federal statute explicitly governed judicial process 
in the federal courts for up to twenty-six years. 
 44. The events leading up to the Process Act of 1828 are discussed at length below. See 
infra Part II.B. 
 45. With respect to the execution of judgments, the Process Act of 1828 specifically gave 
federal courts the authority “to alter final process in said courts as to conform the same to any 
change which may be adopted by the legislature of the respective states for the state courts,” 
thus allowing but not requiring ongoing conformity with state laws governing execution of 
judgments. Process Act of 1828 § 3. 
 46. Act of May 8, 1792 (Permanent Process Act), ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. 
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court concerning” writs, executions, and other processes.47 Thus, the 
process acts did not dictate absolute conformity with relevant state 
law. Although the process acts required federal courts to conform to 
state procedures and remedies in most instances, departures based on 
judicial discretion were allowed, and this grant of discretion became a 
point of serious dispute in the 1820s.48 Nevertheless, the default rule 
in cases brought in law was that federal courts were to apply forum 
state procedural and remedial laws, at least of a certain date. 
The process acts did not address the vertical choice-of-law 
principles applicable to substantive law. Instead, Congress addressed 
that issue in Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which famously 
required “[t]hat the laws of the several states, except where the 
constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise 
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at 
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they 
apply.”49 Section 34’s mandate was oblique. Federal statutes, treaties, 
and the Constitution were to provide the rules of decision in cases in 
which they governed. But outside of these cases, Section 34 circularly 
declared that “the laws of the several states” would apply “in cases 
where they apply.” 
Without trying to untangle the thicket of opinion concerning 
Section 34, one can discern two modern schools of thought regarding 
early-nineteenth-century interpretation of that provision. The first 
school of commentators concurs with Justice Brandeis’s opinion in 
Erie,50 arguing that absent a governing federal statute, treaty, or 
constitutional provision, Section 34 commanded the federal courts to 
apply state statutory and judge-made law.51 By this logic, the Supreme 
Court erred in Swift v. Tyson, departing from the First Congress’s 
intended allocation of power between the state and federal courts 
Scholars in this camp included Charles Warren, who influenced 
Justice Brandeis’s interpretation of Section 34 with his article New 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. See infra Part II.B. 
 49. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. 
 50. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) (“[T]he purpose of the section was 
merely to make certain that, in all matters except those in which some federal law is controlling, 
the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as their 
rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as written.”). 
 51. See, e.g., FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE, supra note 13, at 35 (“There seems 
little room for doubt that the ‘laws of the several states’ included statutes, decisions by state 
courts, and vaguely defined ‘local customs’ . . . .”); sources cited supra note 10. 
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Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.52 In New 
Light, Warren argued that “the word ‘laws’ in this Section 34 was not 
intended to be confined to ‘statute laws,’ as Judge Story held in the 
famous case of Swift v. Tyson, but was intended to include the 
common law of a State as well as the statute law.”53 The basic view 
that, absent a controlling federal statute, treaty, or constitutional 
provision, Section 34 was intended to deprive federal judges of the 
power to apply principles other than the forum states’ law—whether 
common law or statute law—continues to influence some scholars’ 
and jurists’ views about the historical and modern scope of federal 
judge-made law.54 
Others have taken a different position on the meaning and effect 
of Section 34, however, arguing instead that it required federal judges 
to apply state judge-made law in limited situations, if at all. For 
example, both Wilfred Ritz and William Fletcher have challenged 
Warren’s famous and influential interpretation of Section 34.55 After 
examining in detail the archival documents on which Warren relied, 
Ritz argues that Warren’s conclusions concerning the legislative 
history of Section 34 are “wholly illusory” and that his interpretation 
of Section 34 is “erroneous.”56 Instead, Ritz argues, Section 34 was 
intended to ensure that in trials at common law federal courts applied 
American rather than English common law.57 
Fletcher provides particularly strong evidence that in the early 
nineteenth century—well before Swift was decided in 1842—Section 
34 was consistently interpreted to mandate the application of “local 
law” (or lex loci)58 but generally not state statutes or state common 
law unless they were understood to involve matters of “particularly 
 
 52. Warren, supra note 6. 
 53. Id. at 52 (citing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842)). 
 54. See sources cited supra note 10 and infra notes 385–86. 
 55. See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: 
EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 165 (Wythe Holt & 
L.H. LaRue eds., 1990); Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1514; see also White, supra note 30, at 972 
(“[I]n the period from 1815 through 1835 the federal courts were conceived of as free to follow 
or to ignore relevant state law as they chose, subject to the dictates of their own established 
practices[,] . . . despite the language of Section 34 . . . .”). 
 56. RITZ, supra note 55, at 9. 
 57. Id. at 148. 
 58. See Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1532 (“[T]o the degree that a law was local, the federal 
courts were required under the lex loci principle to follow a state’s deviation from the general 
common law.”). 
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local concern.”59 This was not a minor exception, as lex loci would 
have generally applied in cases concerning title to real property, 
would have often applied in cases concerning locally recorded 
instruments (such as wills), and would have sometimes applied in 
cases concerning negotiable instruments.60 But in the absence of a 
local law, federal courts applied law from a number of sources 
including, perhaps most prominently, the “general common law”—a 
reservoir of common-law principles that were generally applicable 
and were not identified with a particular state or sovereign entity.61 
Given that federal judges regularly applied nonstate, judge-made law 
in the pre-Swift era, Fletcher urges that Swift did not mark a 
departure from the original meaning of Section 34—as both Warren 
and Brandeis concluded—but was instead consistent with the early 
understanding of that section.62  
Regardless of how one interprets Section 34, and hence resolves 
the issue of whether Swift departed from existing norms and 
practices, it remains the case that the law side of the federal docket 
was characterized to a certain extent by a state-law-respecting norm. 
Under the process acts, state law usually dictated the procedures used 
in federal courts, even as the acts allowed for discretionary departures 
from state procedural law. With respect to legal remedies, it appears 
that federal courts generally followed state remedial schemes, and 
that, unless the federal judge exercised his discretion to craft an 
alternative rule, the process acts generally obliged conformity with 
existing state laws designed to enforce those remedies. Finally, under 
Section 34, federal courts generally applied local laws to resolve the 
substantive rights and liabilities of the parties “in cases where they 
appl[ied].”63 Conformity with state law was by no means absolute in 
actions at law. However, with certain important exceptions, including 
 
 59. Id. at 1527–28 (noting that “federal courts usually felt obliged to comply with state laws 
[created by state courts and legislatures] only in subject areas of particularly local concern, such 
as title to real property”); id. at 1532 (“To the degree that a law was general rather than local, 
federal courts had equal status with state courts in its exposition and development. . . . But to 
the degree that a law was local, the federal courts were required under the lex loci principle to 
follow a state’s deviation from the general common law.”). 
 60. Id. at 1536–38. 
 61. See id. at 1517 (“The American courts resorted to this general body of preexisting law 
to provide the rules of decision in particular cases without insisting that the law be attached to 
any particular sovereign.”). 
 62. See id. at 1514. 
 63. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. 
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the general common law, conformity was the general and expected 
practice. 
B. Sources of Law in Cases Brought in Equity 
Scholars and jurists have given considerable attention to Section 
34 and the federal courts’ application of the general common law in 
the early nineteenth century, but have given far less consideration to 
judicial practices on the equity side of the docket. Several legal 
scholars have noted that federal judges had greater latitude to apply 
nonstate, judge-made decisional rules when sitting in equity.64 But 
many accounts of nonstate, judge-made law in the early-nineteenth-
century federal courts simply overlook equity or operate under the 
view that Section 34 always applied in federal equity cases.65 
Accordingly, the story of judge-made law on the equity side of the 
docket is usually considered, if at all, as a subplot in the Section 34–
Swift narrative. As this section demonstrates, that impression is 
misleading.66 
Although the law and equity sides of the federal docket were 
interrelated in important ways,67 the vertical choice-of-law doctrines 
that developed on the two sides of the federal docket were both 
technically and normatively distinctive. On the equity side, the 
vertical choice-of-law rules were maddeningly complex. But overall, 
federal judges applied nonstate uniform equity principles to 
determine the applicable procedures, remedies, and—in certain 
cases—substantive principles. Those nonstate equity principles were 
drawn from federal and English chancery sources, statutory and 
judge-made. 
This Section details the development of the uniform equity 
principles that applied in federal court. First, it briefly describes the 
tepid reception courts of equity received in many of the colonies, the 
resulting varied availability of equity in colonial and state courts, and 
the decision to include equity in Article III and the early judiciary 
acts. It then considers, in some detail, the Supreme Court’s efforts to 
 
 64. See sources cited infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text. 
 65. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 15. 
 66. Indeed, it might be more accurate to characterize the general common law and Swift as 
a subplot of the story of federal equity power. After all, in Swift, Justice Story referenced the 
uniformity requirement in equity as support for the application of general common law on the 
law side of the docket. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 22 (1842). 
 67. For example, equity jurisdiction was possible only if the remedy available in law was 
incomplete or inadequate. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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clarify what sources of equity would supply procedural, remedial, and 
substantive equity principles in federal court. By the 1810s—more 
than twenty years before Swift was decided—horizontal uniformity-
of-equity principles within the federal court system was the explicit 
norm in federal equity cases, rather than vertical conformity with 
state law or equity. One important implication of the existence of the 
uniform equity doctrine in the early nineteenth century is that—
regardless of what one concludes regarding the acceptance of the 
general common law under Section 34—analyses of judge-made law 
in federal courts that draw general conclusions based on judicial 
practices in actions at law are misleading. Specifically, they tend to 
mistake a part for the whole of federal judicial practices by failing to 
account for the commonplace application of nonstate, judge-made 
equity principles in federal courts in the early nineteenth century. 
1. The Origins of Federal Equity Power.  Equity had a varied 
reception in the American colonies, and that variation significantly 
influenced how equity was later applied in federal courts. Both 
historically and today, the term “equity” refers to a set of rights, 
remedies, and procedures available ostensibly to ameliorate defects 
of the common law (such as in the cases of fraud, mistake, and 
forgery) and to enforce equitable instruments that required the 
ongoing supervision of a court (such as trusts and guardianships).68 In 
eighteenth century England, equity was available in separate courts 
with equity powers but was not available in the law courts.69 As a 
doctrinal matter, a court of equity had jurisdiction only when no 
remedy was available in law, or when the available legal remedy was 
incomplete or inadequate.70 
 
 68. See F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 1 (2d ed. 1936) (noting the difficulty of defining equity 
without a historical explanation and stating that “[e]quity is that body of rules which is 
administered only by those Courts which are known as Courts of Equity”). See generally J.H. 
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 106–13 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing 
the development of equity courts in England and the relationship between law and equity); see 
also infra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. 
 69. See BAKER, supra note 68, at 108 (describing how, from the mid-sixteenth century 
onward, equity in England was regarded as the “peculiar prerogative” of the Court of 
Chancery). 
 70. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 33, at 32 
(Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 4th ed. 1846) (1836) (“Perhaps the most general, if 
not the most precise, description of a Court of Equity, in the English and American sense, is, 
that it has jurisdiction in cases of rights, recognised and protected by the municipal 
jurisprudence, where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had in the Courts of 
Common Law.”). 
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Despite equity’s association with higher notions of justice and 
the chancellor’s conscience, by the seventeenth century equity had 
developed a sullied reputation in some sectors. Especially among 
religious and political dissenters, the English Chancery Court was 
associated with royal prerogative, judicial overreaching, and 
standardless discretion71—hence, the often-repeated saying that 
“Equity is a Roguish thing,”72 measured only according to “a 
Chancellor’s Foot.”73 Even absent ideological objections to equity, its 
critics complained of complex procedures and endless delay.74 
At least in part as a consequence of these concerns, several 
American colonies refused to create separate equity courts. Some of 
these colonies empowered courts of law, the legislature, or the 
governor to apply certain equitable principles, but equity practice as 
traditionally understood was often partially or totally unavailable.75 
Equity’s mixed reception in the colonies resulted in significant 
variation of equity practices in the individual states—variation that 
was duly noted and lamented in the early nineteenth century. As 
explained by Justice Story in an 1821 address to the Suffolk Bar in 
 
 71. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 55 (2d ed. 1985) 
(“Chancery was closely associated with executive power, in turn with the English overlords. 
Equity also worked without a jury; thus there were no barriers against the use of these courts as 
tools of imperial policy.”); Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: 
Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in 5 
PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 260 (Donald 
Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971) (“By the late sixteenth century, and especially with the 
accession of the Stuarts, the court of chancery was closely associated with the royal prerogative 
and became the target of opposition.”); Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity 
Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1181, 1203 (2005) (noting that in the seventeenth century the Chancery Court was “tarred 
by the conceptual link forged in the revolutionary era between courts drawing on the Roman-
canon tradition and the perceived threat of tyranny”). 
 72. JOHN SELDEN, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 43 
(London, E. Smith 1689). 
 73. Id. at 44. 
 74. See BAKER, supra note 68, at 111–13 (discussing the basic procedural defects in 
chancery). 
 75. See Katz, supra note 71, at 265–83 (discussing early-American equity practice and 
opposition to chancery courts in the colonies). Katz urges that, in the colonial period, the 
primary debates were not over whether equity should be available at all, but whether there 
should be separate courts of equity. Id. at 265. Nevertheless, the states’ varied adoption of 
equity—whether administered by courts of equity, law courts, the legislature, or the executive—
appears to have shaped the availability of equity as a mode of adjudication. See infra notes 76–
82 and accompanying text. See generally Solon Dyke Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the 
American Colonies, in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 779–809 
(Ass’n of Am. Law Schs. ed., 1908) (discussing the operation of courts of equity in the American 
colonies). 
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Massachusetts, “equity jurisdiction . . . exists in complete operation in 
some states, in partial operation in others, and in others again is 
obsolete, or totally prohibited.”76 Story counseled that, even in 
jurisdictions in which the state courts enjoyed full equity powers, the 
“general doctrines of the English Chancery” had been “so modified 
by local statutes, usages, and decisions, that it would be somewhat 
hazardous for a lawyer at the chancery bar of Westminster to form an 
opinion as to the authority to give, or to deny relief.”77 Significantly, 
Story concluded that “the deviations in America from the established 
principles of equity were far more considerable than from those of 
the common law.”78 
Other jurists shared Story’s general assessment. In his 
Commentaries on American Law, James Kent described the 
significant variation in state equity practices.79 In an 1831 American 
edition of an English equity treatise, Philadelphia editor Antony 
Laussat explained that “[t]he Equity powers of the courts under the 
several state governments, are very various,”80 and dedicated nine 
pages of his tome to an exposition of their many forms.81 In 1841, the 
editor of The American Chancery Digest, Jacob Wheeler, lamented 
this state of affairs, observing that “we have these numerous separate 
and independent judicatories, as much uninfluenced and unconnected 
between themselves as they are with the equity courts of Great 
Britain, deciding general abstract principles of jurisprudence at 
variance with each other.”82 The sheer variety in state equity practice 
and jurisprudence warrants emphasis because it helps to explain the 
strongly felt need for uniform principles of equity in the federal 
system.83 
 
 76. Joseph Story, An Address Delivered Before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at Their 
Anniversary, at Boston (Sep. 4, 1821), in 1 AM. JURIST 1, 22 (1829); see also 1 STORY, supra note 
70, § 56, at 62 n.1 (“Equity Jurisprudence scarcely had an existence, in any large and appropriate 
sense of the terms, in any part of New England, during its Colonial state.”). 
 77. Story, supra note 76, at 22. 
 78. Id. 
 79. 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 163 n.d (New York, O. Halsted, 
2d ed. 1832). 
 80. 1 HENRY BALLOW, A TREATISE OF EQUITY 13 (John Fonblanque & Antony Laussat 
eds., Phila., John Grigg 3d ed. 1831). 
 81. Id. at 13–21. 
 82. 1 JACOB D. WHEELER, AMERICAN CHANCERY DIGEST, at xii–xiii (New York, Gould, 
Banks & Co., 2d ed. 1841). 
 83. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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Despite misgivings about equity, and despite—or because of—
the variation in the availability of equity in colonial and state court 
systems, the drafters of the Constitution included equity as one of the 
federal courts’ basic powers. Some Antifederalists proclaimed their 
distrust of equity because of its traditional association with broad 
judicial discretion and because they worried about the preservation of 
trial by jury in common law cases.84 But the practical need for equity 
power was overwhelming. Without equity jurisdiction, federal courts 
would have no power in actions raising issues of fraud, mistake, 
hardship, or trusts.85 Relatively little debate concerning Article III 
occurred at the Constitutional Convention, and the decision to give 
federal courts powers in equity was no exception.86 Article III in its 
final form simply commanded that “[t]he judicial Power” of federal 
courts “extend to all Cases[] in . . . Equity.”87 
As with much of the design of the federal judicial system, the 
details of the federal courts’ equity powers were left to Congress and 
the Supreme Court to resolve. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress 
recognized and formalized the federal courts’ equity powers in two 
provisions.88 Section 11 of the 1789 Act endowed circuit courts with 
the authority to decide cases in equity.89 And in Section 16, Congress 
simultaneously confirmed the availability of equity in circuit courts 
 
 84. The worry was that by empowering a single court with both legal and equitable powers, 
equity would subsume the law, nullifying the right to jury available in law. See HOFFER, supra 
note 3, at 95 (“Anti-federalists immediately seized upon the proposed equity power to warn 
against the dangers of uncontrolled discretion in the federal courts. They cited as proof of that 
danger the absence of juries in the chancellors’ chamber.”); RITZ, supra note 55, at 144 (noting 
that, in debates over equity, the First Congress’s “overriding consideration . . . was trial by jury, 
not applicable law” (footnote omitted)). 
 85. With respect to the Constitutional Convention, Hoffer notes the “relative absence of 
controversy over equity at the convention” and suggests that there was “a generally perceived 
need [for federal courts to have equity power] among the delegates.” HOFFER, supra note 3, at 
96–97. Alexander Hamilton observed the necessity of federal equity power. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 480 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“There is hardly a subject of litigation 
between individuals which may not involve those ingredients of fraud, accident, trust, or 
hardship, which would render the matter an object of equitable rather than of legal 
jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 86. See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the 
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1460 (“Little space in members’ sparse 
notes of the Convention’s debates . . . is devoted to the judiciary branch . . . .”). 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 88. For a discussion of the legislative history relating to the inclusion of equity in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, see 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 483–84, 492–94 (1971). 
 89. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
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and memorialized the traditional limitation on equity by making it 
unavailable “in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy 
may be had at law.”90 But nothing in the 1789 Act determined what 
source or sovereign would provide equity principles in the newly 
created federal courts.91 
National legislators trained their attention on federal equity 
when debating the Temporary Process Act of 1789 and the 
Permanent Process Act of 1792, but the resulting statutory language 
provided little clarity regarding what body of equity principles would 
apply in federal court. In a provision that confused as much as it 
elucidated, the Temporary Process Act provided that “the forms and 
modes of proceedings in causes of equity . . . shall be according to the 
course of the civil law.”92 Three years later, Congress returned to the 
drafting table and produced the Permanent Process Act, which stated 
that in equity cases, federal courts were to proceed “according to the 
principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity . . . as 
contradistinguished from courts of common law.”93 Although in its 
basic contours the Permanent Process Act duplicated the Temporary 
Process Act, the permanent act shed some light on the temporary 
act’s ambiguous reference to “civil law”: the processes to be applied 
by federal courts sitting in equity were not those to be applied at law, 
but instead were those that “belong[ed] to courts of equity.”94 
This clarification was partial, as it did not explain which “courts 
of equity” were to provide the principles for adjudication of federal 
equity cases. This issue was briefly raised in debates leading up to the 
enactment of the Permanent Process Act. The slim legislative record 
suggests that at least some legislators may have believed that the 
 
 90. Id. § 16, 1 Stat. at 82. Section 16 codified the longstanding limitation on chancery 
jurisdiction. See Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231, 1233 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 9341) 
(observing that “the sixteenth section of the judiciary law . . . does no more than affirm the 
general principle[s]” that “regulate the jurisdiction of a court of chancery”). 
 91. See RITZ, supra note 55, at 144 (“The First Congress argued about the extent to which 
the national courts should be authorized to exercise any equity jurisdiction, not over the law to 
be applied in such equity jurisdiction as they were allowed.”). Despite reference to “trials at 
common law” in Section 34, some early-nineteenth-century commentators and advocates urged 
that Section 34 required application of state law and equity in actions brought in equity, and 
some modern commentators have followed their lead. See infra note 154. But this was not the 
prevailing view at the time. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 92. Act of Sept. 29, 1789 (Temporary Process Act), ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 (emphasis 
added). Julius Goebel describes the inclusion of the term “civil law” in the Temporary Process 
Act as “something done in haste.” 1 GOEBEL, supra note 88, at 534. 
 93. Act of May 8, of 1792 (Permanent Process Act), ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. 
 94. Id. 
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federal courts would apply nonstate equity procedures, rather than 
conforming to state equity practice.95 But the process acts themselves 
were riddled with ambiguity and failed to resolve the matter. In short, 
Article III extended the judicial power of the federal courts to cases 
brought in equity, but neither the drafters of the Constitution nor the 
early Congresses did much to clarify what, exactly, that would mean 
in a federal judicial system. 
2. Uniformity in Federal Equity.  Given the ambiguity of the 
process acts, determining what sovereign or source would provide 
equity principles in federal court was largely left to federal judges. At 
the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Jay promulgated an order in 1791 
adopting the rules of the Court of Chancery in England to “afford[] 
outlines for the practice of this court” in equity cases.96 But in lower 
federal courts, resort to local equity practice and principles was surely 
the most natural course in states where equity practice existed. 
Evidence suggests that in the 1790s, lower federal court judges were 
indeed applying state equity principles in federal court without 
correction by the Supreme Court.97 In the late 1810s, however, the 
 
 95. In 1792, prior to the enactment of the Permanent Process Act, the Senate introduced a 
process bill that would have eliminated the use of civil law in federal equity cases, replacing it 
instead with directions to follow forum-state equity principles. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 85 
(1792) (“[T]he forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity . . . shall be, except where 
the laws of the United States otherwise provide, according to the course which hath obtained in 
the States respectively in like causes . . . .”). In states without equity courts, the Senate bill 
would have required federal courts to follow the state equity practices of “the nearest State in 
which [equity courts] have been instituted.” Id. The House rejected the equity-conformity 
requirement and replaced it with language similar to that found in the final version of the 
Permanent Process Act: federal equity cases were to be conducted “according to the principles, 
rules and usages, which belong to a court of equity as contra-distinguished from a court of 
common law.” 1 GOEBEL, supra note 88, at 545. 
 96. Rules & Orders of the Supreme Court of the U.S., 5 U.S. (1 Cranch), at xvi (1804) 
(Rule VII, dated Aug. 8, 1791). 
 97. See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 88, at 580–85 (discussing variation in equity practice in the 
circuit courts in the 1790s). Resort to local equity principles may have been particularly 
common in early cases involving disputes over titles to real property. See Bodley v. Taylor, 9 
U.S. (5 Cranch) 191, 221–23 (1809) (relying, in a case brought in equity, on the forum state’s 
court of appeals rulings to determine whether a party could resort “to a court of chancery in 
order to set up an equitable against the legal title” to a parcel of land, and to determine the 
legitimacy of titles); cf. Gilman v. Brown, 10 F. Cas 392, 401–02 (C.C.D. Ma. 1817) (No. 5441) 
(finding that no lien existed on property located in Massachusetts under either general 
principles of equity or, alternatively, on the ground that the absence of chancery courts in 
Massachusetts meant that no lien was available). But other cases from the first decade of the 
nineteenth century portended the application of nonstate equity principles in federal court. 
Riding circuit, for example, Chief Justice Marshall observed that Section 34, by its own terms, 
applied to “suits at common law as contradistinguished from those which come before the court 
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Supreme Court developed a firm principle of uniformity in federal 
equity cases. In equity cases brought in federal courts, a uniform body 
of nonstate, judge-made principles would apply. 
a. Procedure in Equity.  By 1819 at the latest, any doubts 
regarding the source of procedural rules to be followed in federal 
equity cases were settled. In United States v. Howland,98 Chief Justice 
Marshall made clear that federal courts would apply a uniform body 
of equity procedures, regardless of whether the forum state courts 
had equity power, and regardless of whether the forum state courts’ 
equity procedures differed from equity procedures available in 
federal court.99 In Howland, the United States brought an action in 
equity to enforce a judgment against a firm for “duties on imports and 
tonnage” owed. The United States sought an accounting of “goods, 
effects, money and credit” in the hands of one of the firm’s other 
creditors and an injunction to restrain the creditor firm from 
disposing of the assets.100 The enforcement action was brought in 
federal court in Massachusetts, a state that had no court of equity and 
had endowed its law courts with only limited equity power.101 One of 
those limited grants of equity power was an attachment and joinder 
provision, enacted in 1794, that allowed “a creditor to sue the debtor 
of his debtor.”102 
Defendants urged that the federal court lacked power to hear the 
case in equity because the Massachusetts statute provided an 
adequate and complete remedy under Massachusetts law. Hence, 
 
sitting as a court of equity or admiralty.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 188 (C.C.D. Va. 
1807) (No. 14,694). 
 98. United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108 (1819). 
 99. Id. at 115. 
 100. Id. at 109. 
 101. The earliest Massachusetts courts lacked equity powers altogether, but over the course 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the state legislature gradually expanded 
the state courts’ equity powers. When Howland was decided, Massachusetts state courts had 
particular equity powers in cases of foreclosure and redemption of mortgages, Act of Nov. 4, 
1785, ch. 22, 1785 Mass. Acts 474, and in cases involving estates and specific performance of 
contracts, Act of Feb. 10, 1818, ch. 87, 1818 Mass. Acts 486. State statutes empowered courts of 
law to use procedures or provide remedies that traditionally would have been available only in 
equity, including the particular provision at issue in Howland, which allowed courts of law to 
attach the property of a debtors’ debtor. See Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 41, 1794 Mass. Acts 120; 
see also Act of Feb. 18, 1819, ch. 98, 1819 Mass. Acts 148, 148 (providing for the addition of 
parties in suits for the redemption of lands or tenements when such addition is “necessary to the 
attainment of justice”). 
 102. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 115. 
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under Section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the case did not qualify 
for federal equity jurisdiction and state law must apply. The United 
States Attorney General argued that the Massachusetts attachment 
and joinder statute was irrelevant, not because it did not apply by its 
own terms, but because “[t]he power and practice of the Circuit 
Courts, in Chancery cases, are not to be controlled by the local laws 
of the states where those Courts sit. They are the same throughout 
the Union.”103 The Court agreed, finding that federal equity’s more 
generous joinder procedure would apply: 
[T]he remedy in Chancery, where all parties may be brought before 
the Court, is more complete and adequate, as the sum actually due 
may be there, in such cases, ascertained with more certainty and 
facility; and as the Courts of the Union have a Chancery jurisdiction 
in every state, and the judiciary act confers the same Chancery 
powers on all, and gives the same rule of decision, its jurisdiction in 
Massachusetts must be the same as in other States.104 
In 1822, three years after Howland, the quest for uniform equity 
procedure was aided by the promulgation of the first federal rules of 
equity. Likely drafted by Justice Story, the rules codified certain 
uniform equity procedures to be used in the lower federal courts.105 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court issued 
equity rules on one other occasion, in 1842.106 Both sets of Federal 
Equity Rules covered various aspects of equity practice, aiding in the 
pursuit of uniformity in federal equity cases. But the scope of the 
early-nineteenth-century equity rules was limited, and in recognition 
 
 103. Id. at 112. 
 104. Id. at 115 (emphasis added). Several cases followed the Howland principle. See Union 
Bank v. Stafford, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 327, 340 (1851) (rejecting application of a Texas statute of 
limitations on the basis that “these sections can have no application to a bill in equity”); Russell 
v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 147 (1851) (“This being a suit in equity, and oral evidence 
being admitted, or rejected, not by the mere force of any State statute, but upon the principles 
of general equity jurisprudence, this court must be governed by its own views of those 
principles.”); Bennett v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 669, 674–75 (1850) (“Whatever may be 
the laws of Texas [regarding pleading], they do not govern the proceedings in the courts of the 
United States . . . . [If a party asserts an equitable claim], he must proceed according to the rules 
which this court has prescribed . . . regulating proceedings in equity in the courts of the United 
States.”); Harding v. Handy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 103, 132 (1826) (rejecting the applicability of a 
Rhode Island law allowing suits by heirs to set aside a conveyance to proceed without making 
all heirs parties, noting that the state law’s “influence on a suit in equity is not so certain”). 
 105. See Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the U.S., 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.), at v, v–
xiii (1822). 
 106. See Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the U.S., 42 U.S. (3 How.), at xli, xli–
lxx (1842). 
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of their limited scope, both sets of equity rules endowed the circuit 
courts with the authority to “make further rules and regulations, not 
inconsistent with the rules hereby prescribed, in their discretion.”107  
What procedural rule applied in the absence of a federal equity 
rule or a local federal rule? One could imagine a world in which the 
Supreme Court would direct federal judges to default to forum state 
equity procedures, especially in states that recognized equity as part 
of their legal systems. Indeed, such a course was strongly urged.108 But 
consistent with then-established Supreme Court precedent, including 
Howland, the Federal Equity Rules of both 1822 and 1842 pointed 
federal judges to the “practice of the High Court of Chancery in 
England”109 to fill any gaps left after consulting the equity rules and 
any local rules promulgated by the circuit courts. 
The fact that the Federal Equity Rules defaulted to English 
chancery practice may appear a fairly minor, arcane point of early-
nineteenth-century procedural law. But upon reflection, it is quite 
striking that the first procedural rules promulgated by the Supreme 
Court directed lower federal court judges to default to English equity 
principles. In the absence of an applicable federal equity rule, for 
example, a federal court sitting in Georgia was to look to English 
chancery practice to determine what procedures to follow, rather than 
to the practices of Georgia state courts.110 Today, this approach is 
striking because the application of foreign law in federal courts has 
become a lightning-rod issue. But it was equally striking to some 
early-nineteenth-century critics of federal equity, who complained 
bitterly about the application of “alien” law in federal equity cases.111 
b. Equitable Remedies.  By the late 1810s, it was similarly well 
established that a uniform corpus of remedies applied in actions 
 
 107. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity in the U.S., 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.), at xiii, r. 32; 
see also Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity in the U.S., 42 U.S. (3 How.), at lxix, r. 89 
(“The Circuit Courts . . . may make any other and further rules and regulations for the practice, 
proceedings and process . . . not inconsistent with the rules hereby prescribed . . . .”). 
 108. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 109. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.), at 
xiii, r. 33; see also Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity in the United States, 42 U.S. (3 
How.), at lxix, r. 90 (requiring that, absent an applicable rule, federal courts “be regulated by 
the present practice of the High Court of Chancery in England”). 
 110. See, e.g., Neves v. Scott, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 196, 208–09 (1850) (citing English chancery 
cases in an opinion regarding an action filed on the equity side of the Circuit Court of the 
United States for the District of Georgia); see also text accompanying infra notes 162–65. 
 111. 4 REG. DEB. 364 (1828) (statement of Sen. Rowan). See generally infra Part II.B–C. 
COLLINS IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 10/17/2010  10:06:06 PM 
2010] ARTICLE III, EQUITY, AND JUDGE-MADE LAW 275 
brought in federal equity cases, remedies that were derived from 
federal and English sources rather than state law or state equity 
principles.112 This was the case even—and especially—when state law 
or equity would dictate a different result than that mandated by 
equity principles applicable in federal court. Indeed, it was precisely 
in cases in which the law (state or federal) failed to give a complete or 
adequate remedy that federal equity jurisdiction attached under 
Section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, hence triggering the 
application of uniform nonstate equity principles.113 
In 1818, the Supreme Court decided Robinson v. Campbell,114 
which quickly became the leading case in this area. Robinson 
presented a tricky choice-of-law question, but one that was not 
entirely unusual in the early 1800s. Both parties claimed ownership of 
four hundred acres of property located in a region that had once been 
part of Virginia but that had become part of Tennessee pursuant to 
an 1802 compact.115 A question arose as to whether the defendant in 
the action could assert an equitable title as a defense in an ejectment 
action—an action at law—as was allowed in Tennessee courts 
pursuant to a state statute governing priority in land titles.116 Even 
while conceding that the doctrine of lex loci and Section 34 dictated 
that Tennessee law governed,117 Justice Todd rejected the suggestion 
that the Court was required by Section 34 to follow a Tennessee 
statute with respect to the equitable remedies available.118 
In certain respects, Robinson is an odd case to have become a 
leading authority establishing the federal uniform equity doctrine. 
Robinson involved an action brought in law. According to the 
defendant’s attorney, the core issue was whether, in an action brought 
 
 112. This has been called the “equitable remedial rights doctrine.” See 19 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 4513 (2d ed. 1996) (recognizing that, historically, “in some circumstances federal equity courts 
could grant equitable relief that was not available in the courts of the forum state”). The 
existence of this doctrine was discussed and questioned in the years following Guaranty Trust 
Co. v. York, presumably because that opinion seemed to disclaim the existence of a federal 
decisional law of equitable remedies. See, e.g., Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal 
Remedies, 71 HARV. L. REV. 513, 518–19 (1958); Note, The Equitable Remedial Doctrine: Past 
and Present, 67 HARV. L. REV. 836, 843–45 (1954). Guaranty Trust’s disclaimer of a history of 
judge-made law in federal equity cases is discussed in Part III, infra. 
 113. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §16, 1 Stat. 73, 82. 
 114. Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212 (1818). 
 115. Id. at 214. 
 116. Id. at 220–21. 
 117. Id. at 219–21. 
 118. Id. at 222–23. 
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at law, the defendant could assert an equitable title in real property 
because a Tennessee court would have allowed him to do so.119 But 
Justice Todd posed the question differently. To him, the issue was 
whether, Section 34 notwithstanding, Congress had intended to 
“confine the courts of the United States in their mode of 
administering relief to the same remedies, and those only, . . . which 
existed in the courts of the respective states.”120 In other words, were 
lower federal courts required to follow state remedial schemes, in 
which “remedial” was used rather liberally to describe assertion of an 
equitable title? Justice Todd’s answer to this question was negative: 
he explained that the remedies in federal court “are to be, at common 
law or in equity, not according to the practice of state courts, but 
according to the principles of common law and equity, as 
distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our 
knowledge of those principles”121—England. 
Although Justice Todd’s references to remedies “at common law 
or in equity” may seem strange, their context suggests that he sought 
to protect the uniformity of federal equitable remedies against the 
radical disuniformity of state equity practice. Todd was particularly 
concerned about the significant variation in the application of equity 
in state courts: 
In some states in the union, no court of chancery exists to administer 
equitable relief. In some of those states, courts of law recognise and 
enforce in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights which a 
court of equity would recognise and enforce; in others, all relief is 
denied and such equitable claims and rights are to be considered as 
mere nullities at law. A construction, therefore, that would adopt 
the state practice in a[ll] its extent, would at once extinguish, in such 
states, the exercise of equitable jurisdiction [in federal court].122 
Hence, equitable remedies in federal court would conform to a 
national standard and default to English chancery practice, regardless 
of the remedies available in the forum state courts, in law or equity. 
 
 119. Id. at 215 (argument of counsel) (“By the law, as settled in Tennessee, the prior 
settlement right of the defendant, though an equitable title, might be set up as a sufficient title 
in an action at law.”). 
 120. Id. at 222 (opinion of the Court). In other words, Todd explained, the question was 
“whether it was [Congress’s] intention to give the party relief at law, where the practice of the 
state courts would give it, and relief in equity only, when according to such [state] practice, a 
plain, adequate, and complete remedy could not be had at law.” Id. 
 121. Id. at 222–23. 
 122. Id. at 222. 
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This would be so even when those state remedies were defined in a 
statute, and even when those remedies would result in a different 
outcome.123 Over the following decades, Robinson came to stand for 
this basic principle, which was reconfirmed by the Court with great 
vehemence throughout the period124 and (generally) followed with 
great diligence in the circuit courts. Judge Betts of the Southern 
District of New York, sitting in his capacity as circuit court judge, 
made the point exceedingly clear: “The state laws furnish the rule of 
decision in the courts of the United States in cases at common law. 
But the equity jurisdiction of those courts is one and the same in 
every state, and is in no respect dependent upon the local law.”125 
Careful consideration of just two of these many cases highlights 
the significance of the Robinson holding. In Mayer v. Foulkrod,126 a 
circuit court opinion involving a dispute over the administration of an 
estate, Justice Washington rejected an attempt to defeat the circuit 
court’s equity power to order discovery and an accounting. Counsel 
for the defendant argued that under a Pennsylvania statute, an action 
at law could be maintained for recovery of a legacy, including a 
process that would allow the plaintiff to seek an accounting, and 
hence the federal court lacked equity jurisdiction.127 Pennsylvania had 
never established equity courts, but its courts of law had adapted 
some equitable principles and practices, and the state legislature had 
enacted several statutes that provided the law courts with a limited 
range of equitable powers.128 But Justice Washington was adamant 
that neither the state statute respecting legacies nor Pennsylvania’s 
 
 123. Id. at 222–23. 
 124. See, e.g., Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 660 (1835) (reversing the lower 
federal court in Louisiana for failing to apply federal equity rules of discovery and refusing to 
make federal equitable relief available); Boyle v. Zacharie (Boyle II), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648, 658 
(1832) (“[T]he remedies in equity are to be administered, not according to the state practice, but 
according to the practice of courts of equity in the parent country, as contradistinguished from 
that of courts of law.”); see also infra Part II.B–C. 
 125. Lamson v. Mix, 14 F. Cas. 1055, 1056 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1837) (No. 8034) (citing Robinson 
v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212 (1818)). For other circuit court opinions following the 
Robinson rule, see Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231, 1235 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 9341), 
and Bean v. Smith, 2 F. Cas. 1143, 1150 (C.C.D.R.I. 1821) (No. 1174). As discussed in Part II.C, 
infra, not all lower federal court judges were inclined to apply uniform equity principles. 
 126. Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231, 1235 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 9341). 
 127. Id. at 1234; see also Act of Mar. 21, 1772, ch. 654, 1772 Pa. Laws 195, 195 (declaring it 
lawful for a person “to commence, sue and prosecute an action” to recover a legacy). 
 128. See John G. Buchanan, Sources of the Development of Pennsylvania Equity, 8 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 1, 5–9 (1941) (discussing the limited application of equity in the Pennsylvania state 
courts before 1836). 
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limited acceptance of equity practice was of any consequence as to 
what equity principles would apply in federal court. He took the 
opportunity to explain the stark difference between law and equity in 
the federal courts: 
[S]tate laws, respecting rights, are to be considered by the courts of 
the United States as rules of decision . . . . But as to suits in equity, 
state laws, in respect to remedies, . . . could have no effect whatever 
on the jurisdiction of the court, the [Permanent Process Act of 1792] 
having prescribed a rule, by which the line of partition between the 
law and the equity jurisdiction of those courts is distinctly marked.129 
Washington spoke of equity jurisdiction, but that should not lead one 
to think that he meant subject matter jurisdiction, which was 
governed by Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.130 Rather, he 
used the term in a general sense to mean the power of the federal 
court to apply traditional equitable remedies in a case in which legal 
remedies were unavailable or inadequate. And in these cases, 
uniform equitable remedies would apply in federal equity cases 
regardless of the availability or unavailability of equity in the state 
courts. 
The Supreme Court made this point clear in the 1832 case of 
Boyle v. Zacharie.131 In Boyle, Louisiana merchants James Zacharie 
and Samuel Turner sued Baltimore merchant Hugh Boyle in federal 
court in Maryland for monies owed. In 1821, the circuit court had 
entered a judgment against Boyle for approximately $3,000.00.132 But 
 
 129. Mayer, 16 F. Cas. at 1234–35. One reason to focus on the Mayer case is that Fletcher 
relies on it to support his contention that Section 34 applied to actions brought in equity. 
Fletcher argues that, in Mayer, “Washington . . . interpreted [Robinson v.] Campbell to mean 
that questions of rights, both at law and in equity, would be determined according to local state 
law, whereas questions of remedies, both at law and in equity, would be determined according 
to federal court practice.” Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1529 n.72. Certainly language in Mayer 
could be read to mean that federal courts followed state substantive law in equity. However, as 
discussed below, that practice was limited in scope: in certain cases federal courts sitting in 
equity looked to state law to determine the substantive rights of the parties, while in cases 
where equitable rights were at issue, the federal courts turned to uniform nonstate substantive 
equity principles. See infra Part I.B.2.c. Moreover, it is clear that Justice Washington did not 
understand Section 34, even as it applied in cases brought in law, to require conformity with 
respect to all “questions of rights,” as he explained that “[t]he thirty-fourth section of the 
judiciary law of 1789 is very correctly stated . . . to apply only to the rights of persons and of 
property.” Mayer, 15 F. Cas. at 1234. 
 130. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
 131. Boyle v. Zacharie (Boyle I), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 635 (1832); Boyle v. Zacharie (Boyle II), 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648 (1832). 
 132. Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 649. 
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Boyle was insolvent, and Zacharie and Turner would have to wait to 
collect. Several years later, when Boyle’s fortunes had changed, the 
Louisiana merchants sued again to execute the original judgment 
through attachment of a ship owned by Boyle, the General Smith.133 
Boyle filed a bill in equity in federal circuit court, seeking an 
injunction on the grounds that a Maryland insolvency statute barred 
execution of the 1821 judgment.134 The federal circuit court in 
Maryland temporarily granted Boyle’s request for an injunction 
staying execution of the judgment but then promptly allowed the 
execution to go forward.135 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, reciting the standard 
refrain that “[t]he chancery jurisdiction given by the constitution and 
laws of the United States is the same in all states of the union,” and 
explaining that “the remedies in equity are to be administered, not 
according to the state practice, but according to the practice of courts 
of equity in the parent country, as contradistinguished from that of 
courts of law.”136 With this in mind, the Court insisted that “the effect 
of the injunction granted by the circuit court was to be decided by the 
general principles of courts of equity, and not by any peculiar statute 
enactments of the state of Maryland.”137 As in Mayer, the fact that a 
state statute would have dictated a very different result was of no 
moment.138 
It is worth pausing to consider just how different this doctrinal 
world was in contrast to the modern Erie doctrine. Today, in federal 
diversity cases, absent a specific, codified federal procedural rule or 
statute on point, a state rule applies under basic vertical choice-of-law 
 
 133. Boyle I, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 642. 
 134. Id. at 638; Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 654–55. Boyle also filed a motion to quash the 
venditioni exponas, a writ of execution directed at the sheriff or marshal to order the sale of 
property in satisfaction of a judgment. Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 654–55. 
 135. Boyle I, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 643. 
 136. Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 658 (citing United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
108, 115 (1819); Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 220 (1818)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. In fact, Boyle relied on two state statutes to support his case: the insolvent act of 
Maryland, which the Court held not to apply in a federal equity case, Boyle I, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 
642–43, and a Maryland statute governing the effect of injunctions on executions of judgments, 
Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 657–58. The circuit court granted Boyle’s request for a temporary 
stay of the execution and apparently had not vacated that stay in equity before issuing or 
reissuing the writ of execution. Boyle II, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 655. Boyle claimed that, in so doing, 
the circuit court violated a Maryland statute governing equity practice. Id. at 657–58. The 
Supreme Court made clear that such state statues had neither force nor effect in federal court. 
Id. at 658–59. 
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doctrine if application of that state rule is outcome determinative.139 
But in the early nineteenth century, a contrary vision of federal equity 
power prevailed. According to this vision, it was commonsensical that 
a federal court sitting in equity would supply a remedy even when a 
state court would not. A central purpose of equity was to remedy the 
deficiencies of the common law, and equity traditionally did so by 
providing a remedy only when no such remedy was available in law or 
when the available legal remedy was incomplete or inadequate. Thus, 
equitable remedies were by their very nature “outcome 
determinative” relative to legal remedies.140 And in the early 
nineteenth century this truism was incorporated into the federal 
system, resulting in a vertical choice-of-law doctrine that required 
application of uniform nonstate equity principles when state law or 
equity failed to provide adequate relief. 
c. Equitable Rights.  By today’s jurisprudential standards, the 
most complex and controversial aspect of the uniformity principle in 
federal equity cases was its application to what early-nineteenth-
century jurists labeled “equitable rights.” This was not just the 
provision of an equitable remedy when legal liability had been 
demonstrated but could not be remedied at law. It was the provision 
of a substantive right or liability rule. 
Equity jurisprudence was (and is) often described as a system of 
remedies and procedures. Thus, one function of equity courts was to 
provide remedies for the violation of rights that, although recognized 
in courts of law, could not be adequately remedied in those courts.141 
But as Justice Story explained in his monumental treatise on equity 
jurisprudence, courts of equity could also “administer remedies for 
rights, which rights Courts of Common Law do not recognise at all; 
or, if they do recognise them, they leave them wholly to the 
conscience and good-will of the parties.”142 Thus, for example, over 
 
 139. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (applying the “outcome-determination” 
test of Guaranty Trust in light of the “twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws”); Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (interpreting Erie to require that “the outcome of the litigation in the 
federal court should be substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a State court”). 
 140. See infra Part III. 
 141. 1 STORY, supra note 70, at 28. 
 142. Id. As examples of equitable rights, Story listed trusts and certain kinds of mistake, 
accident, and fraud claims, as well as penalties, oppressive proceedings, undue advantages, 
betrayals of confidence, and unconscionable bargains, “in all of which Courts of Equity will 
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time the Chancery Court developed expertise and authority over 
particular fields, including trusts, fraud, mortgages, and 
guardianships. Although some equitable rights originated in the 
Chancery Court’s substantial remedial authority, by the early 
nineteenth century equity also provided a well-developed body of 
substantive jurisprudence that governed the primary rights and 
liabilities of individuals in a range of matters.143 And in federal court 
in the early nineteenth century, federal or English equity provided 
those principles. 
Schooled as we are in legal realism, the application of nonstate, 
judge-made equitable rules to determine the substantive rights of the 
parties should not offend our modern sensibilities any more or less 
than the provision of an equitable remedy when a state court would 
have supplied none. In both cases the outcome of the litigation—the 
final entry of judgment by the court and the execution of that 
judgment through court-ordered processes—turned on a nonstate, 
judge-made rule.144 And for this reason, discriminating between 
equitable remedies and equitable rights in certain cases is difficult, if 
not impossible. But because the application of judge-made 
substantive law in federal courts threatens a vital fault line in modern 
theories of federal judicial power, twentieth-century analyses of 
nineteenth-century federal equity have tended to focus on whether 
federal courts had authority to apply substantive judge-made 
equitable principles distinct from the legal or equity principles 
applicable in the forum state courts. 
These analyses have resulted in conflicting accounts. 
Immediately following Erie’s condemnation of the application of 
general common law in federal court, the question arose as to 
whether—and to what extent—Erie’s holding applied in federal 
equity cases. Guaranty Trust v. York provided the definitive answer, 
resolving that the Erie principle applied to all aspects of a case in 
 
interfere and grant redress; but which the Common Law takes no notice of, or silently 
disregards.” Id. at 28–29. 
 143. As Christopher Langdell would explain in the late nineteenth century, equity was not 
“simply a different system of remedies from those administered in courts of law; for there are 
many extensive doctrines in equity, and some whole branches of law, which are unknown to the 
common-law courts.” C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING, at xxv 
(Cambridge, Charles W. Sever 1877). 
 144. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897) 
(“[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things 
he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court;—and so of a legal right.”). 
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which equitable remedies were sought.145 But Frankfurter did little to 
distinguish the Court’s early-nineteenth-century equity cases, 
proclaiming instead that “[i]n giving federal courts ‘cognizance’ of 
equity suits in cases of diversity jurisdiction, Congress never gave, nor 
did the federal courts ever claim, the power to deny substantive rights 
created by State law or to create substantive rights denied by State 
law.”146 
Some contemporary commentators agreed with Justice 
Frankfurter’s assessment, arguing that application of nonstate equity 
principles in federal court had, in fact, never extended to questions of 
substantive law.147 In more recent commentary, in the context of 
Section 34 jurisprudence, William Fletcher essentially concurs with 
that assessment, concluding that, “as a routine matter, the federal 
courts sitting in equity followed local state law,” and that “questions 
of rights, both at law and equity, [were] determined according to local 
state law.”148 
Others have taken a very different position on this issue.149 
Examining the federal right to a jury trial in the early nineteenth 
century, Professors Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins observe 
that “the substantive law that applied in federal equity proceedings 
was frequently either federal or general law rather than state law.”150 
 
 145. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (declaring that state law “ought to 
govern” in federal court “whether the remedies be sought at law or may be had in equity”); see 
also discussion infra note 391. 
 146. Id. at 105. For further discussion of Justice Frankfurter’s treatment of the historical 
record in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, see infra Part III. 
 147. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1027–28 
(1953) (“[A]nalysis of the pre-Erie cases shows that almost invariably the uniformity of decision 
in federal equity was understood to be a uniformity only in matters of practice and remedy.”). 
 148. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1529, 1529–30 n.72. 
 149. In addition to the sources discussed herein, see John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in 
Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1999), Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary 
Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 469 (2003), and Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law 
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29 (1985). An earlier generation of legal 
scholars also discussed the existence of a more robust tradition of federal judge-made law in 
equity. See, e.g., CROSSKEY, supra note 17, at 877–902 (arguing that, when sitting in equity, 
early-nineteenth-century federal courts often disregarded state equity and common-law 
principles); Howard Newcomb Morse, The Substantive Equity Historically Applied by the U.S. 
Courts, 54 DICK. L. REV. 10, 13 (1949) (“The equity jurisdiction of the United States courts in 
the several states has repeatedly been held to be uniform . . . .”); Seymour D. Thompson, 
Federal Jurisdiction in Equity, 12 GREEN BAG 119, 119 (1900) (showing examples of federal 
courts in equity recognizing substantive rights that did not exist under the laws of the states). 
 150. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 619 
(2001); see also Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled 
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In the context of an analysis of the scope and operation of federal 
subject matter jurisdiction, Professor Laura Fitzgerald similarly 
argues that the Judiciary Act of 1789 “authorized the federal judiciary 
to develop for itself a uniquely federal law of equity,” observing that 
“[a]lthough Congress required federal courts to follow state rules of 
decision in common law cases, absent controlling federal 
constitutional or statutory authority, they were not so confined when 
deciding cases in equity.”151 And in the course of examining the 
origins of federal common law review of the actions of federal and 
state officials, Professor John Duffy describes nineteenth-century 
federal equity as “a domain of federal judge-made law.”152 
A closer look at early federal equity jurisprudence helps explain 
why modern jurists and scholars disagree about the choice-of-law rule 
governing substantive law in early-nineteenth-century equity cases, as 
there appears to have been some truth in both positions. Section 34, 
by its own terms, applied only to actions at common law—a fact that 
led early-nineteenth-century treatise writer Thomas Sergeant to 
declare that the provision was irrelevant to suits filed in equity.153 But 
others had a different view. For example, William Rawle, the United 
States Attorney for Pennsylvania under President Washington and a 
successful Supreme Court advocate in the 1810s, contended in an 
1825 treatise that Section 34’s apparent mandate that federal courts 
apply state law was “so convenient and appropriate” to “appl[y] to 
cases in equity, that we may consider it likely to be adopted,” though 
he conceded that “[i]t does not appear that this point has yet been 
directly decided.”154 
This conundrum was gradually, and imperfectly, resolved 
through a rather complicated doctrinal scheme. As a general matter, 
 
Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 104–05 (1997) (“In equity, where Congress had not directed the use 
of state procedures, the federal courts provided effective relief for federal rights claimants with 
even less attention to the strictures of state law than in actions at law.”). 
 151. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1263 (2001). 
 152. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 
126 (1998). 
 153. See THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 148 (Phila., P.H. Nicklin & T. 
Johnson 2d ed. 1830) (1822) (“[The 34th] section is confined to civil proceedings . . . . A case in 
equity must be governed by those rules and principles which prevail in equity.”). 
 154. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 249 (Phila., H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825). In support of his contention that “the federal 
courts sitting in equity followed local state law,” Fletcher observes that “Rawle considered the 
lex loci principle to apply to suits in equity,” Fletcher, supra note 8, at 1529–30. Fletcher, 
however, does not reference Rawle’s caveat that, as of 1825 when Rawle’s treatise was 
published, the matter had not yet been directly decided, RAWLE, supra, at 249. 
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the question of what source of law would provide the substantive law 
in a federal equity case turned on whether the right or claim being 
asserted was traditionally understood as legal or equitable. If the 
underlying right derived from a legal source—for example, the 
common law or a statute providing a legal right or obligation—then 
Section 34 generally governed, requiring judges to engage in the 
rather confusing process of determining whether the case before them 
was one in which state law “applied.”155 But if the right or claim was 
traditionally defined in equity, then federal judges generally applied 
federal or English equity principles rather than state equity or law. 
Riding circuit in Massachusetts, Justice Story applied this 
principle in Powell v. Monson & Brimfield Manufacturing Co.,156 a 
case in which a widow sought assignment of her dower.157 Defendants 
urged that Mrs. Powell had released her dower rights pursuant to a 
Massachusetts statute, despite apparent irregularities in that release.158 
Story explained that, in this scenario, the court was obliged to look to 
the language of the Massachusetts statute to determine whether Mrs. 
Powell’s release in fact complied with the statute.159 He concluded that 
it had not, rejecting the defendants’ contention that in “a case in 
equity, . . . the court will grant great indulgences to the imperfect acts 
of parties to sustain their intentions; and that it will not lend its aid to 
enforce any inequitable claim.”160 Story explained, 
  The parties stand upon their legal rights, and what is not a bar of 
dower at law ought not, under the circumstances of the case, to be 
held a bar in equity. Here, no fraud or imposition is set up. The case 
stands upon its naked rights; and the relief asked, is not rebutted by 
any counter equity . . . .161 
 
 155. See supra Part I.A. Even when a federal court turned to state law to determine the 
primary right or liability, that federal court might still provide a federal equitable remedy when 
such a remedy would not be available under state law. See discussion and sources supra note 31. 
 156. Powell v. Monson & Brimfield Mfg. Co., 19 F. Cas. 1218 (C.C.D. Mass. 1824) (No. 
11,356). 
 157. Id. at 1219. 
 158. Id. at 1219–20. 
 159. Id. at 1220. 
 160. Id. at 1222. 
 161. Id. (emphasis added). Examples abound of federal courts applying state law to 
determine the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties in equity cases. See Walker v. 
Parker, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 166, 174 (1839) (applying Maryland law to interpret the will to resolve 
the claims of a decedent’s widow and infant son in an action at equity); McCormick v. Sullivant, 
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192, 201 (1825) (dismissing a bill in equity on the ground that the will 
allegedly conveying the real property had not been “duly proved” according to the laws of the 
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In such a case, the federal court would follow the state statute. 
As Justice Story intimated, however, if the right in question derived 
from equity—if it had evolved from jurisprudence developed by the 
Chancery Court, such as the law of “fraud or imposition”—then 
equity principles would apply. And when equitable rights were at 
stake in federal court, uniform nonstate equity principles would 
generally apply. 
The 1850 Supreme Court case Neves v. Scott162 provides a good 
example of this phenomenon. The Neves case concerned the 
enforceability of what was then known as a marriage settlement,163 a 
type of trust traditionally administered in equity. The question before 
the Court in Neves was whether a federal court in Georgia would 
enforce a bilateral marriage settlement against third parties, 
notwithstanding the fact that under Georgia’s own equity principles 
such a settlement was enforceable only against parties to the 
agreement and consanguineous relations.164 Thus, the Justices were 
forced to choose between the broader federal equity rule and the 
explicitly narrower rule required under the forum states’ equity 
jurisprudence. By choosing the former, the Justices indicated that 
they understood that federal equity provided a distinct rule of 
decision with respect to the underlying rights and liabilities of the 
parties: 
Wherever a case in equity may arise and be determined, under the 
judicial power of the United States, the same principles of equity 
must be applied to it, and it is for the courts of the United States, 
and for this court in the last resort, to decide what those principles 
are, and to apply such of them, to each particular case, as they may 
find justly applicable thereto. . . . [I]n all the States, the equity law, 
recognized by the Constitution and by acts of Congress, and 
 
state in which the property lay); Talbot v. Simpson, 23 F. Cas. 644, 646 (C.C.D. Pa. 1815) (No. 
13,730) (finding that a husband’s conveyance of his wife’s property to a third party conformed 
with the statutory requirements of privy examination of the wife by a magistrate, and rejecting 
the argument that principles of equity mandated a different result). 
 162. Neves v. Scott (Neves I), 50 U.S. (9 How.) 196 (1850). 
 163. Id. at 197; see also Neves v. Scott (Neves II), 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268 (1851) (rehearing 
and approving of Neves I). 
 164. Neves II, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 271; see also MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE 
LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 89–90, 112–15 (1986) (discussing the evolution of the 
enforcement of bilateral or “simple” marriage settlements). 
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modified by the latter, is administered by the courts of the United 
States, and upon appeal by this court.165 
In both the language and tenor of Neves, the Court registered its 
insistence that the lower federal courts apply uniform equity 
principles, even when doing so required the court to disregard state 
equity principles. 
This basic principle applied even when no state law or equity 
provision provided an analogous right or liability. Perhaps the most 
dramatic example of this phenomenon is Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & 
Belmont Bridge Co.166 In Wheeling Bridge, Pennsylvania sued the 
Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company, seeking to enjoin the 
construction of a bridge across the Ohio River. Because of its height, 
the bridge would have obstructed steamboat traffic to key trading 
outlets on the Ohio River, including those in Pennsylvania.167 One of 
the significant obstacles for Pennsylvania in Wheeling Bridge was the 
absence of a statutory or common law basis for its assertion that the 
bridge constituted a nuisance warranting an injunction. Plans for the 
bridge had been approved by the Virginia legislature and acquiesced 
to by Congress. Hence, counsel for the defendants urged that the 
bridge could “in no sense be considered a nuisance.”168 Conceding 
that “the federal courts have no jurisdiction of common-law 
offences,” and that in law such offenses were defined by state 
common law or a federal or state statute, the Court turned to its 
chancery power, citing Robinson for a well-settled principle: 
In exercising this jurisdiction, the courts of the Union are not limited 
by the chancery system adopted by any State, and they exercise their 
functions in a State where no court of chancery has been established. 
The usages of the High Court of Chancery in England, whenever the 
jurisdiction is exercised, govern the proceedings. This may be said to 
be the common law of chancery, and since the organization of the 
government, it has been observed.169 
 
 165. Neves II, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 272. Although the Court was insistent that federal equity 
principles governed in federal equity cases, it was not entirely insensitive to the status of the 
Georgia Supreme Court. It took pains to examine relevant Georgia precedent and expressed 
great “respect . . . for that learned and able court.” Id. 
 166. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851). 
 167. Id. at 557. 
 168. Id. at 563. 
 169. Id. (citing Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222 (1818)). 
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Pursuant to its broad chancery powers, the Court found that the 
bridge caused “private and . . . irreparable injury,” which “makes the 
obstruction a private nuisance to the injured party” that could be 
remedied in equity.170 
Wheeling Bridge was heard by the Supreme Court pursuant to its 
original jurisdiction, but the same principles applied in cases brought 
in lower federal courts, even when the state courts did not recognize 
or enforce the particular right in question in law or equity. For 
example, in Fletcher v. Morey,171 a London merchant sought to 
enforce an equitable lien against a bankrupt Boston firm to which it 
had extended credit pursuant to a written agreement.172 The plaintiff 
claimed that the lien was created by the agreement, but the defendant 
urged that such a lien could not be recognized or enforced by the 
federal court because Massachusetts courts would not recognize such 
a lien.173 Relying on English and federal case law, Justice Story, riding 
circuit, found that the agreement indeed created an equitable lien,174 
and he rejected the notion that such a lien could not be created by a 
contract executed in Massachusetts: 
It has been long since settled in the courts of the United States, that 
the equity jurisdiction and equity jurisprudence administered in the 
courts of the United States are coincident and coextensive with that 
exercised in England, and are not regulated by the municipal 
jurisprudence of the particular state, where the court sits.175 
Several years earlier, Justice Story had also made clear that 
rights defined and created in English chancery court would be 
enforced in federal court, even when they conflicted with a state 
statute or the state supreme court’s interpretation of that statute. 
 
 170. Id. at 564. Although the Court used the language of “relief,” id., the Court in Wheeling 
Bridge was not simply determining whether the infringement of a right could be remedied, but 
also was ascertaining the rights of Pennsylvania to be free of the alleged nuisance that would be 
caused by the bridge. This point is underscored and illuminated by Chief Justice Roger Taney’s 
dissent, in which he questioned “by what law, or under what authority, this court can adjudge it 
to be a public nuisance and proceed to abate it, either upon a proceeding in chancery or by a 
process at law.” Id. at 580–81 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). 
 171. Fletcher v. Morey, 9 F. Cas. 266 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 4864). 
 172. Id. at 267. 
 173. Id. at 269. 
 174. Id. at 270. 
 175. Id. at 271 (citing United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 115 (1819); 
Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 220 (1818)). 
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Flagg v. Mann176—a case that, because of allegations of fraud, fell 
within the Massachusetts federal court’s equity jurisdiction177—
demonstrates just how far the uniformity principle extended to ensure 
the application of nonstate equity instead of state law or equity. In 
Flagg, Henry Flagg filed a bill in equity to set aside certain 
conveyances of property by Samuel Mann as fraudulent. A central 
question in the case was whether Flagg and Mann were tenants in 
common or were otherwise in a fiduciary relationship at the time of 
the conveyance—a precondition for Flagg’s fraud claim.178 As of the 
late 1830s, when Flagg filed suit in federal circuit court in 
Massachusetts, the state courts had been given limited equity powers 
by the state legislature, including the power to “determine in equity, 
all disputes between co-partners, joint tenants and tenants in 
common.”179 Hence, the issue was whether the federal court was 
bound by such state legislation, and state court interpretation of such 
legislation, when exercising its equity power. 
In Flagg that issue was particularly salient because, in a prior 
action involving the same parties and facts, Massachusetts’s highest 
court had held that, under the relevant state statute, Flagg and Mann 
were not tenants in common, “and that therefore the bill was not 
maintainable.”180 Flagg refiled in federal court, and Justice Story, 
sitting as Circuit Justice, expressed his “distress” regarding the 
Massachusetts court’s determination of Flagg and Mann’s status. 
Story purportedly objected not to the Massachusetts court’s 
interpretation of its “local law,” but rather to its views “upon general 
principles of interpretation applicable to courts of equity,” which “are 
not, and cannot from their nature be, conclusive upon this court, in a 
suit in equity addressed to its general jurisdiction.”181 In a lengthy 
opinion that relied on “ancient and modern authority, . . . the positive 
rule of the Roman law, . . . [the law of] continental Europe, and the 
actual jurisprudence of England and America,”182 Story found that 
Flagg and Mann were “in a court of equity at least, . . . tenants in 
 
 176. Flagg v. Mann, 9 F. Cas. 202 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 4847). 
 177. Id. at 231. 
 178. Id. at 215. 
 179. Act of Feb. 21, 1824, ch. 140, § 2, 1824 Mass. Acts 399, 399. 
 180. Flagg, 9 F. Cas. at 223. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 216. 
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common,”183 and that the defendant “was guilty of a wrong and 
constructive fraud upon the rights and equity of the said Flagg.”184 
In sum, the vertical choice-of-law regime that determined the 
substantive legal and equitable principles applicable in federal equity 
cases was exceedingly complex. In a case like Powell, the plaintiffs 
rested their claim to an equitable remedy—assignment of dower—on 
a legal right to dower and on a Massachusetts statute. In such cases, 
the federal courts would first determine, pursuant to Section 34, 
whether to apply local law or general common law to resolve the 
underlying legal issue,185 and then apply federal equity principles to 
determine whether a violation was remediable in equity. By contrast, 
Neves, Wheeling Bridge, Fletcher, and Flagg were all cases in which a 
party asserted claims based on rights as defined in equity. In those 
cases, nonstate uniform equity principles were used to resolve those 
claims. 
These general principles were not always followed perfectly, 
especially because the line between an equitable right and an 
equitable remedy was so imperfectly discernible.186 And in the 1850s, 
the application of nonstate equity principles to determine the rights of 
the parties found a critic in Chief Justice Taney, even as he endorsed 
federal uniformity in equitable remedies and procedures.187 But 
 
 183. Id. at 223. 
 184. Id. at 231. 
 185. See supra Part I.A. 
 186. In addition, by the 1840s the Court seems to have developed two exceptions to the 
general practice that equitable rights would be defined by a uniform corpus of nonstate equity 
principles. First, in the case of land titles, the Court made clear that “when investigating and 
decreeing on titles in this country, we must deal with them, in practice, as we find them, . . . so as 
to give effect to state legislation and state policy.” Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 204 
(1839). The Court, however, was also careful to note that, when sitting in equity, it would not 
“depart[] . . . from what legitimately belongs to the practice of a Court of Chancery.” Id. 
Second, after struggling to determine the force and effect of English equity principles governing 
charitable trusts in Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart’s Executors, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 1 (1819), the Court in Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844), 
found that a challenge to a charitable trust established for the benefit of Philadelphia failed 
under “the law of charities in Pennsylvania,” id. at 196. 
 187. Although Chief Justice Taney generally endorsed the proposition that federal courts 
sitting in equity followed uniform federal principles, sitting as a Circuit Justice in Meade v. 
Beale, 16 F. Cas. 1283 (C.C.D. Md. 1850) (No. 9371), Taney suggested a different view of the use 
of federal principles in determining “equitable rights.” Although Taney recognized that “the 
jurisprudence of England is to be observed in [federal courts] in administering the remedy for 
an existing right,” that rule “applies to the remedy and not the right.” Id. at 1291. “[T]he right 
must be given by the law of the state, or of the United States.” Id. For discussion of Taney’s 
dissent in Wheeling Bridge, see supra note 170. 
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despite such criticism, and although Section 34 and general principles 
of comity sometimes led federal courts to apply local law in equity 
cases, federal courts generally applied federal equity principles, with a 
default to English chancery practice. 
*          *          * 
It is tempting to understand the uniform nonstate equity 
principles applied in federal court as a direct analogue to the general 
common law—a general body of principles that were employed by 
both state and federal judges.188 Nineteenth-century jurists sometimes 
referred to the equity principles that applied in federal courts as 
general or universal. But it is important to recognize the significant 
differences between the general common law and the uniform equity 
principles applied by federal courts. Although some state courts 
surely drew on the same equity principles, it was routinely 
acknowledged that the equity principles applicable in federal courts 
were not available in many state courts. Indeed, Section 16 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 required federal judges to evaluate the 
adequacy of state law against traditional equity principles.189 When 
state law (or equity) failed to provide an adequate or complete 
remedy—as measured by federal judges against traditional equity 
principles—a uniform corpus of federal and English equity principles 
would apply in their stead. In this regard, the equity principles 
applied in federal court were, in the United States context, federal 
rather than general in character.  
The equity principles applied in federal court were not, however, 
considered supreme federal law that state courts were required to 
apply, and in that regard they were unlike today’s federal common 
law.190 Indeed, it was not even intimated that state courts would or 
should apply federal equity principles, as was sometimes suggested of 
the general common law principles provided in federal opinions.191 
Rather, the uniform equity doctrine was understood only to require 
 
 188. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (“[S]uits in equity shall not be 
sustained . . . in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.”). 
 190. See Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964) (observing that post-Erie federal common law “is truly uniform 
because, under the supremacy clause, it is binding in every forum”). 
 191. Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) (noting that the Swift doctrine 
had failed to lead the state courts to conform with general common law as provided in federal 
court decisions). 
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application of a single body of equity principles throughout the 
federal judicial system. 
Finally, as the foregoing analysis of early-nineteenth-century 
federal case law demonstrates, the equity principles applied in federal 
court were federal in the sense that federal judges frequently 
distinguished them from state law that generally applied on the law 
side of the docket. Discursively, the equity side of the federal docket 
was a recognized site of judge-made decisional rules that, in many 
states, were available in federal courts only. 
II.  FOREIGN LAW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Shifting attention to federal equity power provides a fresh 
perspective on the history of judge-made law in the federal courts and 
also prompts consideration of a different set of issues: Why did the 
federal uniform equity doctrine evolve as it did? What does it reveal 
about early-nineteenth-century understandings of the role of the 
federal courts vis-à-vis the states and Congress? If there was vocal 
resistance to the application of nonstate equity in federal courts—as 
there was—why didn’t Congress rein in federal equity power? After 
all, for much of this period, Congress was dominated by legislators 
who tended to resist, or purported to resist, efforts to nationalize 
government functions. 
A focus on the history of federal equity illuminates 
underexamined sources that help answer these questions. The 
uniform federal equity doctrine prompted substantial debate, a fact 
that makes federal equity a particularly fruitful subject for analysis.192 
National legislators quarreled over whether federal courts sitting in 
equity should be required to apply state law and equity. State officials 
petitioned Congress, challenging the availability of federal equitable 
remedies in cases in which state law or equity provided none. And in 
at least in one state, lower federal court judges simply refused to 
apply federal and English equity principles, openly resisting repeated 
Supreme Court mandates. Thus, analyzing the history of judge-made 
law in the federal courts through the lens of equity prompts 
examination of a host of sources generated by players from different 
corners of the early-nineteenth-century legal community. Considering 
 
 192. By contrast, the Swift opinion was unanimous; it was readily followed by lower federal 
judges; it received very little attention in legal periodicals and reviews; and it did not give rise to 
cries for congressional intervention. FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE, supra note 13, at 
2–3. 
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these perspectives provides a much fuller account of contemporary 
views regarding nonstate, judge-made law in federal courts than could 
be provided by focusing on judicial opinions alone. 
Analysis of two episodes in which federal judges’ application of 
nonstate equity principles precipitated significant contests helps 
explain why the federal uniform equity doctrine prevailed. The first 
episode occurred in the aftermath of the Panic of 1819 and concerned 
the particular response of Kentucky state and federal courts to the 
wave of lawsuits that followed as debtors were unable to fulfill their 
contractual obligations. The second is the cause célèbre of Myra Clark 
Gaines, a fraud case that originated in New Orleans and captured the 
attention of both the nation and the Supreme Court. 
Upon first impression, these two contests concerning federal 
equity power may seem to have concerned outlier cases in the 
Supreme Court—literally, cases that involved federal courts on the 
territorial fringes of the republic—and hence would not have 
reflected concerns central to the operation of the federal courts more 
generally. But I argue that it was precisely because these two contests 
were geographically remote from the metropolitan centers of the East 
Coast that they raised an issue of substantial importance: institutional 
uniformity and the capacity of the federal judicial system. 
A primary concern during this period was the failure of the 
federal courts to keep pace with westward expansion. New states—
states incorporated into the Union after 1789—often received 
inadequate federal judicial resources and were entirely left out of 
important federal judicial legislation. Such systemic inadequacies 
were a constant source of complaint, debate, and calls for judicial 
reform. And they also occasioned and created—in the Supreme Court 
and in Congress—a felt need for system-wide uniformity in the 
federal courts. Although social needs do not necessarily translate into 
law,193 in this situation the institutional conditions and realities of the 
early-nineteenth-century federal court system helped shape the 
federal uniform equity doctrine and prompted Congress’s repeated 
acquiescence to it. In the face of concerns over the federal judiciary’s 
failure to provide uniform judicial services, and significant disparity in 
the states’ embrace of equity, the Supreme Court used uniform equity 
 
 193. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 101 (1984) (“If a 
society’s law can’t be understood as an objective response to objective historical processes, 
neither can it be understood as a neutral technology adapted to the needs of that particular 
society.”). 
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as one way to secure a modicum of horizontal consistency throughout 
the federal judicial system. And it did so in the context of a complex 
institutional relationship with a Congress that was unable or unwilling 
to engage in substantial, and much-needed, judicial reform. 
A. New States, Orphan States, and Quasi-Circuit Courts 
In many accounts, the Supreme Court in the early national 
period is portrayed as a Leviathan-like adjudicative body. Federal-
court-empowering opinions of the 1810s and 1820s are explained as a 
consequence of institutional aggrandizement by Chief Justice 
Marshall and other federalist-minded Justices on the Court.194 
Extending this characterization of the Court into the tenure of Chief 
Justice Taney, scholars have argued that even as President Andrew 
Jackson’s appointees gained presence and power on the Court in the 
1830s and 1840s, it continued to exhibit nationalizing tendencies.195 
With little effort, one can see how the uniform equity doctrine would 
seem to fit into this narrative. Through this doctrine, the Court 
empowered itself and the lower federal courts to largely disregard 
state law and equity when sitting in equity, thereby strengthening 
federal judicial authority and concomitantly weakening the authority 
of state courts and legislatures. 
There is, however, another perspective on the Supreme Court’s 
institutional status in the early nineteenth century, one that draws 
attention to the Court’s role as the head of a rather loosely organized 
system of lower federal courts and its complex relationship with 
Congress. In this period, the federal judiciary was still a system in the 
making, and the lower courts frequently labored with woefully 
inadequate institutional resources, especially in the farther reaches of 
the republic. Undoubtedly, concerns about the Court’s nationalizing 
 
 194. As G. Edward White has noted, historians regularly use “four talismanic labels” to 
describe the Marshall Court: “[I]t was a ‘nationalistic,’ ‘Federalist,’ ‘property-conscious,’ and 
‘Chief Justice-dominated’ Court.” G. Edward White, The Art of Revising History: Revisiting the 
Marshall Court, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 659, 671 (1982). 
 195. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Article IV and Federal 
Powers, 1836–1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 695, 742 (“A summary of the achievements of the Court 
over which Taney presided would include a rather generous interpretation of congressional and 
presidential power . . . [and] a striking expansion of federal judicial authority beyond the 
boundaries set by the Marshall Court . . . .”). Some scholars emphasize the Court’s ideological 
transformation under Presidents Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren. See FORREST 
MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776–1876, at 118–19 
(2000); Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political Fragmentation, 
and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REV. 95, 145–46 (2009). 
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tendencies gave rise to episodic efforts to restrict the authority of the 
federal courts.196 But concerns about the lower federal courts’ 
institutional inadequacies gave rise to constant complaints and myriad 
legislative proposals to reform and expand the federal judicial system. 
A brief sketch of the organization and operation of the federal 
judicial system during this period is essential to understanding 
contemporary fears of institutional incapacity, and how the felt need 
for institutional judicial reform helped shape the Court’s equity 
doctrine. 
Although contemporaries referred to it as a system, the lower 
federal courts of the early nineteenth century hardly resembled 
today’s well-organized and well-staffed federal judiciary. First, the 
judiciary was quite small during this period. In 1789, there were 
thirteen district court judges;197 by 1840, there were twenty-nine.198 
District courts exercised original jurisdiction over certain cases 
involving crimes, admiralty law, and land law.199 The circuit courts 
functioned both as intermediate courts of appeals and as courts of 
original jurisdiction in several significant classes of cases, including 
diversity cases, certain criminal cases, and certain cases in which the 
United States was a plaintiff.200 Until the late nineteenth century, the 
circuit courts were composed of two judges: the itinerant Circuit 
Justice assigned to the particular judicial circuit and the local district 
 
 196. The most famous of these efforts was the proposal to repeal Section 25 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, which empowered the Supreme Court to review state-court judgments in which the 
constitutionality of a federal law was “drawn in[to] question,” or where the constitutionality of a 
state law was upheld. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86. For deeper 
background on Section 25, see Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme 
Court of the United States—A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act [Part 
One], 47 AM. L. REV. 1 (1913); Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme 
Court of the United States—A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act [Part 
Two], 47 AM. L. REV. 161 (1913). 
 197. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 2, 1 Stat. at 73. 
 198. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 394 (2d ed. 2002) (“As 
new states were admitted to the Union, each was organized as a single judicial district with a 
single judge without regard to the size of the district.”). Although there were only twenty-six 
states in 1840, in three of the original thirteen states Congress had created two districts. See Act 
of Apr. 29, 1812, 2 Stat. 719 (New York); Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 108, § 3, 3 Stat. 462 
(Pennsylvania); Act of Feb. 4, 1819, ch. 12, § 1, 3 Stat. 478 (Virginia); see also RUSSELL R. 
WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 13 (2d ed. 
1994). 
 199. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77. 
 200. Id. §§ 11, 22, 1 Stat. at 78–79, 84–85. 
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judge.201 Consequently, district court judges wore two hats: They sat as 
district court judges and as circuit court judges alongside a Supreme 
Court Justice acting as Circuit Justice.202 
The lower federal courts’ operational resources were quite 
limited. Those courts had no courthouses and often held court in state 
or local public buildings, in private homes, or in the public rooms of 
taverns.203 Due to significant delays in the reporting of Supreme Court 
decisions, district judges were likely to learn about opinions of the 
Court by reading reports of the opinions in newspapers204 or from a 
Supreme Court Justice sitting as a Circuit Justice. By statute, the 
district court judges were required to reside in their appointed 
district, generally hundreds of miles from their closest colleague in 
the federal judiciary.205 
The circuit-riding system was the glue that was to hold this 
system together, connecting the center to the periphery and binding 
these far-flung outposts of federal justice into a system. But circuit 
riding was poorly suited for the vast, ever-expanding territory of the 
United States. The Justices’ complaints about circuit riding and the 
toll it took on their physical constitutions almost register as quaint 
today,206 but the original circuit system had significant limitations that 
 
 201. Originally, each circuit court was constituted by two Supreme Court Justices and the 
district court judge. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75. But owing to the difficulty of ensuring that two 
Justices attend circuit, the requirement was reduced in 1793 to one Supreme Court Justice. 
Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333. 
 202. See Judiciary Act of 1789 §§ 3–4, 1 Stat. at 73–75. 
 203. SURRENCY, supra note 198, at 81. 
 204. See Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective 
on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1310 (1985) (“Delay . . . in the reporting 
of the decisions of the nation’s highest court necessarily diminished, in many instances almost to 
the vanishing point, the immediate impact that the Court’s actions might otherwise have been 
expected to have on the bar and the public at large. For the newspapers of the period, the only 
other significant means of disseminating information concerning the jurisprudence of the Court, 
routinely reported even its most major doctrinal pronouncements in almost summary fashion.”). 
 205. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 3, 1 Stat. at 73. 
 206. See, e.g., Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 9, 
1792), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT, 1790–1794, at 288 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) (“We 
really, Sir, find the burthens laid upon us so excessive that we cannot forbear representing them 
in strong and explicit terms.”); Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to John Adams 
(Aug. 15, 1797), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT, 1795–1800, at 220–21 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990) 
(opposing a change in the scheduling of the circuit court for Delaware because it would be 
inconvenient for the assigned judge to travel immediately from Virginia to Delaware); John 
McKinley, Praying an Alteration in the Judicial Circuits of the United States, S. DOC. NO. 27-99, 
at 1–2 (2d Sess. 1842) (noting that the “business of the [ninth] circuit [was] greatly beyond the 
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exemplified a larger set of institutional deficiencies of the federal 
courts, especially with respect to the states that became part of the 
Union after 1789. Eleven of the fifteen states added between 1789 
and 1842 were “orphan states”—they were not included in a federal 
judicial circuit and, hence, lacked a Circuit Justice—for anywhere 
between one and forty-two years.207 A host of other states had what 
were dubbed “quasi Circuit Courts” during this period because, 
although nominally part of a circuit, they were rarely, if ever, graced 
with the presence of their assigned Circuit Justice.208 
New states were marginalized from the federal judicial system in 
other ways, too. Neither the Temporary Process Act nor the 
Permanent Process Act technically applied in the new states. Thus, 
until the situation was corrected by the Process Act of 1828, no 
statute formally guided the procedure or the execution of judgments 
in federal cases brought in law or equity in federal courts located in 
the new states.209 This statutory omission not only created problems in 
the lower federal courts but also signaled the more general failure of 
 
physical capacity of any one man,” and observing that he was required to travel 10,000 miles to 
attend to his circuit duties). 
 207. A federal district court was created for each state when it gained statehood, but there 
was substantial delay in integrating these district courts into a federal judicial circuit. Hence, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio became states, with district courts, in 1791, 1797, and 1803, 
respectively, but those states were not made part of a judicial circuit until 1807. See Act of Feb. 
4, 1791, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189 (recognizing Kentucky statehood); Act of Jan. 31, 1797, ch. 2, § 2, 1 
Stat. 496, 496 (recognizing Tennessee statehood); Act of Feb. 19, 1803, ch. 7, § 2, 2 Stat. 201, 
201–02 (recognizing Ohio statehood); Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, § 2, 2 Stat. 420, 420 (creating 
the Seventh Circuit to comprise the district of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio). In 1837, a 
portion of the district of Louisiana, created by Act of Apr. 8, 1812, ch. 50, § 3, 2 Stat. 701, 703, 
the district of Indiana, created by Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 100, § 2, 3 Stat. 390, 390, the district of 
Mississippi, created by Act of Apr. 3, 1818, ch. 29, § 2, 3 Stat. 413, 413, the district of Illinois, 
created by Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 70, § 2, 3 Stat. 502, 502–03, the district of Alabama, created 
by Act of Apr. 21, 1820, ch. 47, § 2, 3 Stat. 564. 564, the district of Missouri, created by Act of 
Mar. 16, 1822, ch. 12, § 2, 3 Stat. 653, 653, the district of Arkansas, created by Act of June 15, 
1836, ch. 100, § 4, 5 Stat. 50, 51, and the district of Michigan, created by Act of July 1, 1836, ch. 
234, § 2, 5 Stat. 61, 62, were integrated into circuits, see Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 
176, 176–77. 
 208. S. REP. NO. 20-50, at 5 (2d Sess. 1829); see also 2 REG. DEB. 510 (1826) (statement of 
Sen. White) (noting that, due to the failure of an ailing Circuit Justice to ride circuit, Tennessee, 
Kentucky, and Ohio were “no better provided with an opportunity of obtaining a due 
administration of justice in their Federal Courts, than the other six Western States” that were 
not included in a circuit at all); 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 419 (1817) (statement of Rep. Claiborne) 
(noting that “unless some remedy [is] provided” for the Justice assigned to the Seventh Circuit, 
Tennessee would continue to be denied “justice as to the laws of the United States”). 
 209. See infra notes 241–42 and accompanying text. 
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Congress to implement needed judicial reform as the country 
expanded westward. 
These institutional deficiencies had significant consequences for 
litigants, prompting calls for judicial reform and preoccupying the 
early-nineteenth-century Senate and House Judiciary Committees.210 
Starting with Edmund Randolph’s Attorney General Report of 
1790,211 proposals to reform and expand the federal judicial system 
were standard fare for national legislators. They included various and 
sundry proposals to abandon or curtail circuit riding, to create an 
independently staffed intermediate federal court of appeals, and to 
remedy the significant lacunae in judicial legislation for the new 
states.212 Regardless of the specific reform proposal, by the 1820s, two 
discursive refrains characterized advocacy for judicial reform: 
uniformity and equality. There was a general understanding that 
litigants in all regions should have equal access to the federal courts 
(including the circuit courts) and that the federal judiciary should 
operate uniformly in all regions. 
Thus, although historians have tended to focus on contemporary 
fears of the Court’s consolidationist tendencies in the 1820s213 that 
informed proposals to limit federal judicial power, during the same 
period concerns about the federal judiciary’s incapacity regularly 
animated debates concerning how best to expand the federal judicial 
system. Calls for expansion of the lower federal judicial infrastructure 
often came from what, at first appearance, may seem to have been 
unexpected quarters. In 1826, Senator John Eaton of Tennessee—a 
 
 210. One of the most common complaints of orphan states and quasi-circuit states was that, 
absent a Circuit Justice, the resident circuit judge sat alone on appeal and hence was the sole 
judge to review his own decision as a district judge. Because of the practical and jurisdictional 
limits of appeal to the Supreme Court, this meant that there was no means of effective appellate 
review in the vast majority of cases heard in federal court in states which, de jure or de facto, 
lacked a Circuit Justice. See J.E. DAVIS, MEMORIAL OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE 
OF MISSISSIPPI, H.R. REP. NO. 18-94, at 5 (2d Sess. 1825) (“At present, in the absence of the 
Circuit Court System, the decision of the District Judge, in all cases where the amount in 
controversy does not exceed $2,000, is final and conclusive.”); Geo[rge] M. Bibb et al., Petition 
to the Congress of the United States, 2–3 (Frankfurt, KY Jan. 10, 1824) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (observing that in the “[s]ix states that are without the benefit of the circuit 
system . . . the opinion of the single District Judge is final and without appeal in all causes of less 
value than two thousand dollars”). 
 211. See EDMUND RANDOLPH, JUDICIARY SYSTEM, H.R. REP. NO. 1-17, at 21 (3d Sess. 
1790). 
 212. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 19, at 14–55 (describing pre-Civil War 
legislative proposals to reform the federal judiciary); see also sources cited infra notes 215–24. 
 213. See source cited supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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close personal ally of President Jackson—delivered a lengthy address 
in Congress that was typical of dozens of similar complaints 
articulated by national legislators of the western states. “We are one 
people living under a Government common to us all,” Eaton 
emphasized, “and each State has a right to expect from the Federal 
Government, that a like provision will be made for her citizens, with 
that made for the citizens of the other States. This has not been done 
[with respect to the judiciary].”214 
Such concerns were voiced in petitions submitted to Congress by 
state legislatures, bar associations, and other concerned groups. For 
example, in 1836, the Alabama legislature petitioned Congress for an 
extension of the circuit system to that state to secure “equal blessings 
and equal benefits upon the citizens of every portion of the 
republic.”215 In his address to Congress in 1829, President Jackson 
decried the inequality of the federal courts in different states and 
regions, observing that a “uniform operation of the Federal 
Government in the different States is certainly desirable; and, existing 
as they do in the Union, on the basis of perfect equality, each State 
has a right to expect that the benefits conferred on the citizens of 
others should be extended to hers.”216 Jackson repeated this message 
in substance in 1831, 1832, 1834, and 1835.217  
Such calls for judicial reform and expansion of the lower federal 
court system did not necessarily signal the embrace of a 
consolidationist vision of federal judicial power—the strengthening of 
 
 214. 2 REG. DEB. 511 (1826) (statement of Sen. Eaton). For similar complaints by other 
Jacksonian senators, see id. at 1061–62 (statement of Rep. Hemphill); 1 REG. DEB. 587–88 
(1825) (statement of Sen. Van Buren); 1 REG. DEB. 527–28 (1825) (statement of Sen. Johnson). 
Party affiliations of legislators are taken from KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS 
OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1789–1989, at 88 (1989). 
 215. S. REP. NO. 24-130, at 1 (1st Sess. 1836). For similar statements regarding the unequal 
and defective organization of the federal judiciary, especially in the western states, see G.W. 
CAMPBELL, MEMORIAL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BAR OF NASHVILLE IN THE STATE OF 
TENNESSEE, H.R. REP. NO. 18-29, at 3 (2d Sess. 1825); DAVIS, supra note 210, at 4–5; JOHN 
HENDERSON, MEMORIAL OF JOHN HENDERSON, SUBMITTING A PLAN FOR THE 
REORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES, S. MISC. DOC. NO. 31-4, 
at 1 (1st Sess. 1849); Bibb et al., supra note 210, at 1. 
 216. ANDREW JACKSON, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. 
REP. NO. 21-1, at 18 (1st Sess. 1829). 
 217. See Andrew Jackson, Third Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1831), in 2 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 544, 558 (James D. Richardson 
ed., 1897) [hereinafter CMPP]; Andrew Jackson, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1832), in 2 
CMPP, supra, at 591, 605; Andrew Jackson, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 1, 1834), in 3 CMPP, 
supra, at 97, 117; Andrew Jackson, Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1835), in 3 CMPP, supra, 
at 147, 177. 
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the federal government at the expense of the states. Legislators with 
significantly different views on other federalism-sensitive issues 
agreed that the lower federal court system created by the 1789 Act 
needed to be modified and expanded to ensure uniform federal 
judicial services throughout the country. 
Despite that broad consensus, judicial reform was exceedingly 
difficult for Congress. An 1823 House Judiciary Committee report 
responding to a memorial submitted by the State of Indiana reported 
its efforts to determine “‘whether any . . . alterations are necessary to 
be made in the organization of the Courts of the United States, so as 
more equally to extend their advantages to the several states.’”218 The 
Committee recognized that the new states ought “to be placed upon a 
footing of equality with the old [states], in respect to their judicial 
establishments,”219 but it dodged the issue by presenting several 
reform options “in hopes that the subject may attract the attention of 
the country generally,” explicitly leaving the issue of reform to “the 
next Congress.”220 An 1829 Senate Judiciary Committee report 
revisited the issue of inequality in the administration of justice in the 
federal courts, denominating as “quasi Circuit Courts” those states in 
which a “District Judge alone” undertook the responsibilities of 
circuit judge due to the absence of the assigned Circuit Justice.221 But 
substantial reform was not forthcoming. 
At least in part, significant judicial reform was unsuccessful 
during this period because reform proposals did not readily map onto 
existing partisan alignments and thus were unable to attract a cross-
partisan coalition. Some legislators who opposed centralization 
nevertheless generally supported expansion of the federal judiciary 
through, for example, the creation of additional circuits.222 But other 
 
 218. H.R. REP. NO. 17-105, at 1 (2d Sess. 1823). 
 219. Id. at 2. 
 220. Id. at 3. 
 221. S. REP. NO. 20-50, at 5 (2d Sess. 1829). For additional committee reports considering 
various judicial-reform measures, see H.R. REP. NO. 23-429, at 1 (1st Sess. 1834); H.R. REP. NO. 
19-95, at 1 (1st Sess. 1826); S. REP. NO. 19-89, at 1 (1st Sess. 1826); H.R. REP. NO. 17-105, at 2–3; 
S. DOC. NO. 15-12, at 1 (2d Sess. 1818); S. DOC. NO. 15-80, at 1 (1st Sess. 1818); and see also 
Courts of the United States, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 271, 271 (1854). 
 222. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 208. Some legislators urged that creating a permanent 
intermediate court of appeals and abolishing circuit riding would maximize the presence of local 
judges who would be sensitive to local law. Hence, expansion of the institutional capacity of the 
lower federal courts through the creation of circuit judgeships would be consistent with a robust 
understanding of state sovereignty in the context of a federal system. See, e.g., 2 REG. DEB. 520 
(1826) (statement of Sen. White) (advocating expansion of the Supreme Court to ensure that all 
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legislators sensitive to states’ rights associated expansion of federal 
judicial resources with increased federal judicial power generally223—a 
painful hangover from the infamous 1801 Judiciary Act.224 At the 
same time, some legislators who generally embraced broad national 
power nevertheless objected to certain judicial reforms that would 
have involved the addition of Justices or judges, likely because the 
creation of new judgeships would have given significant appointment 
power to an opposing-party administration.225 Although unlikely 
factions can sometimes build coalitions, in this instance disagreement 
over how to address the very obvious problems facing the judiciary 
led to legislative paralysis. In their famous study of the administration 
of the federal courts, Felix Frankfurter and James Landis noted that 
legislative activity on judicial reform during this period largely “spent 
itself in talk.”226 
Amid calls for judicial reform—and the failure of Congress to 
implement substantial judicial reform legislation—the Supreme 
Court’s insistence on federal uniform equity principles takes on a 
different light. Although uniformity of institutional infrastructure was 
by no means synonymous with uniformity of the equitable principles 
to be applied in federal court—or vice versa—the two concepts were 
tightly linked in the legislative and judicial debates over federal 
equity power. Viewed in this context—and as stories from one-time 
orphan states Kentucky and Louisiana show—the federal uniform 
equity doctrine serves less as evidence of the Supreme Court’s 
 
states have a Circuit Justice who will bring “an intimate knowledge of the municipal laws of the 
respective States” to the high Court). 
 223. See, e.g., 2 REG. DEB. 537 (1826) (Statement of Sen. Berrien) (objecting to an increase 
in the number of Supreme Court Justices to supply the need for Circuit Justices in part on the 
ground that “[t]he federal government is already too strong for the States”). 
 224. On the eve of Jefferson’s presidential inauguration in 1801, the Federalist-dominated 
Seventh Congress enacted a judicial-reform statute, abolishing circuit riding for Supreme Court 
Justices, creating a federal intermediate court of appeals, redrawing the boundaries of the 
federal judicial districts, and endowing the federal courts with federal question jurisdiction. Act 
of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, §§ 1–7, 2 Stat. 89, 89–90. It was immediately and famously repealed by 
the Republicans in 1802. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132. For a probing discussion 
of the 1801 Act, see generally Alison L. LaCroix, The New Wheel in the Federal Machine: From 
Sovereignty to Jurisdiction in the Early Republic, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 381–93 (2008). 
 225. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 133 
(1922). 
 226. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 19, at 44. In 1837, Congress finally enacted 
legislation that brought Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, the eastern district of Louisiana, 
Michigan, Mississippi, and Missouri into the circuit system—a move that required the creation 
of two new Associate Justice seats on the Supreme Court. Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, §§ 1–3, 5 
Stat. 176, 176–77. 
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unilateral effort to consolidate federal judicial authority at the 
expense of state sovereignty and more as evidence of an effort to 
ensure litigant equality and uniform administration of justice 
throughout the federal judicial system. 
B. Kentucky: Panic, Process, and Alien Law 
In February 1822, Abraham Venable executed a deed conveying 
over three hundred acres of real property, as well as slaves and 
personal property, to George M’Donald, Venable’s brother-in-law.227 
As consideration, M’Donald promised that he would support 
Venable’s stepchildren.228 The timing of the conveyance was telling. In 
1821, the Bank of the United States had filed suit in federal court 
against Venable and several others as endorsers of a promissory note 
for $4700 that had changed hands several times and was eventually 
purchased by the bank at a discount.229 As the Supreme Court 
explained, “Here then is the case of a person upon the eve of a decree 
being rendered against him for a large sum of money, which it is 
admitted would go far to his ruin, making conveyances of his whole 
property real and personal to his brother-in-law . . . .”230 Such last-
ditch efforts to stave off complete financial ruin were not unusual in 
Kentucky in the wake of the Panic of 1819, which brought destitution 
to many in that state and gave rise to a state constitutional crisis 
concerning judicial power.231 
Perhaps with more zeal than other states caught in the grip of the 
Panic, Kentucky moved swiftly to enact legislation that would bring 
some measure of relief and protection to debtors. Starting in 1819, the 
Kentucky legislature enacted a series of relief measures, including 
stay laws, debt exemption provisions, minimum pricing for execution 
of judgments on real property, laws that eased or abolished 
imprisonment for debt, and relief-driven monetary policies.232 These 
 
 227. Venable v. United States, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 107, 107 (1829). 
 228. Id. at 111. 
 229. Id. at 110. 
 230. Id. at 112. 
 231. For discussions of the Panic of 1819 in Kentucky and the state legislature’s response, 
see 2 WILLIAM ELSEY CONNELLEY & E.M. COULTER, HISTORY OF KENTUCKY 599–600 
(Charles Kerr ed., 1922); 2 WARREN, supra note 225, at 93–111; Theodore W. Ruger, “A 
Question Which Convulses the Nation”: The Early Republic’s Greatest Debate About the Judicial 
Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826, 835–55 (2004). 
 232. 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 231, at 608, 613–14; 2 WARREN, supra note 225, 
at 104. 
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relief laws occasioned political mayhem, a state constitutional crisis, 
and the complete upheaval of the Kentucky state courts. In 1824, as a 
direct response to the invalidation of a stay law by Kentucky’s highest 
court, the state legislature abolished the existing Court of Appeals 
(the Old Court) and created a new court staffed with prorelief judges 
(the New Court).233 The members of the Old Court refused to 
acknowledge their removal from office, paralyzing the Kentucky 
judicial system for well over a year.234 
As others have chronicled, the Old Court–New Court 
controversy led to substantial debates over, and a referendum 
concerning, the power of judicial review in Kentucky state courts.235 
But the Panic of 1819 also occasioned significant controversy over the 
power of the federal courts, including their equity powers. Given the 
state of affairs in Kentucky in the 1820s, creditors were 
understandably concerned about the prospect of collecting on 
contracts in the state courts. For creditors—including the Bank of the 
United States—who could satisfy subject matter jurisdiction 
requirements, the federal court in Kentucky became the only hope. 
Indeed, at certain junctures, it was the only functional adjudicative 
body available in that state. 
In a series of cases, including most famously Wayman v. 
Southard,236 the Supreme Court affirmed the Kentucky circuit court’s 
refusal to apply state relief laws, including laws that directed courts to 
stay the execution of judgments.237 Similarly, in Venable v. United 
States,238 a case brought in equity, the Court affirmed the Kentucky 
 
 233. 2 CONNELLEY & COULTER, supra note 231, at 629–31. The constitutional crisis 
concerning judicial and legislative authority became a central feature of the conflict between the 
relief and antirelief factions, so much so that “New-Court” and “Old-Court” came to stand for 
their respective platforms. Id. at 636–40. 
 234. Id. at 636–37. 
 235. These debates that have been examined in great detail by Theodore Ruger. See Ruger, 
supra note 231. 
 236. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). 
 237. 2 WARREN, supra note 225, at 104. Although the Kentucky stay laws varied in their 
details, they all stayed execution of judgments issued by any court in the state for a designated 
time period unless the creditor agreed to accept notes issued by the Bank of the 
Commonwealth, in which case the stay of execution was of a shorter duration. Unlike most 
contemporary paper currency, notes issued by the Bank of the Commonwealth were not 
redeemable for specie. Thus, when the state legislature approved massive printing of notes in 
1824 (secured, in theory, on certain assets in the state’s treasury), the notes plummeted in value. 
Consequently, under the stay laws, a creditor could wait one year to be paid in a near-worthless 
currency, or wait two years to be paid in specie or U.S. notes. Warren, supra note 38, at 437–38. 
 238. Venable v. United States, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 107 (1829). 
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circuit court’s 1822 determination that Venable’s conveyance to 
M’Donald was, in fact, fraudulent, and that Venable’s property could 
be sold at a marshal’s sale in satisfaction of a promissory note.239 Such 
rulings by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts triggered 
significant debate in Congress over the scope of federal judge-made 
law and, of particular concern here, federal equity power.240 
The Kentucky episode also illuminated an embarrassing lacuna 
in existing federal legislation. As Wayman made clear, federal courts 
in the new states were not covered by the Permanent Process Act, as 
that statute applied only to the states that were part of the Union in 
1789.241 This revelation was another piece of evidence that the new 
states were orphaned from the federal judicial system.242  
For some, then, the Kentucky situation revealed the lack of 
uniformity and institutional incapacity of the federal judicial system.243 
For others, however, the Kentucky cases betrayed a different kind of 
defect in the federal judicial system—the discretion allowed to federal 
judges sitting in law and, to a much greater extent, in equity to usurp 
 
 239. See id. at 120. 
 240. The Wayman decision and the resulting legislative debates concerning the Process Act 
of 1828 have received significant attention from federal-courts scholars. See, e.g., Warren, supra 
note 38, at 435–50 (summarizing the legislative debates over the Process Act); Woolhandler, 
supra note 150, at 103 (discussing Wayman v. Southard and noting that in that opinion “Chief 
Justice Marshall indicated . . . that the process acts had been designed specifically to allow 
federal courts to avoid using state debtor relief legislation.”). But to my knowledge, little, if any, 
attention has been given to the fallout over federal equity power that was also part of the 
debates leading up to the Process Act of 1828. 
 241. Wayman, 23 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 32 (observing that the Permanent Process Act “adopts 
the State law as it . . . stood [in 1789], not as it might afterwards be made”); 2 REG. DEB. 11 
(1825) (statement of Sen. Kane) (noting that in Wayman the Court determined that “benefits” 
of the Process Act of 1789 applied “to the citizens of those States only which had existence 
when the act was passed. It was for the purpose of placing the citizens of other States upon the 
same footing, that he ventured to introduce this resolution”); see also Warren, supra note 38, at 
436 (“[U]nder the Act of 1792, only State [practice] laws existing in 1789 in the original thirteen 
States were automatically applicable to the Federal Courts . . . .”). 
 242. The fact that the Permanent Process Act did not apply in the new states was not news 
to those who had been alert to legislative debates concerning judicial policy. Efforts to remedy 
the omission of new states from the process acts began as early as 1809. See Warren, supra note 
38, at 436–37. 
 243. For example, the day after Senator Kane proposed that the Senate Judiciary 
Committee consider the failure of the existing judicial process acts to reach the new states, see 
supra note 241, Senator John Eaton expressed enthusiasm for the proposal because he sought 
resolution of an allied problem: the failure of the circuit system to reach the new states in the 
west, 2 REG. DEB. 13 (1825) (statement of Sen. Eaton). 
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the function of the state legislature and, in turn, to undermine 
important state-level prodebtor legislation.244 
1. Senator Rowan Versus Senator Webster, and the Process Act of 
1828.  Senator John Rowan—a former Kentucky Court of Appeals 
judge who was elected to the United States Senate in 1825 as a 
member of the New Court faction—was of the latter opinion. Federal 
courts, he believed, possessed too much discretion and lawmaking 
authority, especially in equity.245 Impatient with judicial power—
especially federal judicial power—and a proponent of legislative 
supremacy—especially state legislative supremacy—Rowan thought 
that putting such discretion in the hands of federal judges defeated 
basic principles of republican government.246 In January 1827, amid 
ongoing debates regarding judicial reform and the new-state problem 
illuminated by Wayman, Rowan seized upon the issue in an effort to 
end the tyranny of lawmaking by federal judges, particularly when 
sitting in equity. Notably, however, Rowan was unable to turn his 
colleagues, the majority of whom were Jacksonians, against federal 
equity. Even among those lawmakers who tended to be suspicious of 
policies that would strengthen federal power, there was no consensus 
that the federal uniform equity doctrine represented an 
encroachment on state sovereignty or a violation of separation of 
powers. 
Senator Rowan threw his energies behind a judicial-reform bill 
that was intended to bring the new states into the federal judicial 
system by clarifying the processes that would apply in federal courts 
both in law and equity.247 The bill, which had been proposed by the 
 
 244. See, e.g., 2 REG. DEB. 12 (1825) (Statement of Sen. Johnson) (expressing support for the 
resolution to evaluate the operation of the process acts in the new states out of concern that 
“irresponsible judicial officers [may have] assumed the right, and exercised . . . the power, of 
making laws for a sovereign and independent State”); see also infra text accompanying notes 
245–70. 
 245. Senator Rowan was a veteran of judiciary politics, as he had been a member of the 
second Kentucky state constitutional convention in 1799, where debates and power struggles 
focused on the proper institutional design of Kentucky’s judiciary. See 2 CONNELLEY & 
COULTER, supra note 231, at 626–47. 
 246. See Stephen W. Fackler, John Rowan and the Demise of Jeffersonian Republicanism in 
Kentucky, 1819–1831, 78 REG. KY. HIST. SOC’Y 1, 11–13 (1980). 
 247. S. 81, 19th Cong. (2d Sess. Feb. 2, 1827). This bill was virtually identical to a bill that 
had been reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee several months earlier, S. 158, 19th 
Cong. (1st Sess. May 11, 1826). Both S. 81 and S. 158 would have required that, in the new states 
only, the “forms of writs of execution and other process, except their style, and the forms and 
modes of proceeding in suits in the Courts of the United States . . . in proceedings in equity, 
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Senate Judiciary Committee, would have significantly altered the 
scope and nature of federal equity power by requiring conformity 
with state equity in federal courts sitting in the new states.248 In this 
way, the bill departed from well-established uniformity in federal 
equity cases. Rowan seized the opportunity, proposing an amendment 
that would have required conformity with state equity in all lower 
federal courts249—not only in the new states. In addition, his 
amendment would have stripped federal judges of any discretionary 
rulemaking power in law or equity, thus departing even further from 
existing practice.250 But Rowan’s aggressive tactics backfired. By 
calling attention to the changes to federal equity practice that the 
Committee’s bill would have effected, and by proposing amendments 
that would rein in federal equity power even further, Rowan 
prompted a response from Senator Daniel Webster that ultimately 
doomed his efforts to require conformity with state equity practices 
and principles. 
Although Justice Story later described it as “a most masterly 
speech,”251 Webster’s address to the Senate on the pending judicial 
process bill has not survived. The brief reference to Webster’s speech 
in the legislative record indicates that he “addressed the Senate at 
great length,” arguing that modification of the process acts, and 
particularly any disruption of the way “equity process was to be 
regulated,” would be “disastrous.”252 Newspapers reported that 
Webster delivered a “most powerful speech on the Bill regulating the 
process in the Courts of the United States” to a Senate chamber 
packed with “[a]ll our most distinguished lawyers . . .” and most of the 
 
[shall be] according to the principles, rules, and usages, which belong to Courts of Equity of the 
said States, respectively.” S. 81; accord S. 158. It is not apparent that the Chair of the 
Committee, Senator Martin Van Buren, appreciated the full significance of the bill, as he later 
remarked that, prior to Webster’s intervention, the process bill “was allowed to progress merely 
through an oversight of the Senate.” 4 REG. DEB. 343 (1828). 
 248. See S. 81, 19th Cong. (2d Sess. Feb. 2, 1827). 
 249. See S. 11, 20th Cong. § 1 (1st Sess. Jan. 30, 1828) (requiring conformity with state laws 
governing process and execution of judgments, in cases brought in law and equity, “held in any 
of the States composing this Union”). 
 250. See id. § 2 (“That so much of any act of Congress as authorizes the Courts of the United 
States, or the Supreme Court thereof, at their discretion, to add to, or modify, any of the rules, 
forms, modes, and usages aforesaid, or the forms of writs of execution, and other process, except 
their style, shall be, and the same is hereby, repealed.”). 
 251. Letter from Joseph Story to George Ticknor (Mar. 6, 1828), in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF 
JOSEPH STORY 536 (William W. Story ed., London, John Chapman 1851). 
 252. 4 REG. DEB. 342–43 (1828) (statement of Sen. Webster). 
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members of the House.253 In his address, Webster “replied in detail to 
arguments urged by Messrs Tazewell and Rowan,” specifically 
addressing the significance of the term “civil laws” in the Temporary 
Process Act.254 Webster urged that “if the process bill passed in its 
present shape, it would destroy all Equity process in many of the old 
states.”255 Faced with a bill that threatened to minimize, or even 
eliminate, the federal courts’ distinctive equity powers, Webster 
delivered an encomium for equity that, according to one report, 
“seemed to flash on every mind instant conviction that the subject 
had not before been fully understood; and [that] placed one or two 
lawyers of that body . . . in a situation in which no high minded man, 
no man of genius or ambition, could desire to be.”256 Rowan was one 
of those men. 
Whatever the precise nature of Webster’s remarks, they were 
enough to incite Senator Rowan to make a forceful and complete 
defense of state legislative supremacy and the concomitant need for 
complete federal conformity with state law in both common law and 
equity cases. Rowan reserved his most scathing remarks for federal 
equity. The requirement of uniform equity principles Webster 
embraced offended every tenet of government that Rowan held dear, 
beginning with rudimentary principles of separation of powers. 
“Legislative power,” admonished Rowan, “is never to be exercised 
but under strict responsibility to the people, whose will gives 
obligatory force to the law.”257 According to Rowan, federal judges—
“in office for life” and removable by impeachment only—“were 
commissioned to judge, not to legislate—to expound, not to make 
laws.”258  
In making his defense, Senator Rowan was not solely, or even 
largely, concerned with protecting congressional power from 
encroachment by federal judges; he was concerned with 
encroachment upon the sovereign rights of states and state 
legislatures. The fact that some state courts lacked equity powers was 
no justification for federal courts to employ uniform equity principles 
in the federal courts, as defenders of federal equity suggested. 
 
 253. From the Massachusetts Journal, PORTSMOUTH J. & ROCKINGHAM GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 
1828, at 2. 
 254. In the Senate, PROVIDENCE PATRIOT & COLUMBIAN PHOENIX, Feb. 27, 1828, at 2. 
 255. Id. 
 256. From the Massachusetts Journal, supra note 253, at 2. 
 257. 4 REG. DEB. 349 (1828) (statement of Sen. Rowan). 
 258. Id. 
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Instead, it was precisely because of the variation in state equity 
principles that the federal courts should be required to conform to 
state equity practice, or the lack thereof. “[W]hat ought to be 
conclusive,” Rowan argued, “is, that those States have not chosen to 
administer justice through Chancery forms.”259 
If [equity] does not exist in each State, it must be owing to the want 
of power, or of wisdom, in the State which has it not. It cannot be 
want of power, for all the States are sovereign and equipollent—
quoad hoc. . . . [Will any Senator] say that the rights and interests of 
the citizens of his State shall be decided, whenever drawn into 
question in the Federal Court, . . . not by those principles and rules 
of equity, which have been ordained by the wisdom, and consecrated 
by the usage of that State, but by a code imparted by the [federal] 
Judges, and unknown to the State?260 
If Senator Rowan’s ideological sensibilities were thoroughly 
offended by the thought of a federal judge, “unknown to the State,” 
usurping the role of the state legislator and deciding the “rights and 
interests of the citizens of his State,” Webster’s insistence that “civil 
law regulates proceedings in equity” was the final insult.261 Taking 
apparent joy in trying to school the schoolmaster, Rowan started with 
first principles. “Now, . . . by the civil law, every lawyer understands 
that the municipal law of the Roman empire is meant. That law, 
[Webster] tells us, regulated proceedings in equity in England, and 
performs the same office in our country. Mr. President, can the 
gentleman be serious?”262 Taunting Webster, Rowan continued, “the 
gentleman will have it from England; we must get the rules of equity, 
says he, from England, through learned judges and lawyers, who have 
made it (the civil law) their study. . . .”263 But according to Rowan, 
resort to judges and lawyers as the “medium of [equity’s] 
intromission” was itself a usurpation.264 “[T]he Judges have given that 
State law enough . . . . [Kentucky] will acknowledge nothing as law, 
which has not . . . had legislative sanction. She will insist . . . that the 
Judges shall neither make nor import law.”265 
 
 259. Id. at 362. 
 260. Id. at 362–63. 
 261. Id. at 363–64. 
 262. Id. at 364 (emphasis added). 
 263. Id. at 365. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
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Finally, the notion that federal judges were to import a “foreign 
or alien code”266 of equity offended Senator Rowan’s republican 
vision of law as organic to the people, and as a core dimension of 
state sovereignty. A state’s “mode or form of administering justice . . . 
is essential to its sovereignty,” he explained.267 “Free states 
appropriate, by legislative sanction, those universal rules and 
principles of equity and justice, and use them as their own. Vassal 
states are regulated by laws enacted or adopted for them by others.”268 
Senator Rowan’s understanding of federal courts’ obligation to 
follow state law and equity—and his corresponding critique of judicial 
“legislation”—was coherent and passionate. And it was animated by 
criticisms of federal judge-made law that are sometimes purported to 
represent the prevailing understanding of the limits of federal judicial 
power in the early nineteenth century.269 If it was indeed generally 
understood that application of judge-made law in federal courts made 
“[f]ree states” into “vassal states,”270 however, one might expect that 
Rowan’s proposed amendment to the judicial-reform bill would have 
passed without controversy. Yet Rowan’s vision of the federal courts 
as functionaries of the state legislatures ultimately failed to capture a 
majority of his fellow senators’ support. Not only was his specific 
amendment requiring absolute federal conformity with state equity 
principles rejected, but upon Webster’s motion, the entire bill was 
sent back to committee for reconsideration.271 
The resulting legislation, the Process Act of 1828, finally 
remedied the glaring omission of the existing process acts by 
stipulating the sources of procedural and remedial law applicable in 
federal courts in the new states.272 But notwithstanding Rowan’s best 
efforts, and after sustained debate in Congress, with one significant 
exception273 the Act did nothing to limit the application of a uniform 
corpus of nonstate equity principles in federal equity cases. 
2. Judicial Reform and Federal Equity in Kentucky.  How does 
the legislative fallout over, and the final response to, the state and 
 
 266. Id. at 364. 
 267. Id. at 366. 
 268. Id. at 368. 
 269. See sources cited supra note 10 and infra notes 385–86. 
 270. 4 REG. DEB. 368 (1828) (statement of Sen. Rowan). 
 271. Id. at 371–72. 
 272. Process Act of 1828, ch. 68, §§ 1, 3, 4 Stat. 278, 278–81. 
 273. See infra text accompanying notes 295–96. 
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federal courts’ conduct in the wake of the Panic of 1819 help explain 
the vitality of the federal uniform equity doctrine during the early 
nineteenth century? As an initial matter, in light of congressional 
acquiescence to the uniform equity doctrine in the Process Act of 
1828, it would be misleading to characterize that doctrine as a product 
of the Supreme Court’s particular institutional tendency to 
unilaterally aggrandize federal judicial power. As discussed 
previously, when viewed through the lens of Section 34 and the Swift 
case, the history of judge-made law in the federal courts in this period 
is sometimes told as a story about the federal courts’ particular 
tendency to overreach, repudiating Congress’s statutory 
pronouncements.274 
However accurate that characterization may be with respect to 
Section 34,275 events in Congress following the Panic of 1819 suggest 
that the Supreme Court’s uniform equity doctrine cannot be so easily 
reduced. It cannot be gainsaid that Congress was well aware of the 
federal courts’ equity powers after the Rowan-Webster debate. 
Despite that awareness, Congress was unwilling or unable to enact 
legislation requiring the federal courts to conform to state law in 
federal equity cases. Instead, in 1828 national legislators extended the 
geographical reach of existing legislation that, although not 
particularly clear, had been interpreted by the Court for a decade to 
require uniformity in federal equity cases. The uniform equity 
doctrine was not a product of a unilateral power grab by the Supreme 
Court but rather was the product of a complex, institutional dynamic 
between the Court and Congress.276 
Second, debates over the Process Act of 1828 suggest that 
uniform equity was not predominantly understood as a doctrine that 
violated prevailing federalism and separation-of-powers principles. 
Some legislators—like Senator Rowan—described federal equity in 
such terms. But for many legislators, including many Jacksonians in 
Congress, such concerns were either nonexistent or were outweighed 
by other factors. Defenders of state sovereignty—such as Senator 
Martin Van Buren of New York,277 Senator Elias Kane of Illinois,278 
 
 274. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 275. As discussed earlier, William Fletcher’s important contribution on this point called that 
characterization of Section 34 into question. See Fletcher, supra note 8. 
 276. See infra Part II.D. 
 277. See 4 REG. DEB. 203–04 (1828) (statement of Sen. Van Buren) (“It appears to me that 
it was the duty of the State legislature to have adopted rules; and if they did not establish them, 
it was their own fault. The Courts, in the performance of their duties, finding none, were forced 
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and several other Jacksonians in Congress—opposed Rowan’s efforts 
to secure absolute conformity with state law and equity.279 The point 
here is not that these senators were sympathetic to Webster’s 
nationalist views on federal judicial policy in general. Rather, it is that 
even among legislators whose ideological inclinations tended toward 
the limitation of federal power, there was a range of views about the 
proper scope of federal judicial power, and the uniform equity 
doctrine did not generally offend a shared understanding of the 
constitutional limits of federal judicial power. 
Recognizing that debates over federal uniform equity were part 
of a larger conversation concerning the institutional capacity of the 
federal judicial system helps explain why Rowan’s anti-federal equity 
campaign failed. In judicial-reform debates, uniformity in equity was 
seen by many as a jurisprudential device that would help standardize 
the administration of justice in the judicial system—an issue that 
appealed across partisan lines. The process bills, triggered in 
significant part by the Kentucky crisis, would not remedy all of the 
federal courts’ institutional problems, such as those stemming from 
the circuit-riding system and chronically understaffed circuit courts. 
But they were designed to remedy the related problem of the 
 
to make rules to govern their process.”); id. at 93 (statement of Sen. Van Buren) (“It was 
impossible to give up all the power of the Federal Courts without involving the country in 
confusion.”). 
 278. Id. at 94–95 (statement of Sen. Kane) (observing that the Process Act of 1792 struck a 
wise path by “g[iving] the Circuit Courts power to alter and amend the laws of process, passed 
by the State Legislatures; and to the Supreme Court of the United States, power to supervise 
and overrule them”); id. at 371 (statement of Sen. Kane) (making the same argument); see also 
id. at 372 (statement of Sen. Berrien) (“[T]he power to prescribe rules for their own courts had 
been hitherto given to the Federal Judges, under certain limitations; and it could not be 
confined . . . without doing serious injury.”). 
 279. For example, seven Jackson-supporting senators voted against the Rowan amendment 
that would have required strict conformity with state law and equity. See id. at 327–28 
(recording the nay votes of Jackson-supporting Senators Chandler, Dickerson, Kane, McLane, 
Smith of Maryland, Van Buren, and Williams). Determining the political allegiances of national 
legislators in this period is fraught with difficulty because “the mass political party did not 
become established as an institution of public authority until at least the 1830s.” GERALD 
LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 9 (2002). But the Rowan-Webster 
showdown occurred at a moment during which there was an unusual degree of clarity 
concerning nascent party affiliation among national legislators. In the congressional elections of 
1826 and 1827, support for President John Quincy Adams or challenger Andrew Jackson was a 
crucial factor, and—although the Jacksonians were a heterogeneous group—support for the 
latter generally signaled a rejection of Adams’s nationalist program and stronger support of 
states’ rights. See MARTIS, supra note 214, at 30 (noting that Jackson’s support came in part 
from the fact that the American people perceived him as a “champion of states’ rights”). 
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omission of the new states from the original process acts.280 For 
legislators bent on bringing some measure of consistency to the 
federal court system, Senator Rowan’s demand for total conformity 
with state equity and zero discretion in rulemaking was out of step 
with the larger goals of judicial reform—uniformity and equality 
throughout the federal system. 
In theory, institutional uniformity of the sort sought by western 
legislators and others did not require the application of uniform 
equity principles in federal court.281 When deciding cases in law, 
federal judges typically applied the forum state’s procedure, 
remedies, and—with important exceptions—substantive law.282 
Rowan’s proposed amendment would have required even stricter 
conformity with state equity practice in old states and new.283 But 
conformity of this sort was unworkable on the equity side of the 
docket. Variety in state equity systems, including a near-total absence 
of equity in some states, meant that conformity with state equity 
would result in radical disuniformity in the administration of justice in 
federal courts.284 From a modern perspective, this may seem like a 
trivial concern. But even defenders of state sovereignty understood 
that the purpose of the federal judiciary was to bring some measure of 
uniformity to the national administration of justice. For example, an 
1824 petition by Mississippi’s bar association authored by Joseph 
Davis, Jefferson Davis’s older brother, explained that precisely 
because of the diversity of laws, “the system of national tribunals, 
ordained to enforce them, should be uniform in every part of the 
Union, in order that the spirit of system and uniformity prevailing in 
the one, might counteract the tendency to anarchy and confusion in 
the other.”285 Although one might conclude that Davis’s enthusiasm 
for uniformity in the federal courts was of limited scope, Davis went 
on to laud the “Napoleon Code” and to suggest that “if there was no 
other motive for the extension of the Judicial System of 1789 to the 
 
 280. See sources cited supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 281. An 1824 petition by a group of Kentucky lawyers proposed a plan that would have 
remedied the institutional defects of the federal courts in the west and also would have required 
greater deference to state law through limitation of diversity jurisdiction. See Bibb et al., supra 
note 210, at 1, 10. But the sometimes subtle distinction between uniform administration of 
justice and uniform law was by no means evident. See infra note 296 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra Part I.A. 
 283. See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. 
 285. DAVIS, supra note 210, at 4. 
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new States, but that the system should be uniform and universal, that 
alone would be sufficient to induce Congress so to extend it.”286 
In the immediate context in which the debates over federal 
equity power took place in the 1820s, Davis’s concerns about 
“anarchy” and, at the very least, “confusion,”287 seemed plausible, 
making federal uniform equity appear particularly important to both 
national legislators and members of the Court. Uniformity in federal 
equity cases functioned as a quasi-constitutional bulwark against the 
fragmentation of the Union and localist excess. Thus, within the limits 
of their jurisdictional grant, lower federal courts sitting in equity were 
to provide a national floor of remedies and, sometimes, rights for 
those litigating in federal court.288 In light of the Kentucky crisis, strict 
judicial conformity with state law and equity would arguably involve 
the federal courts in similar turmoil. It would require them to 
conform with state law even when state judges would not—a problem 
that even Martin Van Buren could appreciate.289 If that was the kind 
of conformity required under Senator Rowan’s amendments, then 
perhaps this was taking too far the concept of federal judicial 
conformity with state law and equity. Rowan’s insistence that federal 
courts conform to state equity thus ran contrary to the general desire 
for some level of uniformity in the federal judicial system. 
Finally, any analysis of federal judge-made law in the early 
nineteenth century would be incomplete without considering the 
possibility that economic interests motivated the development and 
perpetuation of the federal uniform equity doctrine. Professors 
Morton Horwitz and Tony Freyer have both demonstrated how the 
perceived need for a uniform body of commercial law generated 
significant support for general common law and uniform equity 
principles, especially among the commercial classes.290 Another 
 
 286. Id. at 5. 
 287. Id. at 4. 
 288. In this regard, application of uniform federal equity principles in private-law litigation 
is consistent with the application of federal equitable remedies in constitutional cases filed in 
federal court during the same period. As Woolhandler has demonstrated, diversity jurisdiction 
was an important means of bringing federal constitutional litigation into federal court well 
before statutory recognition of federal question jurisdiction in 1875. See Woolhandler, supra 
note 150, at 84–85. Her observation that there was a “settled consensus that the federal courts 
should administer a federalized set of rights and remedies for federal constitutional rights,” id. 
at 81, applies in parallel fashion to the private rights asserted in federal equity cases. 
 289. See sources cited supra note 247. 
 290. FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE, supra note 13, at 40 (explaining how Swift 
made it possible for federal judges to create a “federal commercial law” which “served the 
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important possibility, then, is that Congress failed to rein in the 
Court’s uniform equity doctrine because it was generally sympathetic 
to the Court’s apparent efforts to create a national uniform 
commercial law, one that tended to favor out-of-state creditors. 
At first blush, such an interpretation seems directly applicable to 
the Process Act of 1828. After all, in cases like Wayman, the Supreme 
Court ratified federal procedural rules that aided the collection of 
debt and thwarted the operation of state debtor-relief laws, thus 
helping to create and enforce national norms concerning creditors’ 
rights.291 And in the 1820s, as in 1789, congressional debates 
concerning judicial process and equity were bound up in contests over 
debtors’ and creditors’ respective rights.292 In debates following the 
Kentucky crisis, strong defenders of debtors’ rights—such as Senator 
Rowan—advocated that federal courts apply state law and equity, in 
no small part because state legislatures had enacted laws tending to 
favor debtors. Given this important context, it is inviting to 
understand the Process Act of 1828 as evidence of a general 
procreditor bias in national judicial policy. Under this theory, 
national legislators ratified federal uniform equity by refusing to rein 
in federal equity power when the opportunity arose, thereby further 
entrenching the power of a national commercial elite. 
As tempting as such an interpretation is, the final version of the 
Process Act of 1828 demonstrates that, in this instance, creditor-
debtor tensions played a rather nuanced role in shaping federal 
judicial policy. Given the immediate context of cases like Wayman 
that gave rise to debates regarding judicial reform and federal equity 
in the 1820s, national legislators could not have failed to recognize the 
significance of judicial policy to the relative rights of creditors and 
debtors.293 But national legislators also perceived the need for 
institutional uniformity in the federal judicial system. 
The final form of the Process Act of 1828 reflects a compromise 
struck between these two competing concerns. Like the earlier 
 
interests of merchants involved in interstate trade”); HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 250 (“[T]he 
much heralded quest for legal uniformity . . . can also be seen more concretely as an attempt to 
impose a procommercial national legal order on unwilling state courts.”). 
 291. See Warren, supra note 38, at 437–39 (describing Kentucky’s debtor-relief laws and the 
Supreme Court cases that made the laws ineffective in federal courts). 
 292. See Holt, supra note 86, at 1478–1503 (describing the debate and history surrounding 
the passage of The Judiciary Act of 1789 as a struggle between procreditor and prodebtor 
legislators). 
 293. See supra notes 232–40 and accompanying text. 
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process acts, the Process Act of 1828 provided that in “proceedings in 
equity,” federal cases would be conducted “according to the 
principles, rules, and usages, which belong to courts of equity.”294 By 
1828, this phrasing was understood to refer to federal and English 
equity principles. But the 1828 Act also contained an important 
exception. The third section of the Act required federal conformity, 
in law and equity, with respect to “writs of execution” and final 
process.295 This third section of the 1828 Act was a triumph, albeit a 
limited one, for Senator Rowan and other supporters of debtors’ 
rights, for it generally required federal courts to apply debtor-friendly 
stay-of-execution statutes like Kentucky’s. 
Thus, while the Process Act of 1828 by and large perpetuated 
and expanded the federal uniform equity doctrine geographically, it 
slightly narrowed the scope of that doctrine by directing federal 
judges to apply the execution provisions that had been enacted by 
state legislators—many of which were debtor friendly—in equity. 
Given this particular exception to federal uniform equity, it would be 
a misstatement to suggest that the Act’s perpetuation and extension 
of the uniform federal equity doctrine can be attributed to 
procommercial interests in Congress. Out-of-state creditors who 
frequently litigated in federal courts to collect debts surely lost 
important ground in the final version of the Act. Other concerns were 
also at work in the debates leading to the Process Act of 1828, 
including the felt need for institutional coherence and uniformity in 
the federal judicial system.296 
In sum, by reading the debates leading up to the enactment of 
the Process Act of 1828 for what they were—judicial reform 
debates—one sees that it is impossible to understand the vitality of 
federal uniform equity without also understanding contemporary 
 
 294. Act of May 19, 1828 (Process Act of 1828), ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278, 280. 
 295. Id. § 3, 4 Stat. at 281. 
 296. It is worth noting, moreover, that although commercial cases were certainly an 
important part of the federal equity docket, equity jurisdiction also extended to a whole host of 
subjects unlikely to involve typical commercial interests. The federal courts applied, and insisted 
on the application of, a uniform body of equity principles in cases involving all manner of 
subjects—from disputes over dower, Powell v. Monson & Brimfield Mfg. Co., 19 F. Cas. 1218 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1824) (No. 11,356), to marriage settlements, Neves v. Scott, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 196 
(1850), to wills, Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 619 (1844). See infra Part II.C.1. Thus, to use 
modern terminology, the uniform equity doctrine was transsubstantive, at least within the 
federal equity docket. This does not mean that the perceived need for a national, uniform 
commercial law did not animate the push for uniformity in federal equity jurisprudence. But it 
does suggest that other factors were also at work. 
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concerns about institutional uniformity. Amid cries from orphan 
states for uniformity, equality, and expansion of the institutional 
infrastructure in the federal court system, uniform equity in the 1820s 
was not generally understood as a violation of federalism or 
separation-of-powers principles. Nor was it identified exclusively, or 
even largely, with an overreaching, nationalizing, and creditor-
friendly Supreme Court. In important ways, it appealed to a desire for 
uniformity and equality in the federal judicial system, especially on 
the fringes of the republic. 
In so concluding, one need not naïvely dismiss the significance of 
partisan disagreement and economic interests in shaping the behavior 
of federal judges and legislators. Surely some proponents of federal 
uniform equity sought expansion of federal judicial power based on a 
consolidationist understanding of government, while others sought to 
protect the interests of out-of-state creditors. But it would also be a 
mistake to suggest that uniformity always and only functioned as a 
code word for consolidation at the expense of state sovereignty, or for 
protection of particular interests. Institutional considerations—broad 
agreement that there was a minimum requirement for institutional 
uniformity in a federal judicial system—created an additional, 
distinctive set of conditions that provided a fertile and necessary 
context for the development and vitality of the federal uniform equity 
doctrine. 
C. Louisiana: “Foreign Law” in the Federal Courts 
The dynamic created by the Supreme Court’s use of federal 
equity power to secure institutional uniformity in the federal courts, 
and Congress’s acquiescence to that power, played out dramatically in 
the case of Louisiana. In the 1812 statute granting Louisiana 
statehood, Congress also created a federal judicial district, the 
“Louisiana district,” staffed with a district judge “who shall reside 
therein.”297 But the socio-legal culture of Louisiana remained 
distinctive, presenting the Supreme Court and national legislators 
with a dilemma: defer to the particular legal culture of the state and 
 
 297. Act of Apr. 8, 1812, ch. 50, § 3, 2 Stat. 701, 703. As was the case in all territories, 
Congress established federal courts in Louisiana prior to statehood. James Pfander 
demonstrates that one of the pre-statehood federal courts in Louisiana was, in fact, an Article 
III district court. See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial 
Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 618, 712 (2004) (“In the legislation that 
implemented the Louisiana Purchase . . . Congress created both a territorial court and an 
Article III district court.”). 
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risk complete loss of a distinctive federal judicial authority, or insist 
upon uniformity and risk trammeling Louisiana law. Measures had 
been taken to ensure, to a certain degree, the application of Louisiana 
civil law in federal court.298 In part because of the value placed on 
institutional uniformity in federal courts, however, the Supreme 
Court insisted upon the application of uniform equity principles in the 
federal courts in Louisiana. Once again, Congress demurred. 
It is difficult to imagine a state that was more on the national 
fringes geographically, legally, culturally, linguistically, and politically 
than Louisiana in the early nineteenth century. Louisiana state law 
was generally based on the civil law system that governed in most 
continental European countries rather than on the English common 
law system that governed in other states.299 In Louisiana state courts, 
judicial proceedings were conducted in French rather than English.300 
And with respect to its federal courts, Louisiana was truly an orphan 
state for much of the period. Until 1837, Louisiana was not part of 
any federal judicial circuit, and no Justice had been appointed to 
serve as its Circuit Justice.301 
Because of Louisiana’s distinctive legal system and culture, 
however, the application of uniform equity in Louisiana federal court 
encountered significant resistance in that state. But resistance to 
federal equity in Louisiana differed from that in Kentucky in an 
important respect. In Louisiana it was not only certain legislators who 
viewed federal equity as a usurpation of state sovereignty; the federal 
district judges likewise resisted federal equity. Thus, debates 
concerning federal equity in Louisiana illuminate a different 
dimension of the call for institutional uniformity in the federal courts. 
Given the limits of the circuit-riding system—especially in states like 
Louisiana—it was important that the lower federal court judges 
 
 298. See infra text accompanying note 305. 
 299. See MARK F. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY: THE EVOLUTION OF 
LOUISIANA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 1712–1862, at 31 (2001) (describing how Louisiana’s private law 
was based on the Roman, French, and Spanish civil-law traditions). 
 300. Although the Louisiana State Constitution of 1812 required that all laws be 
promulgated in English, French prevailed as the legal lingua franca in state legislative debates, 
judicial proceedings, and legal arrangements between private parties. Alain A. Levasseur & 
Roger K. Ward, 300 Years and Counting: The French Influence on the Louisiana Legal System, 
46 LA. B.J. 300, 304 (1998). 
 301. In 1837, Congress created the Ninth Circuit and included the Eastern District of 
Louisiana within that circuit. Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176, 176–77. The entirety 
Louisiana was incorporated into the circuit system in 1842. See Act of Aug. 16, 1842, ch. 180, 5 
Stat. 507. 
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complied with Supreme Court precedent and mandates. The creation 
of a lower federal judiciary would have been of little use if the jurists 
appointed did not identify, at some level, as federal judges willing to 
follow Supreme Court precedent.302 But in a state like Louisiana, 
ensuring that federal courts conformed with and followed Supreme 
Court precedent was no mean feat. 
In the early nineteenth century, the judges appointed to the 
federal district court in Louisiana were drawn from the local bar.303 In 
Louisiana, that meant the appointment of judges trained in civil law—
judges who, as it turned out, earnestly defended Louisiana’s legal 
system as the authentic civil law system over the bastardized version 
that was English chancery practice.304 In this institutional context, 
mandates that Louisiana federal courts apply uniform equity 
principles were contested and defined in a series of federal cases 
brought from the 1830s through the 1850s. It was in part because of 
the Louisiana federal judges’ fierce resistance to federal equity—a 
resistance that led nearly to the impeachment of one federal judge—
that the Supreme Court insisted upon the use of uniform equity 
principles with such vehemence. 
1. Equity in Louisiana Federal Courts.  Responding to proposals 
by Louisiana legislators, Congress enacted a special process act in 
1824 to regulate adjudication in federal courts in Louisiana. The 1824  
Act stipulated that “the mode of proceeding in civil causes in the 
courts of the United States . . . established in the state of Louisiana, 
shall be conformable” to the mode of practice in the state courts.305 
But like most judiciary acts of the period, the 1824 Act was vague 
 
 302. One might imagine a unitary judicial system in which lower-court judges were not 
obliged, explicitly or implicitly, to follow clear precedent established by superior courts. 
Acceptance of such a practice, however, would have constituted a significant departure from 
well-accepted norms in Anglo-American judicial practice. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must 
Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994) (noting that 
in American courts, “long-standing doctrine dictates that a court is always bound to follow a 
precedent established by a court ‘superior’ to it”). 
 303. See Act of Apr. 8, 1812, ch. 50, § 3, 2 Stat. 701, 703. 
 304. Although some commentators claimed the civil law as one of the important sources of 
English equity principles—thus tying Anglo-American equity to a glorious history of European 
civil law—the connections between civil law and English Chancery (and, hence, federal equity) 
remain unclear. See Charles Donahue, Jr., The Civil Law in England, 84 YALE L.J. 167, 170 
(1974) (book review) (describing connections between areas of law and courts, but noting that 
finding a connection for the “civil law element in the law applied in Chancery . . . is more 
problematic”). 
 305. Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 181, § 1, 4 Stat. 62, 62–63. 
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with respect to the source of procedures, remedies, and substantive 
principles to be applied in actions brought in equity. In fact, the 1824 
Act made no reference to equity at all. 
The Supreme Court first addressed that issue in 1835, in an 
opinion authored by Jackson-appointee Justice Smith Thompson. In 
Livingston v. Story,306 Thompson explained that because Louisiana 
courts did not recognize “equitable claims or rights” as traditionally 
understood in the Anglo-American tradition, the 1824 Act simply did 
not apply to equity cases brought in Louisiana federal court.307 Citing 
Robinson v. Campbell, he reasoned that equity principles applied in 
Louisiana federal courts as they applied in all federal courts.308 
Although not the only possible interpretation of the 1824 Act, it was 
the interpretation that would both preserve uniformity across the 
federal judicial system and ensure that Article III’s reference to 
equity was honored and enforced. Three years later, the basic holding 
of Livingston was affirmed by Chief Justice Taney in Poultney v. The 
City of La Fayette.309 
Both before and after Livingston was decided, the federal judges 
in Louisiana balked at the suggestion that uniform nonstate equity 
principles would apply in Louisiana federal court. Judge Samuel 
Harper, appointed in 1829 by President Jackson after personally 
assuring the president of his states’ rights views, was the first to joust 
with the Supreme Court over equity power.310 It was his ruling that the 
Supreme Court reversed in Livingston. And, more generally, it was 
his rules of court that prohibited the application of equity in the 
circuit court in Louisiana even after the Livingston Court held 
otherwise.311 
 
 306. Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1835). 
 307. Id. at 660. 
 308. Id. at 655–56. This is particularly significant because the Process Act of 1828 explicitly 
exempted Louisiana federal courts, Act of May 19, 1828 (Process Act of 1828), ch. 68, § 4, 4 
Stat. 278, 282, and—as per the Supreme Court’s interpretation—the 1824 Act did not apply to 
equity cases, Livingston, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 632. Hence, the Supreme Court had no statutory 
foundation for its rulings concerning the applicability of federal uniform equity in the Louisiana 
circuit court. 
 309. Poultney v. City of La Fayette, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 472 (1838). 
 310. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
SELECTION AND THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829–61, at 6–7 (1979) (discussing Harper’s pre-
appointment visit with Jackson, during which he stressed his states’ rights beliefs). 
 311. See Opinion of the Court, Whitney v. Relf (No. 3823) (Mar. 9, 1837) (Harper, J.), at 28, 
32, reprinted in Certificate of Division from the U.S. Circuit Court for E. La., Gaines v. Chew, 
40 U.S. 9 (1841), at 385, 386 [hereinafter Certificate of Division]. 
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Judge Harper’s rules were in place in 1835 when Myra Whitney 
(later, Myra Gaines) filed suit in federal circuit court in Louisiana 
claiming fraud against the executors of her alleged father’s estate.312 
The Gaines case, as it came to be known, demonstrates just how 
valuable federal equity could be for out-of-state litigants who often 
sought out a federal judicial forum. In addition, it shows just how far 
the Supreme Court would go to ensure that the lower federal courts 
applied uniform equity principles. Myra’s lawsuit was made for the 
tabloids.313 On the eve of her marriage to William Whitney, Myra 
learned from her father—or the man she had believed to be her 
father—that she had in fact been adopted. She was actually the 
biological child of the then-deceased Daniel Clark, an extraordinarily 
wealthy man whom Myra had known only as a close family friend.314 
Myra also learned of evidence suggesting that the executors of Clark’s 
estate defrauded her out of an enormous inheritance by suppressing a 
will that named her as his legitimate daughter and primary 
beneficiary.315 
In 1834, Myra and William began investigations and sought the 
assistance of the Louisiana state probate court in securing documents 
relevant to their case. But their investigations generated little more 
than the ire of the executors, a libel suit against William, and 
William’s imprisonment when he was unable to pay the related 
bond.316 Once William was out of prison, the couple decided to try 
their luck in federal court. They filed a bill in equity in federal court, 
charging that Clark’s last will and testament of 1813 had been 
fraudulently suppressed, and asking initially for discovery in the form 
of documents and deposition testimony.317 
But Myra and William fared only slightly better in federal court. 
Ruling on the defendants’ motion in 1837, Judge Harper ignored the 
recently decided Livingston opinion and held that the equity 
 
 312. See Petition for a Rehearing at 33, 34, Gaines v. Relf (June 1, 1839), reprinted in 
Certificate of Division, supra note 311, at 387, 387. 
 313. For fuller accounts of the Gaines case, see generally ELIZABETH URBAN ALEXANDER, 
NOTORIOUS WOMAN: THE CELEBRATED CASE OF MYRA CLARK GAINES (2001); Kristin A. 
Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of 
States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1830–37 (2005). 
 314. ALEXANDER, supra note 313, at 13–14; Collins, supra note 313, at 1830–32. 
 315. Collins, supra note 313, at 1830–32. 
 316. ALEXANDER, supra note 313, at 54–56. 
 317. See Order of Court, Whitney v. Relf (No. 3823) (Mar. 9, 1837) (Harper, J.), at 28, 28, 
reprinted in Certificate of Division, supra note 311, at 384, 384. 
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principles available in all other federal courts were inapplicable in 
Louisiana.318 Instead, he required that the proceedings be regulated by 
Louisiana practice rules, ordered that no discovery would be allowed 
under those rules, and mandated that all papers filed in the action be 
drafted in French.319 
Judge Harper’s opinion employs much of the same anti-federal-
equity reasoning that one finds in Senator Rowan’s speeches in 
Congress. But Harper’s opinion was specifically tailored to 
Louisiana’s unusual situation. Harper insisted that Louisiana’s civil-
law tradition was closer to the original source of equity jurisprudence 
than England’s borrowed and partial version of equity. “It was from 
the civil law that England derived her system of chancery courts; but 
while she borrowed only that part of the civil law, we recognize the 
whole code.”320 In other words, Louisiana courts were not bound by 
equity as defined in common law countries, but instead by a truer 
version of equity. If “want of the name [equity] is a fatal objection” to 
the application of Louisiana’s civil law in equity cases filed in 
Louisiana federal court, Harper complained, “it might as well be said 
that a house is not a house, because it is called maison in French.”321 
Notably, Harper also responded directly to the prevalent 
argument that application of federal and English equity principles 
was necessary to provide uniformity in the federal judicial system: 
“When equity, in the true sense of the word, can be administered in 
this court under the present practice in every case, why should a 
foreign system be introduced, merely to preserve, as it is said, a 
uniformity of practice throughout the Union?”322 Pointing to the Act 
of 1824 and other statutes, Harper reasoned, 
[N]o foreign system of practice can be imposed on this State; and 
until these acts of the national legislature shall be declared 
unconstitutional by the competent authority, it is insisted that this 
State is exempted from the onerous, and (to us,) odious rules of 
procedure with which we are threatened.323 
 
 318. Id. at 28–29. 
 319. See id. at 32–33. 
 320. Id. at 29. 
 321. Id. at 32–33. 
 322. Id. at 31. 
 323. Id. at 31–32. 
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In response to Myra’s first appeal, Ex Parte Whitney,324 the 
Supreme Court made quick work of Judge Harper’s impassioned 
opinion. “That it is the duty of the Circuit Court to proceed in this 
suit according to the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court for 
proceedings in equity causes at the February term thereof, A. D. 
1822, can admit of no doubt.”325 But by the time the opinion in Ex 
Parte Whitney was issued in 1839, Judge Harper had died. So when 
Myra returned to the circuit court in Louisiana—by this point 
widowed and remarried to General Edmund Gaines—she 
encountered Harper’s successor, Judge Philip Lawrence. 
One might have thought that Judge Lawrence would have been 
more amenable to federal equity than was his predecessor, given that 
he was the judicial candidate of a more moderate faction of the 
Democratic Party in Louisiana.326 But Lawrence would have nothing 
of federal equity in his court. For two years Myra’s case foundered in 
the circuit court. In 1841 she appealed to the Supreme Court again, 
complaining of the circuit court’s continued refusal to apply equity 
and unwillingness to require the defendants to answer the bill.327 In 
another opinion by Justice Thompson, the Supreme Court declared it 
to be a “matter of extreme regret, that it appears to be the settled 
determination of the District Judge, not to suffer chancery practice to 
prevail in the circuit court in Louisiana, in equity causes; in total 
disregard of the repeated decisions of this Court.”328 
On appeal before the Supreme Court yet again in 1844, counsel 
for the executors raised the well-rehearsed objections to the use of 
equity in Louisiana federal courts.329 At this juncture, Myra had 
attempted to rescind the executors’ transfer of estate property using 
 
 324. Ex parte Whitney, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 404 (1839). 
 325. Id. at 408. 
 326. Judge Lawrence was a New York native and had worked as an editor for a newspaper 
that began as a pro-Van Buren newspaper, hence giving him a direct connection to President 
Van Buren. Although not a native of Louisiana, Lawrence lived in Louisiana and worked in the 
political and legal community, serving as the U.S. District Attorney. His appointment as the 
district judge enjoyed considerable support from the local Democratic Party. See HALL, supra 
note 310, at 30–31 (“Divisions in the Louisiana Democracy provided Van Buren with some 
discretion in choosing a new judge, but ultimately he responded to the recommendations of 
party moderates.”). 
 327. Gaines v. Relf, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 9, 12 (1841) (“The counsel for the plaintiffs contended 
that the single question in the case was, whether the Circuit Court of Louisiana has chancery 
jurisdiction.”). 
 328. Id. at 17. 
 329. Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 619, 628–31 (1844). 
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an implied trust.330 Explaining that trusts had been abolished by the 
Louisiana Code of 1808, and again by the Code of 1825, counsel for 
the defendants queried, “[How can] this court fasten upon the people 
of Louisiana all the doctrine of uses and trusts, against their positive 
law? . . . The English cases are not applicable.”331 “Our system has 
been called a mongrel system,” counsel explained, “but it is good 
enough for us.”332 
Countering the argument that uniform equity equalized the 
treatment of litigants throughout the federal judicial system, defense 
counsel observed the inequality created by the imposition of equity 
principles: “How can a citizen of another state claim more rights than 
a citizen of the state itself[?] The Constitution requires all to be 
placed upon an equal footing, but nothing more.”333 
The Supreme Court did not relent. At the pen of Justice John 
McLean—a dissenter in Robinson—the Court once again insisted on 
the application of uniform equity, declaring that “the Circuit Court of 
the United States, exercising jurisdiction in Louisiana, as in every 
other state, preserves [as] distinct the common law and chancery 
powers.”334 McLean then dismissed the notion that “the federal 
government has imposed a foreign law upon Louisiana,” denying that 
“[t]he courts of the United States have involved [a] new or foreign 
principle in Louisiana.”335 Either unaware of or unconcerned about 
the tension within his reasoning, McLean declared that “local law 
governs” disputes in federal court in Louisiana “the same as in every 
other state,” but that equity applies, “produc[ing] uniformity in the 
federal courts, throughout the Union.”336 
That such “uniformity” in the federal courts came at the cost of 
conformity with Louisiana’s civil law was of no moment. So, too, was 
the fact that the application of equity principles almost necessarily 
altered the outcome of a lawsuit, which would lead to inequality in 
the administration of justice among litigants depending on whether 
the suit was brought in federal or state court. “No right is jeoparded 
by” the application of uniform equity principles in the federal court, 
 
 330. See id. at 649–50 (discussing the availability of the equitable remedy of the implied trust 
in federal court). 
 331. Id. at 639. 
 332. Id. at 637. 
 333. Id. at 639. 
 334. Id. at 650. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 650–51. 
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McLean explained.337 Rather, “to say the least, wrongs are as well 
redressed, and rights as well protected, by the forms of chancery as by 
the forms of the civil law.”338 
On Myra’s next appeal to the Court in 1848, the Justices 
effectively took over the case. Rather than remanding to the 
Louisiana federal judge, they reviewed all of the evidence de novo 
and resolved the ultimate question of Myra’s legitimacy. In an 
opinion by Justice Wayne—a Jackson appointee and former Georgia 
state court judge—the Court applied federal and English equity 
principles and practices,339declared that Myra was legitimate, and 
found that the executors had committed fraud.340 Although Myra’s 
legal battles did not end there, the Court’s insistence on the 
application of uniform equity principles in Louisiana federal court did 
not wane.341  
2. Institutional Stalemate.  The struggle over federal equity power 
in Louisiana recorded in Livingston, Poultney, and, most vividly, the 
Gaines case, was part of the larger debate concerning the institutional 
authority and operation of the federal courts throughout the nation. 
That debate was taking place in Congress, the state legislature, and 
local bar associations.342 As in the case of Kentucky, the struggle over 
federal equity in Louisiana correlated with a breakdown in the 
administration of justice. But in this case it was a breakdown of the 
operation of the federal courts, rather than of the forum state courts. 
Judge Lawrence’s stalwart refusal to apply federal uniform 
equity principles is notable, not only because it was the subject of 
Myra’s appeals to the Supreme Court, but also because it figured in 
two legal actions initiated by the Clerk of the United States Court for 
the Eastern District of Louisiana, Duncan Hennen. By filing a 
 
 337. Id. at 651. 
 338. Id. 
 339. See Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 550, 584 (1848) (observing that “[t]he 
practice of granting issues” is “not a matter of right” in either “American courts of equity” or 
“[i]n the English chancery, except in the case of an heir at law or of a rector or vicar”). 
 340. See id. at 602 (finding that Myra “is the lawful and only child of [the] marriage” 
between Daniel Clark and Zuline Carriere and that the property in question had been “illegally 
sold by those who had no right or authority to make a sale of it”); Collins, supra note 313, at 
1835–36 (summarizing the Court’s analysis of the evidence regarding Myra’s legitimacy). 
 341. Myra and her heirs appeared before the Supreme Court at least thirteen more times 
before the saga was concluded. See Collins, supra note 313, at 1816 n.196 (listing the Supreme 
Court opinions issued in the Gaines case). 
 342. See supra Part II.A. 
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mandamus action in the Supreme Court and an impeachment petition 
in Congress, Hennen alerted both bodies to the breakdown of the 
Louisiana federal court caused by Judge Lawrence’s refusal to apply 
federal equity principles.343 
Hennen had been appointed clerk by Judge Harper in 1834.344 
Shortly after Judge Lawrence took his oath of office, he terminated 
Hennen’s appointment. The termination was not for cause, as 
Lawrence himself declared that Hennen had performed his duties 
“methodically, promptly, skillfully, and uprightfully.”345 Instead, 
Lawrence fired Hennen to replace him with a personal friend. 
Hennen refused to relinquish his office, and, more materially from 
the perspective of litigants with pending cases, “refused to deliver the 
records of the said court to” the new clerk of court.346 
Hennen’s complaints against Judge Lawrence were many. In 
addition to wrongful discharge and unlawful patronage, Hennen 
charged Lawrence with absenteeism from the state in dereliction of 
his duties and statutory mandates, ethical violations of various sorts, 
“notorious[] and inveterate[] addict[ion] to the intemperate use of 
ardent spirits,” and refusal “to allow . . . petitioner . . . to keep any 
chancery docket, to keep any order-book, to issue any subpoena in 
chancery, or to perform any of the duties of his said office connected 
with the mode of proceeding in chancery.”347 In particular, Hennen 
noted that “in the case of Whitney vs. Relf et al.”—Myra’s “bill in 
chancery” against the executors of Clark’s estate, 
Judge Lawrence . . . refused to allow the solicitor of the 
complainants to have an attachment to compel the defendant to 
answer the bill, on the ground that such proceeding was not 
warranted by the State practice of Louisiana; and on said solicitor 
requesting that said application and refusal, as it occurred, should be 
stated on the records of the court, that it might be brought to the 
supervision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the said 
Judge Lawrence refused, and commanded your petitioner not to 
make any entry on the records of said application and refusal, nor 
 
 343. See In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839); H.R. REP. NO. 25-272, at 2 (3d Sess. 
1839); H.R. DOC. NO. 25-63, at 5 (3d Sess. 1839). 
 344. H.R. DOC. NO. 25-63, at 1. 
 345. H.R. REP. NO. 25-272, at 2. 
 346. Id. at 2–3. 
 347. Id. at 6, 7. 
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any mention thereon of said proceeding, which took place in open 
court at said November session, 1837.348 
The result, Hennen explained, was a complete breakdown of the 
federal court in Louisiana. “[T]he consequences of the said acts of 
Judge Lawrence have been to suspend the administration of justice 
for the period of one judicial year.”349 Although a mandamus petition 
in the Supreme Court yielded no relief for Hennen,350 a House select 
committee appointed to review Hennen’s allegations recommended 
that the House impeach Lawrence “for high misdemeanors in 
office.”351 
Lawrence died before his impeachment was finally decided. But 
the dispute over equity in Louisiana federal court did not die with 
him. In 1841, while Myra’s second appeal was pending before the 
Supreme Court, the Louisiana legislature petitioned Congress, 
“[a]sking the act of 1824 to be so amended as . . . to adopt the 
proceedings in civil cases for equity causes, and prevent the chancery 
law of Great Britain from being introduced in such causes.”352 The 
legislators complained about “repeated decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States” which have determined that “complicated 
and artificial modes of proceeding called the Chancery Practice, 
consisting of the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court . . . and the 
rules of proceedings of the Court of Chancery in England” apply in 
equity cases brought in Louisiana federal court.353 The gravamen of 
their petition was that application of equity in Louisiana federal court 
made Louisiana citizens foreigners in their own federal courts: “[T]he 
whole of the chancery law of Great Britain is introduced among us, 
and established upon us contrary to the desires and interests of the 
State.”354 However forceful, the 1841 petition went nowhere. In 1844, 
the Louisiana legislature submitted a nearly identical petition.355 This 
petition likewise fell on deaf ears. 
 
 348. Id. at 6. 
 349. Id. at 7. 
 350. In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 262 (1839) (denying the relief requested by 
Hennen). 
 351. H.R. REP. NO. 25-272, at 1. 
 352. H.R. DOC. NO. 27-14, at 1 (1st Sess. 1841) (emphasis omitted); see also S. DOC. NO. 27-
14 (2d Sess. 1841) (presenting the same resolution to the Senate).  
 353. H.R. DOC. NO. 27-14, at 1. 
 354. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 355. See H.R. DOC. NO. 28-207 (1st Sess. 1844). 
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Within a couple years, and at the height of the contest 
concerning the application of equity in the Gaines case, two other 
groups filed petitions in Congress objecting to federal equity power. 
In 1848, “judges and members of the bar of New Orleans”356 filed a 
particularly bold petition in the Senate. They argued that by applying 
equity, the Court had “introduce[d] a new and extensive system of 
jurisprudence, unconnected, if not incompatible with the system of 
laws which prevail in this State.”357 If the Supreme Court continued on 
its path, explained the judges, “our State w[ould] present the singular 
spectacle of a country in which two distinct tribunals, exercising a 
concurrent jurisdiction, are governed by principles and forms 
essentially different.”358 This, they continued, would lead to what we 
now call forum shopping. Where equity is available in the federal 
courts but not the state courts, they observed that a “different 
measure of justice may frequently prevail” in the two forums, and 
“foreigners or citizens of other States have the privilege of selecting 
that court which is most favorable to themselves.”359 
In addition to creating a strategic advantage enjoyed by the out-
of-state litigant, this arrangement had overtones of the worst aspects 
of colonial rule. The judges predicted that the federal courts would be 
looked at “as a foreign tribunal sitting in their midst, trampling on 
their laws, overruling the decisions of their courts, and unsettling the 
titles to their property.”360 Such an “intrusion” would be considered 
“worse than that of a country subjugated by war, whose conquerors 
rarely interfere with the laws affecting merely the pecuniary interests 
and civil relations of society.”361 
A ten-page report of the Committee of the Louisiana Bar 
submitted as part of the same 1848 petition took this line of criticism 
even further, arguing cogently and passionately that the application of 
uniform equity in Louisiana federal courts was simply 
unconstitutional. This report echoed the concern that the application 
of equity in Louisiana federal court would lead to the gradual 
extinction of Louisiana’s distinctive—and superior—legal system: 
“[T]hat under the guise of mere forms of practice, a system of law 
 
 356. S. MISC. DOC. NO. 30-144, at 1 (1st Sess. 1848). 
 357. Id. at 2. 
 358. Id. at 3. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
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wholly foreign to our habits and usages may supersede our own as far 
as it can be done by the authority of the federal courts . . . and the 
State laws [would] be abrogated without the authority or sanction of 
our legislature.”362 The report further argued that as long as equity 
principles were applied in Louisiana federal court, and, 
as long as the rules enacted by ourselves for the equitable 
interpretation and enforcement of our own laws are cramped, 
controlled, and set at naught by others originally adopted some 
hundred years ago to govern the anti-jury tribunals, and enforce the 
feudal laws of a distant monarchy, so long will our rights be 
impaired, our property perilled, our very liberties rendered 
precarious, our territorial legislation converted into a solemn farce, 
and our system of jurisprudence itself be eventually jostled out of 
existence.363 
In 1849, a resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary in response to these petitions,364 and the following year 
the committee introduced a bill that would have required federal 
judges to conform to Louisiana state law and judicial practice.365 But 
the 1850 bill went nowhere and it seems to have generated little 
interest or debate. An 1851 report of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary that provided a negative recommendation on a similar bill 
sheds a little light on the lack of support for the Louisiana petitions. 
The House Committee’s report is short and defers entirely to the 
Supreme Court: “[T]he court in the last resort having repeatedly 
decided that the distinction between law and equity, and to be 
exercised by the federal judiciary, is a constitutional one: the question 
is therefore settled against the proposed reform.”366 
The report’s characterization of the Court’s insistence on 
uniform exercise of federal equity power as a constitutional decision, 
and therefore insulated from legislative reform, seems overstated 
given that Congress already regulated the federal courts’ equity 
powers in various ways. But the Committee’s report intimated that its 
members understood there to be constitutional limits on the extent to 
 
 362. Id. at 13. 
 363. Id. at 15. 
 364. See S. JOURNAL, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1849). 
 365. S. 112, 31st Cong. (1st Sess. 1850). The bill passed to a second reading, S. JOURNAL, 
31st Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1850), but then disappeared. 
 366. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PRACTICE OF STATE COURTS, H.R. REP. NO. 31-67, at 1 
(2d Sess. 1851). 
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which Congress could regulate the federal courts’ equity powers 
because of Article III’s extension of the judicial power to cases 
brought in equity. 
Whatever the force of the theory that Article III restricted 
Congress’s authority to restrict federal equity power, the suggestion 
of such limits at the very least indicates that there was no general 
sense that constitutional principles—such as federalism or separation 
of powers—prevented federal courts from applying uniform equity 
principles, even when those principles departed from state law or 
equity, as they often did.  
3. Federal Equity and Institutional Uniformity in Louisiana.  
Careful reconstruction of debates regarding equity in Louisiana 
federal courts illustrates the underappreciated relevance of judicial-
reform debates to early-nineteenth-century attitudes toward the 
application of nonstate, judge-made law in federal equity cases. It also 
helps to explain why Louisianans’ objections to the application of 
uniform equity principles had little influence in the early nineteenth 
century. 
Federal equity’s critics decried the Supreme Court’s uniform 
equity doctrine as colonial in its aspirations. But the historical sources 
reveal that such criticism reflected an extreme states’-rights 
understanding of the limits of federal judicial power. Given the 
prevalent concern about disuniformity in, and the incapacity of, the 
federal judicial system, critics’ complaints about federal equity’s ill 
effects were unlikely to resonate with many national legislators or 
with members of the Supreme Court. With the Gaines case in the 
newspapers and a recent petition to impeach one of Louisiana’s 
federal judges in part because of his rejection of federal equity, 
Congress’s refusal in the 1840s and 1850s to take any further 
measures to protect Louisiana’s legal system from alleged federal 
judicial overreaching is unsurprising. The temporary breakdown of 
the administration of justice in the Louisiana federal court over the 
issue of federal equity underscored the profound need for uniformity 
in the federal courts, helping to explain why the Supreme Court 
insisted upon, and Congress acquiesced to, application of uniform 
equity principles. 
Considered in conjunction with Congressional debates 
concerning the Process Act of 1828, disagreement over the 
application of equity in Louisiana federal court also calls into 
question the relevance of an explanation frequently offered to 
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account for the development of general common law. Early-
nineteenth-century judges, the argument holds, simply did not 
understand themselves as engaged in lawmaking at all. Rather, when 
employing a common law rule of decision, they were declaring law, 
not making law. In such accounts, the Swift case is explained as the 
product of a radically different, prepositivist jurisprudential moment, 
and hence cannot be understood to have ratified judicial lawmaking 
as that concept is understood today.367  
One could easily formulate a parallel account tailored to equity 
jurisprudence—a field of adjudication in which judges purportedly 
understood themselves to be applying a common reservoir of 
equitable procedures and remedies, not adjudicating substantive 
liabilities or making law. One finds such language in some early-
nineteenth-century equity cases.368 Under this theory, federal judges 
applying uniform equity principles were not making law at all. Hence, 
contemporaries would not have seen the federalism and separation-
of-powers problems posed by the federal uniform equity doctrine. 
But one of the most interesting aspects of the early-nineteenth-
century debates over federal equity is their modern-sounding—even 
positivist—resonance. Critics of federal equity were under no illusion 
that federal courts sitting in equity were merely declaring the law, 
prescribing remedies, or drawing on general equitable principles that 
 
 367. In Swift, Justice Story proclaimed that the decisions of courts “are, at most, only 
evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves laws.” Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 
1, 18 (1842). Some modern commentators contend that this alternative jurisprudential 
understanding of the common law helps to explain why, during the Swift era, the general federal 
common law did not offend contemporary sensibilities about federalism and separation of 
powers. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 10, at 1284–85 (explaining that, at the time it was decided, 
Swift offended neither federalism nor separation of powers principles, in part because the Swift 
Court “ascertain[ed] the applicable rule of decision,” and did not make law or policy). That 
theory of judicial role has been called into question by Morton Horwitz and William Nelson, 
both of whom contend that in the early nineteenth century, judges abandoned the declaratory 
understanding of the common law in favor of an “instrumentalist” or policy-oriented 
understanding. See HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 22; WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION 
OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–
1830, at 172 (Univ. of Ga. Press 1994) (1975). 
 368. Chief Justice Taney drew this distinction when sitting as a Circuit Justice. See Meade v. 
Beale, 16 F. Cas. 1283, 1291 (C.C.D. Md. 1850) (No. 9371) (recognizing that equitable remedies 
in federal court would be supplied by English chancery practice, but insisting that “the right 
must be given by the law of the state, or of the United States”). Justice McClean also drew this 
distinction in the Gaines case. See Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 619, 650–651 (1844) (“In 
deciding controversies in [Louisiana] the local law governs, the same as in every other 
state. . . . [The application of equity is] only a change of mode, which produces uniformity in the 
federal courts, throughout the Union.”). 
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were universally applicable. Instead, they were quick to observe that 
the federal courts were imposing new laws associated with other 
sovereigns on the people of Kentucky and Louisiana, thereby 
treading on the powers of state legislators and the rights of the 
people. Senator Rowan cogently urged that federal judges were 
improperly legislating from the bench: “We have been contending at 
the boundary line which separates the legislative from the judicial 
power . . . .”369 The 1848 memorial from the judges and members of 
the New Orleans Bar made the same point. The application of 
uniform equity principles in Louisiana federal court would mean that 
“those courts may decide, not according to local law, but according to 
a system of laws foreign to our own laws and usages. . . . [I]t would 
make them legislators.”370 
In short, despite competing jurisprudential views concerning 
what, exactly, judges did when deciding cases in equity, this was not a 
situation in which contemporaries were unable to comprehend the 
potential separation-of-powers and federalism problems posed by 
federal equity power because they were schooled in a radically 
different jurisprudential philosophy. Yet, even though litigants and 
lawmakers very clearly articulated those concerns, such views 
garnered little support on the Supreme Court or in Congress. By 
reading the debates over federal equity in Louisiana as judicial-
reform debates, one can see that such arguments found little general 
support at least in part because conformity with Louisiana law in 
federal equity cases would have compromised the fragile institutional 
integrity of a fledgling federal judicial system. 
D. Instituting the Federal Courts and Courting the Nation 
No single factor can explain a complex phenomenon like the 
development of the federal uniform equity doctrine in the early 
nineteenth century. And this Article makes no attempt to dismiss 
entirely the explanations frequently offered for the parallel 
phenomenon of the general common law, such as the need for a 
uniform commercial law or alternative jurisprudential theories of the 
judicial function. But careful attention to debates concerning federal 
equity power reveals other forces that shaped the uniform equity 
 
 369. 4 REG. DEB. 368 (1828) (statement of Sen. Rowan); see also id. at 363 (“Does the Chief 
Justice, do all the Judges together, possess legislative power?”); id. (“The Judges possess no 
legislative power.”). 
 370. S. MISC. DOC. NO. 30-144, at 10 (1st Sess. 1848) (emphasis added). 
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doctrine, including institutional concerns and pressures. In this 
respect, the story of federal equity power can enrich and complicate 
modern scholars’ and jurists’ understanding of how ideological beliefs 
regarding federal and state power were informed and mediated by 
historically contingent institutional limitations and pressures. 
Analyses of early-nineteenth-century federal judicial power 
account for particular institutional dynamics of the Supreme Court, 
largely by referring to its consolidationist ambitions at that time.371 
But as recent work by political scientists urges, and as the historical 
sources discussed in this Article confirm, students of the federal 
courts would do well to broaden and refine their conception of the 
institutional constraints and pressures that shaped and characterized 
judicial and legislative behavior in the early nineteenth century.372 
First, laws are the result not only of societal interests or the 
ideological predisposition of government officials; they are also 
shaped by particular institutions.373 As Professor Keith Whittington 
and others have argued, institutions constitute preferences in part by 
generating particular interests, incentives, and habits of mind in the 
people operating within those institutions. Thus, “justices are likely to 
think about and act on public problems differently as a consequence 
of their experiences and expectations on the Court.”374 Second, 
institutions also largely determine the range of actions available to 
officials seeking to achieve a particular policy goal.375 
We can see both of these institutional dynamics at play in the 
Supreme Court’s insistence on uniformity in federal equity cases. 
 
 371. See White, supra note 194, at 673–77 (summarizing several authors’ analyses of the 
Marshall Court); cf. Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction 6 (Univ. 
of Chi. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 297, 2010), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558612 (“The Marshall Court’s jurisdictional 
decisions emerged from a complex array of causes that cannot be attributed simply to an 
overarching nationalist project.”). 
 372. For example, Professor Paul Frymer cautions against conflating institutions with “a 
more porous and less analytically rigorous ‘political context.’” Paul Frymer, Law and American 
Political Development, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 779, 781 (2008) (book review). 
 373. See Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist Approaches to 
Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 608 (2000) (book review) (explaining the theory 
of “New Institutionalism,” which claims that judges do not decide cases based solely on their 
“personal policy preferences”; rather, “[b]oth the internal procedures and norms of the Court 
and the external relationship between the Court and its larger political environment affect 
judicial outcomes”). 
 374. Id. at 615; see also Frymer, supra note 372, at 785 (“[I]nstitutions create and shape the 
interests of those who work within them . . . .”). 
 375. See Whittington, supra note 373, at 614. 
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Concerns about the lack of uniformity in the federal judiciary were 
not abstract. The Supreme Court Justices’ particular institutional 
position within the federal judiciary sensitized them to concerns 
about disuniformity in the federal courts. Through circuit riding in 
particular, Justices experienced the failures of the system first hand. 
Originally, circuit riding was the primary way that the federal judicial 
system would bring federal justice “to every Man’s Door,” while also 
ensuring that the Justices stayed in touch with the mores of the 
people.376 But circuit riding of the scope originally mandated quickly 
became implausible. By the 1810s, reliance on the circuit-riding 
system left many states without a Circuit Justice at all.377 The Justices, 
more than other federal officials, were thus intimately aware of, and 
sensitive to, the ways that existing institutional arrangements were 
failing to ensure uniform administration of justice in the lower federal 
courts. 
Though the Justices were personally aware of the disuniformity 
in the lower federal courts, their particular institutional position 
limited the manner by which they could effect change in the system. 
Justices petitioned Congress personally for judicial reform on 
numerous occasions, spelling out the crisis in terms familiar to 
litigants and western legislators. But they achieved little significant 
effect.378 Although the Justices were powerless to directly influence 
judicial-reform legislation, they could shape the Court’s jurisprudence 
in ways that would diminish the reliance on circuit riding and ensure 
that federal courts served the rudimentary function of providing a 
forum that would administer justice uniformly throughout the 
nation.379 In short, by insisting on the application of a uniform body of 
 
 376. John Jay’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York 
(Apr. 12, 1790), in 2 The DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT, 1790–1794, supra note 206, at 25, 27–28. 
 377. See sources cited supra notes 206–08. 
 378. See sources cited supra note 206. In addition to letters and petitions seeking to modify 
circuit-riding duties and the circuit system, the most overt effort by Supreme Court Justices to 
influence judicial legislation in the early nineteenth century was “The Judges’ Bill,” drafted by 
Justice Story in 1816 and endorsed by all of the sitting Justices. The bill would have granted the 
circuit courts the full scope of federal question jurisdiction allowed by Article III and raised 
judicial salaries. See 1 WARREN, supra note 225, at 442; 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, 
supra note 251, at 300 (quoting a manuscript in which Story discusses the reception of the bill by 
the other Justices). 
 379. Uniform federal equity was not the only doctrinal tool at the Justices’ disposal. 
Insistent enforcement of Section 25 and recognition of federal question jurisdiction in certain, 
albeit limited, instances also evince the Court’s effort to secure uniformity. For an insightful 
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equity principles in cases like the Gaines case and myriad other 
mundane cases, the Justices crafted a doctrine that catered to a desire 
for uniformity in the federal courts. 
Attentiveness to institutional dynamics—in particular the 
complex relationship between Congress and the federal courts—also 
helps explain Congress’s role in the evolution and entrenchment of 
the uniform equity doctrine. On the one hand, one might expect that 
the objections to federal equity articulated by Senator Rowan and the 
Louisiana petitioners would have led Congress to restrict federal 
equity power as much as was constitutionally permissible. And at 
least hypothetically, national legislators would have had an interest in 
protecting the prerogative of federal and state legislators by 
constraining federal equity power. But Congress acquiesced to and 
even extended the geographic reach of the federal uniform equity 
doctrine in the aftermath of the Kentucky crisis, and despite 
substantial lobbying by Louisiana officials. 
Once again, the shared concern about the need for federal 
judicial reform and the related concern about the uniform 
administration of justice provide an essential context for 
understanding Congress’s failure to rein in the federal equity power. 
Congress knew that judicial reform was needed. But due to the 
legislative stalemate caused by fractious coalitions and the 
controversial nature of any federal judicial reform, significant 
legislative action was impossible.380 For legislators who wanted to 
secure uniformity in the administration of the federal courts, but who 
were unable to do so directly through legislation, acquiescing to the 
uniform equity doctrine was one way to achieve a modicum of 
uniformity in the federal courts. Moreover, some national legislators 
may have been quite happy to turn judicial reform over to the courts 
to avoid any political consequences that might be associated with it.381 
Again, the Supreme Court’s uniform equity doctrine was by no means 
 
analysis of the Marshall Court’s effort to secure uniformity of federal law through federal 
question jurisdiction, see LaCroix, supra note 371, at 43–52. 
 380. See supra notes 212–26 and accompanying text. 
 381. In this respect, my findings are consistent with Whittington’s important analysis of the 
political operation of judicial review in the early national period and his observation that 
“structural characteristics of political systems such as the United States encourage cooperation 
between judges and political leaders to obtain common objectives.” Keith E. Whittington, 
“Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Support of Judicial Review by the United States 
Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 584 (2005). See generally Mark A. Graber, 
Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 425 (2005) (discussing new research in 
political science that explores the relationship between judicial review and elected officials). 
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an adequate substitute for substantial changes to the circuit-riding 
system or other necessary judicial reforms. But in a world of little 
legislative resolve and imperfect solutions, the crisis in the federal 
judiciary likely made acquiescence to, and even acceptance of, 
uniform equity a palatable alternative. 
Constructing a federal judicial system that would simultaneously 
serve the country and respect state sovereignty was not a 
straightforward project. Individual actors undoubtedly brought 
partisanship and ideologically charged policy views regarding courts 
and commerce to the task. But they were also confronted with the 
practical governance problems that inevitably arose in a polity 
characterized by dual sovereignty, multiple states, concurrent 
jurisdiction, and vast geographic territory. These concerns shaped 
judicial-reform debates in Congress and animated the Court’s 
response to the particularly acute disuniformity that would result if 
the federal courts attempted to conform to the various state equity 
systems. Seen in this light, the Court’s effort to define and defend 
federal equity power appears as evidence less of its raw 
consolidationist ambitions than of the Court’s institutional co-
stewardship of the federal judicial system—a role it shared, albeit not 
always easily, with Congress. 
III.  “A CONSIDERABLE SURGICAL OPERATION” AND THE 
ERASURE OF FEDERAL EQUITY 
For some students of federal courts, the most significant aspect 
of the early-nineteenth-century federal uniform equity doctrine is not 
why it thrived but rather the fact that it existed at all. One of the stock 
historical narratives that continues to shape modern understanding of 
federal judicial power is that the application of nonstate, judge-made 
law was generally disapproved of in the early period and was 
extremely limited in scope. In this account, Section 34’s apparent 
requirement that federal courts apply state law in the absence of 
governing positive federal law is held up as the general rule, with 
Swift and other departures marking aberrations that must be 
explained away or repudiated. Erie thus stands as a triumphant return 
to the true principles of separation of powers and federalism.382 
 
 382. See Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 
846 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000)). 
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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,383 a case in which the majority of the 
Court recognized a narrow species of federal common law in the 
context of the Alien Tort Statute,384 provides an example. Justice 
Scalia’s dissenting proclamation reveals conflicting impulses to 
recognize the modernity of the Erie doctrine while also grounding it 
in founding-era principles: “Despite the avulsive change of Erie, the 
Framers who included reference to ‘the Law of Nations’ in . . . the 
Constitution would be . . . quite terrified by the ‘discretion’ endorsed 
by the Court.”385 Sounding a similar chord, Professor Martin Redish 
explains Section 34 as an attempt by the first Congress “to preserve 
the political values of federalism by curbing the one branch of the 
federal government most feared as a threat to state power.”386 The 
assumption underlying both of these statements is that during the 
founding era, there was a shared understanding of the profound limits 
on nonstate, judge-made law in the federal court—an understanding 
recognized and restored in Erie. 
Telling the story of judge-made law in the federal courts through 
the lens of federal equity power calls that assumption into question. 
Regardless of whether Swift was consistent with contemporary 
practice,387 any account that focuses exclusively on cases brought in 
law mistakes a part for the whole of federal adjudicative activity 
during the period. On the equity side of the docket, application of 
uniform, nonstate, judge-made law was the norm.388 Viewed in light of 
the history of federal equity power, then, any analysis that attempts to 
draw an easy line connecting modern limitations on federal judge-
made law and historical beliefs and practices deserves skeptical 
scrutiny. 
This point is hardly noteworthy to legal historians, who have long 
lamented lawyers’ and jurists’ efforts to simplify the past for 
 
 383. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 384. Id. at 724. 
 385. Id. at 749 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 386. Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive 
Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 792 (1989). 
 387. See supra note 367 and accompanying text. 
 388. This is not to suggest that jurists were insensitive to the problems associated with 
judicial legislation. Concerns were raised in the context of federal equity power, even if they did 
not represent the dominant view in the early nineteenth century. See supra Part II.B–C. And the 
perils of federal criminal common law led to significant limitation of federal judicial lawmaking 
powers in criminal cases. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (holding 
that federal courts do not possess an implied power to exercise common law jurisdiction in 
criminal cases). 
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expedient purposes.389 Although it is well beyond the scope of this 
Article to examine the perils and possibilities of utilitarian 
invocations of the past in federal courts’ jurisprudence generally,390 it 
is germane to consider how the pull of conventional legal reasoning 
has shaped modern understanding of the history of equity power. 
Such an inquiry illustrates why the history of uniform federal equity 
power has been minimized in modern doctrinal and scholarly 
accounts and highlights some of the costs of its erasure. 
In 1945, Justice Frankfurter was faced with a problem: Seven 
years after Erie announced the end of general common law on the law 
side of the federal docket, the question of Erie’s status in equity cases 
remained unresolved.391 By this point in time, law and equity had been 
officially merged by virtue of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.392 
Yet even after the merger, the long-standing norm of uniformity on 
the equity side of the docket weighed strongly against the wholesale 
application of the Erie principle in equity cases. Indeed, it remained 
so powerful that in York v. Guaranty Trust,393 the Second Circuit 
found that Erie did not mandate the application of a state statute of 
limitations in a case in which equitable remedies were sought. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit cited, at the top of a very 
long list of cases, Robinson v. Campbell.394  
 
 389. See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 167–
90 (1996) (discussing the different practices of lawyers and historians and the differing ends to 
which they characteristically apply evidence). 
 390. Moreover, Edward Purcell and Susan Bandes have each provided elegant discussions 
of that subject with particular attention to Erie. See PURCELL, supra note 382, at 3 (observing 
that Erie has been “widely misunderstood, in large part because judges and legal scholars have 
too often divorced it from its full and vital historical context”); Bandes, supra note 382, at 830 
(discussing how principles like federalism are often cast into abstract terms, ignoring historical 
and social realities). 
 391. Because the Rules of Decision Act did not apply in federal equity cases in any 
straightforward way, it was not clear whether or how Erie would apply in these cases. 
Immediately following Erie, the Court announced that the core Erie principle—that federal 
courts sitting in diversity must follow state substantive law—“applies though the construction 
arises not in an action at law, but in a suit in equity.” Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 
205 (1938). Two years later, however, the Court expressly left unanswered the question of 
whether, in federal equity cases, the Erie principle required conformity with state remedies. See 
Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 294 (1940) (“[W]e have no occasion to consider the extent to 
which federal courts . . . are bound to follow state statutes and decisions affecting those 
remedies.”); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 112, §§ 4504 n.6 & 4513. 
 392. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (“There shall be one form of action known as ‘civil 
action.’”). 
 393. York v. Guar. Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev’d, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 394. See id. at 521–22 (citing Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222 (1818)). 
The York court urged that in equity cases, federal courts were under no obligation to follow 
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The Supreme Court opinion reversing the Second Circuit is now 
a staple component of the Erie doctrine. In Guaranty Trust v. York, 
the Court announced the “outcome determinative” test,395 which in its 
modified form remains an essential principle in vertical choice-of-law 
analysis today.396 But Guaranty Trust is important for another reason. 
In the first several pages of the opinion, Justice Frankfurter 
unequivocally extended the Erie principle to federal cases in which 
equitable remedies were sought.397 Guaranty Trust finally eviscerated 
the federal uniform equity doctrine, largely ending equity’s reign as a 
distinctive site of nonstate, judge-made law in federal diversity 
jurisdiction cases.398 
 
state statutes or state decisions “with respect to equitable ‘remedial rights.’” Id. With respect to 
substantive law, the court provided a more equivocal description, contending on the one hand 
that “as to substantive rights, a federal court sitting in equity, in a suit where jurisdiction rests on 
diversity of citizenship, must apply state statutes and, usually, state decisions,” id., and on the 
other hand that, under Swift, “federal courts, in diversity cases, [were required to] follow state 
decisions except where there is no pertinent state statute and where a question of ‘general law’ 
is involved,” id. at 522. As described previously, the application of substantive nonstate equity 
principles in federal court predated Swift—as the Swift Court acknowledged—but by 1944, that 
was irrelevant, as the Supreme Court in Ruhlin had made clear that, with respect to substantive 
law, the Erie principle applied in federal equity cases. See Ruhlin, 304 U.S. at 205; supra Part 
I.B.2.c. 
 395. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“[T]he intent of [Erie] was to 
insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the 
diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be 
substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be 
if tried in State court.”). 
 396. The centrality of Guaranty Trust to the Erie doctrine has been acknowledged for some 
time. See Philip B. Kurland, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 67 HARV. L. REV. 906, 
907 (1954) (book review) (suggesting the renaming of the Erie doctrine to reflect the 
importance of Guaranty Trust). 
 397. Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 99–108. 
 398. The early-nineteenth-century federal equity cases are not completely without force, as 
they continue to animate modern interpretations of the Court’s equity powers by defining the 
limits of the federal courts’ remedial powers under FED. R. CIV. P. 64. See Grupo Mexicano de 
Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 332–33 (1999) (“Because such a 
remedy was historically unavailable from a court in equity, we hold that the District Court had 
no authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing petitioners from disposing of their 
assets pending adjudication of respondents’ contract claim for money damages.”); Judith 
Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. 
L.J. 223, 234–35 (2003) (discussing the Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, 527 U.S. 308 (1999), 
opinion and how the Court relied on history in forming its decision). Others have shown how 
traditional equity doctrines remain a powerful source of remedial authority in the context of 
federal question cases, and particularly in the context of constitutional litigation. See, e.g., John 
Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 990 (2008) (“Anti-suit injunctions have been a 
staple of equity for centuries, so the injunction approved in [Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908),] did not rest on a novel cause of action derived from the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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It is unfortunate that the first portion of the Guaranty Trust 
opinion is generally given so little attention in casebooks and legal 
scholarship, as it illustrates rather starkly the problems facing jurists 
who strive to provide a seamless historical account of federal judicial 
power even as they abandon past practices. Rather than concede that 
the opinion marked a significant—even seismic—change, Justice 
Frankfurter disavowed the existence of a long history of federal 
judicial “power [in equity] to deny substantive rights created by State 
law or to create substantive rights denied by State law.”399 Instead, he 
explained, “federal courts, in the long course of their history, have not 
differentiated in their regard for State law between actions at law and 
suits in equity.”400 Frankfurter’s rather liberal treatment of the history 
of federal equity power enabled him to craft a story of continuity 
concerning the metes and bounds of nonstate, judge-made law in the 
federal courts. In his account, the application of Erie to equity cases 
was a natural extension of “the Framers’” vision of the role of the 
federal courts401 and hence a natural extension of Erie’s return to 
timeless limitations on federal judge-made law. 
But just as Justice Brandeis’s turn to history in Erie has been 
called into doubt,402 Justice Frankfurter’s account of early federal 
equity power is similarly suspect.403 It is practically impossible to 
ascertain what source of equity principles the Framers intended to be 
applied in federal court.404 But in the early national period, federal 
courts routinely applied federal and English judge-made equity 
principles. This included, under certain circumstances, application of 
substantive principles in the form of equitable rights, and application 
of equitable remedies in ways that altered state-created rights. 
Archival evidence suggests that Frankfurter and at least one other 
 
 399. Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 105. 
 400. Id. at 103; see also id. at 106–07 (“Whatever contradiction or confusion may be 
produced by a medley of judicial phrases severed from their environment, the body of 
adjudications concerning equitable relief in diversity cases leaves no doubt that federal courts 
enforced State-created substantive rights if the mode of proceeding and remedy were consonant 
with the traditional body of equitable remedies, practice and procedure, and in so doing they 
were enforcing rights created by the States and not arising under any inherent or statutory 
federal law.”). 
 401. Id. at 111. 
 402. See text accompanying notes 55–62. 
 403. Professors William Crosskey and Laura Fitzgerald have also observed Justice 
Frankfurter’s liberal treatment of the history of federal equity power. See CROSSKEY, supra 
note 17, at 878; Fitzgerald, supra note 151, at 1270–72. 
 404. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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Justice were well aware that the Guaranty Trust opinion took 
significant liberties with the historical sources. In his personal file on 
the case, Frankfurter saved a memorandum in which he carefully 
recorded a telephone conversation with Chief Justice Stone. Stone 
commended Frankfurter’s opinion, and particularly his “surgical” 
approach to the historical record: 
I have now read your opinion in the York case and I must say that 
you have performed a considerable surgical operation with great 
delicacy. I say considerable surgical operation because I think that 
there was a good deal more of historical material to clear away than 
the uninformed reader might realize—and you had to deal with it as 
delicately as you did if it was to be avoided in your decision.405 
Chief Justice Stone’s observation concerning Frankfurter’s 
erasure of the history of federal equity power was an understatement. 
One can, however, understand why Justice Frankfurter, a member of 
the Court’s Progressive wing, would seek to diminish federal equity’s 
robust past.406 Faced with the seismic changes of the New Deal period, 
Frankfurter felt compelled to help minimize the federal judiciary’s 
power to block Progressive legislation.407 Not only had the “switch in 
time” ended the Court’s Lochner-era penchant for invalidating 
economic regulation, but as Professor Edward Purcell has explained 
in elegant detail, Erie required federal judges to abandon general 
common law—which often favored corporate interests—for state 
common law—which tended to favor Progressive interests such as 
expanded tort liability for industrial employers and minimum-wage 
laws.408 Given that equitable injunctions, in particular, had become a 
means of suppressing labor strikes and generally controlling 
organized labor—a fact that Frankfurter had chronicled in depth 
during his years as a law professor409—Guaranty Trust gave him an 
opportunity to limit such uses of federal equity power by requiring 
federal courts to conform to state law in equity cases.410 
 
 405. Memorandum of Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 17, 1945), Papers of Felix Frankfurter, 
Harvard Law Library, Series 7, Subseries G, Paige Box #12, No. 264 (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 406. See PURCELL, supra note 390, at 208–09. 
 407. See id. 
 408. See id. at 141–64. 
 409. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); see 
also PURCELL, supra note 390, at 70–77. 
 410. Justice Frankfurter was by no means a solo actor in the effort to defeat federal equity 
power during the New Deal period. Other opponents of robust federal equity power were 
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In disclaiming the long history of federal uniform equity and the 
attendant authority to apply nonstate, judge-made decisional 
principles, Justice Frankfurter also made space for his particular 
vision of the federal courts. This vision was consistent with the 
modern institutional structure of the federal courts that Congress had 
finally anointed through important judicial-reform legislation. By 
1945, the federal courts were no longer a fledgling system of far-flung 
federal emissaries and Supreme Court Justices navigating streams to 
bring justice to every man’s door. In 1869 and 1891 Congress finally 
created several circuit judgeships to alleviate the circuit-riding 
burdens and improve access to federal circuit courts.411 Importantly, in 
1875, Congress made the existence of a federal question an 
independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction.412 In 1934, Congress 
enacted the Rules Enabling Act, endowing the Supreme Court with 
broad procedural rulemaking authority and creating a process by 
which such rules would be drafted and then ratified by Congress.413 
And in 1938, the Supreme Court, empowered by Congress, approved 
the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.414 When Guaranty Trust 
was decided, therefore, the federal courts were a highly organized and 
structured system of elite judges supported by significant staffs of 
lawyers and nonlawyers.415 
Given this massive institutional transition from the early 
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century—a transition that 
Frankfurter and James Landis examined in great detail in The 
 
essential to the larger mission. For example, Woolhandler and Collins explain that Justice Hugo 
Black “campaigned relentlessly to reduce the role of federal equity in the area of economic 
regulation and elsewhere by developing abstention doctrines that required federal courts to 
dismiss suits that were clearly within their equitable jurisdiction.” Woolhandler & Collins, supra 
note 150, at 681. Unsurprisingly, Justice Black joined Frankfurter’s opinion in Guaranty Trust. 
 411. See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44 (creating nine circuit judgeships). In 1891, 
Congress established permanent federal courts of appeals. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891 (Evarts Act), 
ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
 412. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 474. 
 413. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2072–2074 (2006)). For a discussion of the Act’s origins, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1043–98 (1982). 
 414. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 970–73 (1987). 
 415. Professor Judith Resnik provides a searching examination of the growing 
organizational and lobbying capacity of the federal courts in the early twentieth century. See 
Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 924, 959 (2000) (“With the creation of the Conference of Senior Appellate 
Judges in 1922, the potential for the judiciary to speak as an institution emerged.”). 
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Business of the Supreme Court416—there was no longer a pressing 
need to secure uniformity in the federal courts through uniform 
equity. Instead, every reason existed to push for federal equity’s 
diminution. According to Frankfurter, diversity jurisdiction was 
becoming increasingly outmoded, especially when it allowed federal 
judges to meddle with matters that he considered to be reserved to 
state and federal legislatures. Well before Erie was decided, 
Frankfurter criticized Swift as “mischievous in its consequences, 
baffling in its application, untenable in theory, and . . . a perversion of 
the purposes of the framers of the First Judiciary Act.”417 
Seventeen years after writing those words, Justice Frankfurter 
was assigned to draft the opinion in Guaranty Trust and was thus 
given an opportunity to further erode the significance of diversity 
jurisdiction by fully extending the Erie principle in equity. Hence, in 
Guaranty Trust, Frankfurter dismissed a long line of precedent that 
suggested a different view of federal equity power and once again 
credited his vision of the limited role of federal courts to “the 
Framers.”418 Frankfurter’s invocation of the Framers in Guaranty 
Trust is particularly notable given that two years earlier he had 
accused other Justices of “finding in [their] own personal views the 
purposes of the Founders.”419 But in Guaranty Trust, the Founders’ 
purposes—as Frankfurter presented them—would help further 
minimize the significance of diversity jurisdiction and clear the way 
for the outcome determinative principle.420 
Viewed in historical perspective, however, the outcome-
determinative analysis represented a complete inversion of the 
principles that had governed federal equity power in the early 
national period. As per the traditional restrictions on courts of equity, 
equity jurisdiction did not attach unless no adequate or complete 
 
 416. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 19. 
 417. Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State 
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 526 (1928); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the 
Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of the Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 679, 700 (1999) (discussing “Frankfurter’s well-known opposition to diversity and his 
powerful attacks on the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson”). 
 418. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111–12 (1945) (“The Framers of the 
Constitution . . . entertained apprehensions lest distant suitors be subjected to local bias in State 
courts . . . . And so Congress afforded out-of-State litigants another tribunal, not another body 
of law.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 419. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 666 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
 420. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
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legal remedy was available.421 And once the general principle was 
transposed into the federal system, equity was by its very nature 
outcome determinative vis-à-vis state law. Given this traditional 
function of federal equity power, Justice Frankfurter had a choice 
when explaining his new outcome determinative principle. He could 
either minimize the long history of uniform nonstate equity, or he 
could acknowledge Guaranty Trust as a dramatic break from 
precedent and past practice. The former was apparently the easier 
course of action. 
The point to be made is not that Guaranty Trust was wrongly 
decided as a matter of modern judicial policy, or that Justice 
Frankfurter was disingenuous in drafting the opinion. Rather, the 
goal is to underscore the extent to which the intellectual and 
discursive conventions of legal practice push judges and lawyers to 
account for doctrinal development in ways that call on historical 
sources as authority, while simultaneously reconstituting those 
sources to reflect modern legal norms and policies.422 The Framers, in 
this convention, often function not as a source of precedent, but as a 
source of “timeless elements out of a past that [are] assumed to be 
‘correct’ or ‘providential’ . . . or ‘clear,’” infusing a judicial opinion 
with the aura of inevitability and certitude.423 
In the case of Guaranty Trust, as in judicial discourse generally, 
masking the transformative nature of certain judicial opinions has the 
salubrious effect of enhancing the appearance of law’s stability and 
consistency.424 Erie and Guaranty Trust announced a return to the 
Framers’ wise design, and Swift and its progeny were a departure 
from that design that resulted from institutional- and economic-power 
distortions and misguided jurisprudential thought. Seen in this light, 
Erie may have marked an “avulsive change,” but it was a change that 
inevitably amounted to no change at all. Instead, it returned the 
 
 421. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 422. For an eloquent discussion of this general trend, coincidentally focusing on the judicial 
craftsmanship of Justice Frankfurter, see Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary 
Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201 (1990), and see also Horwitz, supra note 23. 
 423. Ferguson, supra note 422, at 215. 
 424. See KALMAN, supra note 389, at 180 (“[A]uthors of lawyers’ legal history value text, 
continuity, and prescription.”); Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Contingency of the Role of 
History, 90 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 (1981) (“By and large, the dominant tradition in Anglo-
American legal scholarship today is unhistorical. It attempts to find universal rationalizing 
principles.”). 
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federal judiciary to the timeless institutional arrangements 
implemented by our prescient eighteenth-century ancestors. 
By analyzing the history of judge-made law in the federal courts 
through the lens of equity, however, we see that the story is not one 
of stasis or return. Rather, it is a story of change. Given what Justice 
Frankfurter believed to be at stake in Guaranty Trust, it is little 
wonder that he sought to limit the precedential force of over a 
century of case law that could be used to support the exercise of 
nonstate equitable principles by federal judges. However, his 
description of the history of federal equity should not be understood 
as a declaration of an unalterable truth about federal judicial power. 
Nor should it be viewed as the restoration of the original meaning of 
Article III or the Rules of Decision Act through further repudiation 
of Swift v. Tyson. It should instead be understood as a product of 
significant shifts in the political and ideological alignment of the 
Supreme Court and of the changed institutional needs and capacities 
of the federal judicial system. 
 
